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Preface(von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1947; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Kahneman, 1992)
Most everyday economic decisions involve uncertainty. Returns from investing in new
technologies, such as machines or seeds, as part of small businesses, strongly depend
on exogenous stochastic variables, such as weather conditions or non-verifiable qualities.
Other practical examples include purchasing insurance, buying stocks, and investing in
other financial products, which can be modeled as bets between the customer and the
insurer, company or financial institution, respectively.
In economics, Expected Utility Theory is still widely used to explain choices under un-
certainty, as formally specified by John von Neumann and Oscar Morgenstern in their
1947 book on game theory. Although theoretically appealing from a normative perspec-
tive, experimental economists identified numerous behavioral irregularities which cannot
be accommodated in the expected utility framework. The common consequence and
common ratio effects (also known as Allais’ Paradox; Allais, 1953), the certainty effect
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1986), loss aversion (Kahneman and Tversky, 1984; Tversky
and Kahneman, 1991), and preference reversals (Tversky et al., 1990) are among the
most prominent examples for such violations. Theoretical advancements, foremost (cu-
mulative) Prospect Theory, proposed by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky (1979,
1992), followed by Rank-dependent Expected Utility Theory (Quiggin, 1982, 1993), offer
a descriptive formalization of such behavioral biases as rational choice.
In order to understand individual preferences in uncertain settings a distinction between
risk and ambiguity is particularly necessary, as postulated by Frank Knight (1921) and
John M. Keynes (1921). While risky prospects involve probabilities and outcomes which
are exactly known, ambiguous prospects refer to unknown probability distributions. Initi-
ated by the seminal experiments by Daniel Ellsberg (1961), many studies documented that
people often prefer risky to ambiguous events, but might also be ambiguity seeking under
other circumstances. Such behavioral biases are relevant in many practical applications,
where individuals trade risk against ambiguity: investors might compare stocks to fixed-
income products, or domestic to foreign assets; individuals might substitute insurance by
(ambiguous) self-protection measures; and patients might waver between well-proven and
new, but not fully approved, medical treatments.
Another problem of traditional accounts of decision-making under uncertainty is the com-
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mon individualistic framework in economic theory. Yet, many empirical studies high-
lighted the role of others in individual choice. Suitably, already in the early 80’s, Robert
J. Shiller wrote that “investing in speculative assets is a social activity” (Shiller, 1984, p.
457).
Peer effects reflect differences in behavior of the very same individual observed in isolation
from any others, compared to a social setting in which interaction with others is possible.
Peer effects have received great attention in the psychological and economic literature, and
are prevalent in various environments, ranging from effort provision in the workplace (e.g.,
Falk and Ichino, 2006) and pro-social behavior (e.g., Ga¨chter et al., 2013), to performance
in education (e.g., Sacerdote, 2001). In this dissertation I particularly focus on peer effects
in decision-making under uncertainty, where one may think about how feedback about
others might influence one’s own investment strategies, take-up of loans, or purchases of
insurance policies.
There are multiple reasons why peers may influence individual choices, inter alia three
key rationales which refer to distributional concerns, to a taste to conform to others, and
to information. The most important attempts to understand the influence of others on
individual choice in economics are probably based on the concepts of outcome-based social
preferences, as introduced in the seminal contributions by Ernst Fehr and Klaus Schmidt
(1999) and Gary Bolton and Axel Ockenfels (2000). Such models may incorporate non-
selfish individuals who dislike inequitable outcomes, and thereby accommodate feelings
caused by social comparison, such as envy or jealousy. Yet, other-regarding preferences
do not necessarily depend on comparison of outcomes. Conformism, as established in
social psychology (see e.g., Festinger, 1954; Cialdini and Goldstein, 2004), describes that
individuals generally wish to conform to“social”decision anchors, independent of outcome
comparisons. The experiment of Solomon Asch (1956) is just one well-known example that
demonstrates how easily individuals might follow the crowd. Finally, theories of social
learning assume that choices of others might convey information, which may particularly
matter in settings of asymmetric information. In developing countries, many people just
gain access to financial markets, may be inexperienced with finance, or even illiterate. But
even in developed economies, the diversity of financial products in (developed) financial
markets portrays an increased complexity of economic decisions. Basically, learning from
others might seem advantageous when decision-making appears difficult.
Understanding whether these three rationales actually drive peer effects in risk taking is
of utmost importance in many respects. A spread of investments in high-risk products
in societies initiated, e.g., through word-of-mouth recommendations or comparisons with
others, might be undesirable from a policy perspective. The large trading volume of
financial assets, such as derivatives which became a common investment even in traditional
banking, plainly demonstrates potential adverse effects on individuals’ safety nets. On
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the contrary, policy makers may also be interested in the spread of particular behavior,
and they might be able to employ social measures, for example, to leverage the demand
for microinsurance in developing countries.
This dissertation consists of five essays on individual decision-making under risk and am-
biguity, and social interaction. All of them are based on laboratory experiments which
are nowadays well established in economic research, since they allow to draw causal infer-
ences from exogenous treatment variations to behavior. In the context of this dissertation,
experiments provide the central tool to elicit context-free individual preferences, and to
identify peer effects through clean variations in the decision-making environment.
Chapters 1 and 2 deal with decision-making under risk. We examine different sources
of peer effects in risk taking in the first chapter, and study how differences in attitudes
towards risk might relate to social relationships in the second chapter. Chapters 3 and 4
focus on decision-making under ambiguity. In the third chapter, we picture an anatomy
of ambiguity attitudes in accordance to different outcome domains and probability distri-
butions. How peer effects might influence ambiguity attitudes is examined in the fourth
chapter. Chapter 5 provides a test of the theory of Team Reasoning. This chapter goes
beyond individual decision-making, but parallels the previous chapters in that we focus
on decision-making in teams, where social interaction is inevitable.
In the first chapter, which is joint work with Marta Serra-Garcia, we study peer effects in
risk taking. In particular, we test whether peer effects can be explained by preferences over
others’ payoffs, preferences over others’ choices, or both. We thereby contribute to the
theoretical and experimental literature which has devoted most attention to distributional
social preferences as an explanation for imitative behavior.
We design an experiment in which subjects make a series of risky choices between simple
binary lotteries. Eliciting choices individually and again in groups of two subjects, a
decision maker and his peer, allows us to cleanly identify peer effects which we define
as strategies by which a decision maker chooses not to stay with his individual choice.
Across three treatments we either allow the peer to choose among lotteries, we randomly
allocate her a lottery, or we ask her to make a random draw which is completely unrelated
to the lotteries or payoffs.1 We then elicit the decision maker’s choice conditional on the
peer’s choice, allocation, or random outcome. In order to asses how peer effects shape
individual behavior, additionally to a quantitative assessment, we use the strategy method.
This allows us to distinguish between four feasible (pure) strategies: to imitate and to
deviate from the peer (conditional strategies), and to change and to keep the individual
choice, both irrespective of the peer’s choice, allocation or random outcome (unconditional
strategies).
1In all chapters of this dissertation I refer to a decision maker as “he”. In this chapter, we additionally
refer to the peer as “she”.
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Our results reveal two essential findings. First, somewhat surprisingly, the possibility to
condition on a peer’s allocated lottery does not lead to stronger peer effects than the
possibility to condition on an unrelated outcome of the peer. This may reflect indifferent
preferences to some extent, but it also suggests that the mere possibility of conditional
choices already induces changes in individual behavior. At the same time, decision makers
are equally likely to play an imitation and deviation strategy with respect to the unrelated
outcome (where imitation and deviation is defined rather arbitrarily), but they are signifi-
cantly more likely to imitate the lottery allocated to the peer. This strongly indicates that
– conditional on being affected by the peer’s presence – decision makers exhibit relative
payoff concerns which are such that imitation is optimal. Second, peer effects increase
significantly when the peer chooses instead of being randomly allocated a lottery, and the
frequency of imitation almost doubles. This clearly demonstrates that choices of peers
matter, above and beyond their direct impact on payoffs.
Why is this the case? We elaborate on two possibilities. First, relative payoff concerns
might change if peers actively choose. Intention-based models of social preferences, for
example, suggest that a feeling of envy may increase if peers are accountable for their
decisions. And fairness considerations may reinforce this feeling when peers choose a
relatively safe option.2 Alternatively, following the ideas of social comparison theory
(Festinger, 1954), choices of peers might be perceived as a decision anchor and measure for
“correctness”, thereby inducing a norm to conform to others’ behavior. Both models allow
us to derive testable predictions on comparative statics and can be structurally estimated.
Overall, we find that our data is at odds with a flexible specification of relative payoff
concerns, but consistent with a norm of conformism.
Our study is one of the first to distinguish between outcome-based and choice-based social
preferences as explanations for peer effects in risk taking. Our main contribution is to
show that peer effects in risk taking cannot only be explained by relative payoff concerns,
and, hence, to demonstrate that a parsimonious explanation of preference interactions
in risk taking needs to allow active or passive choices to matter. Beyond research, our
results also have important implications for the spread of risky behavior in a society.
They suggest that communicating others’ risky choices may have large consequences even
if everyone is equally well informed. At the same time, the perception of accountability
– for example, whether peers chose their pension plans on their own responsibility or
simply benefit from company policies – might crucially influence imitative behavior and
the effectiveness of providing social decision anchors. Campaigns that endow individuals
with financial products to leverage demand, such as obligatory insurance which is bundled
with take-up of loans in developing countries, may only have limited success.
2Intention-based models of social preferences were proposed, for example, by Blount (1995) or Bolton
et al. (2005). Fairness consideration in risk taking were examined by, e.g., Cappelen et al. (2013).
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The second chapter, which is joint work with Marta Serra-Garcia, Ben D’Exelle, and Arjan
Verschoor, also contributes to the literature on risk taking, by linking risk attitudes to
social relationships. More precisely, we examine whether the pervasiveness of interpersonal
conflict between two individuals is related to differences in their attitudes towards risk.
This study builds on fieldwork in more than thirty villages of rural Uganda, in which
we conducted a survey to identify social relationships on a village level and to gather
socio-economic information, followed by an experiment to elicit risk attitudes. We focus
on a society, the Bagisu people, which historically suffered from violent conflicts among
each other, as well as severe hierarchical and gender ideals.3 Of course, interrogating
about conflictual disputes among village members required a particularly sensitive design
of questionnaires.
Linking individual attitudes towards risk to conflictual disputes seems straightforward
in many settings, especially in developing countries. In these regions, investments in
the context of farming, for example, are often made jointly by groups, and investments
yield only uncertain returns, given unsteady weather conditions and risks inherited in
new technologies. Differences in the willingness to take risks might hinder agreements
in bargaining over investments into new machines, seeds, or other technologies. Other
examples include informal risk-sharing arrangements (IRSAs) in case the investment goes
wrong; and gifts or informal loans to help finance an investment, often with an expectation
of reciprocity.
Our analysis reveals a persistent and significant relationship between the presence of
conflict and differences in risk attitudes, controlling for other relevant individual and
pair characteristics. Interestingly, this relationship is particularly strong among kin and
between males. But since the composition of rural villages, with respect to distributions
of risk attitudes and the presence of conflicts, cannot be exogenously changed, our results
cannot be interpreted as causal evidence. Yet, using a simulation approach, we argue that
the relationship seems to be of causal nature, in the sense that differences in risk attitudes
directly increase the likelihood for interpersonal conflict, instead of vice versa. Given that
we only documented social links between participants from the same village, out of which
only one pair reports not to be acquainted, we extrapolate our analysis to links between
individuals who are very unlikely to know each other by randomly generating links across
villages. If conflicts are likely to severe social relationships, as a result of which risk
attitudes might diverge, then differences in risk attitudes should be similar across random
and conflict links. However, we show that this is not the case. Our results are also robust
against selection effects, given that we do not find that risk attitudes are per se correlated
to conflict or personal attributes which are related to the exposure of conflict.
To our knowledge, we are the first to study the determinants of interpersonal conflict in
3Suzette Heald (1998) provides an excellent account about the Ugandan society and the Bagisu people.
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the microeconomics literature which rather focuses on friendships or generally positive
social ties, relative to links with only little or no depth. In that sense, we provide novel
evidence on how fragile interpersonal relationships might be under heterogeneity in risk
attitudes, particularly among individuals who are likely to be involved in joint economic
decisions. Our results may help us understand future conflict between groups, including
small societies, kin or teams in organizations. Especially in developing countries, people
in small-scale societies are tied through informal financial arrangements in myriad ways,
which may imply a tremendous scope for disagreement, and if not settled, for conflict.
The third chapter is joint work with Martin Kocher and Stefan Trautmann and estab-
lishes the step from decision-making under risk to decision-making under ambiguity. This
work is motivated by an overwhelming number of experimental papers that document
varying ambiguity attitudes in different settings, and theoretical papers that mostly as-
sume a generally negative attitude towards ambiguity. Daniel Ellsberg (1961) was the
first, followed by many other experimentalists, to cleanly document that individuals tend
to exhibit ambiguity aversion if presented with lotteries in the domain of moderate like-
lihood gain events. Theoretically, ambiguity aversion was proposed to explain the equity
premium puzzle, a home bias of investors, or low take-up rates of genetic tests.4 However,
for unlikely events and losses, experimentalists also found ambiguity seeking, and report
rather limited evidence for mixed domain events. In terms of applicability, as with regard
to stock market performance or consequences of testing certain medical treatments, out-
comes likely refer to gain and loss events, and (objective and subjective) probabilities are
not necessarily of moderate size.
Yet, experimental papers mainly measured ambiguity attitudes in very particular settings,
i.e., only a few documented attitudes for gains and losses, as well as for small and moder-
ate probabilities at the same time. In particular, the fact that elicitations methods vary
considerably across studies, inhibits to picture a clean anatomy of ambiguity attitudes.
This is exactly what we aim for. We contribute to the literature on decision-making under
ambiguity by collecting a rich dataset on individual attitudes, in the most common com-
binations of outcome and likelihood distributions. In our experiment, we elicit ambiguity
attitudes of roughly 500 subjects across seven treatments, for prospects over gains, losses,
or mixed outcomes, involving small or moderate likelihoods, respectively.
Unambiguously, our findings confirm the conjecture that ambiguity aversion is by far
not the predominant attitude. At a first glance, we replicate the persistency of ambiguity
aversion in the standard Ellsberg setting, while we also find evidence for ambiguity seeking,
particularly for small likelihoods. Digging a bit deeper into preferences, we find that
a substantial fraction of subjects in fact exhibits preferences close to neutrality. But
abstracting from those lets the typical fourfold pattern of ambiguity attitudes unfold: we
4See Collard et al. (2011); Epstein and Miao (2003); Hoy et al. (2014), for an example, respectively.
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observe a reflection effect between gains and losses, with ambiguity aversion (seeking) for
moderate gain (loss) events as well as for low likelihood loss (gain) events. Results on
mixed domains further suggest the existence of ambiguity seeking.
It was in fact Daniel Ellsberg (2011) himself, on the occasion of his article’s 50th anniver-
sary, who argued that the fear of a bad unknown probability might be an artifact of the
particular experimental setting. Consistently, our results strongly suggest that ambiguity
seeking will empirically be equally relevant as ambiguity aversion, especially in situations
in which people might hope for better odds by choosing the ambiguous alternative.
In the fourth chapter I examine ambiguity attitudes and whether feedback about others’
choices provides an anchor for individual decisions, thereby linking the first and the third
chapter. In contrast to the first chapter in which we examined specific social preferences
behind peer effects in risk taking, I here particularly focus on whether peer effects may
depend on characteristics of the ambiguous setting.
Numerous field studies documented peer effects in economic decisions characterized by
ambiguity. But although identifying dynamics in ambiguity attitudes and their (social)
determinants is hard in the field, laboratory studies mainly studied determinants of peer
effects in risky settings. Yet, given a body of theory which explains suboptimal economic
decisions by ambiguity aversion, e.g., in finance or health, understanding how such atti-
tudes and biases in probabilistic sophistication might be affected by others, has important
implications.
Following the experimental design from the third chapter, ambiguity attitudes are elicited
in the standard Ellsberg setting with moderate likelihoods, individually in a first part,
and again in a second part. Between subjects, I vary whether participants learn previous
choices of a peer when making their choices a second time (which I label a social anchor),
and whether prospects are defined over gains or losses. Building on documented patterns
of ambiguity attitudes with respect to outcome domains (as supported in the previous
chapter), this design allows me to study how peer effects differ according to initial attitudes
and outcome frames.
My analysis reveals one key finding, that is, individual dynamics and peer effects in
ambiguity attitudes considerably differ between the domains of gains and losses. In the
domain of gains, learning to be more ambiguity averse than a peer significantly increases
the likelihood to change, relative to having no social anchor available. Also, decision
makers tend to imitate their peer’s attitude, towards ambiguity aversion, seeking, or
neutrality. In the domain of losses, in contrast, learning to exhibit exactly the same
attitude as a peer significantly reduces the likelihood to change, relative to an individual
condition. In this case, I predominantly observe shifts towards neutrality, however, such
movements even exists if a social anchor is not available. This suggests that ambiguity
seeking might not be particularly robust in the long run. But generally, the relative
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ambiguity attitude, i.e., the ambiguity attitude compared to the peer’s, matters, although
differently depending on the outcome domain. Further, the provision of a social anchor
ultimately induces ambiguity neutrality on the aggregate level.
Models on rational learning might suggest that Bayesian decision makers converge to-
wards ambiguity neutral preferences, and two experimental studies by Keck et al. (2011)
and Charness et al. (2013), who examine changes in ambiguity attitudes after face-to-face
consultation with others, validate that social interaction might induce shifts towards am-
biguity neutrality. In contrast, social preferences models on conformism or distributional
concerns might generally predict imitative shifts towards the peer’s attitude. My findings
provide evidence for both lines of argument, but they particularly corroborate the conjec-
ture of Keck et al. (2011) and Charness et al. (2013), namely that ambiguity neutrality
may be established as a persuasive argument, at least in the domain of gains.
A project that goes beyond individual decision-making by considering a model of collective
agency, constitutes the fifth chapter of this dissertation, and is joint work with Bernd
Lahno. In this chapter we discuss and experimentally test the theory of Team Reasoning
(TR) as a guide to coordination in common dilemma problems of strategic interaction.
TR was proposed by Robert Sugden (1993, 2000, 2003) and Michael Bacharach (1999,
2006) as an attempt to overcome shortcomings of traditional Rational Choice Theory,
in particular its inability to explain equilibrium selection in simple coordination games.
Often, our common senses suggest an evident strategy to reach coordination, which makes
it even more frustrating that Rational Choice Theory – the central theoretical model
of strategic interaction – neither offers an appropriate solution concept, nor provides a
normative justification of the obvious “rational” route to coordination.
We analyze how TR implements team agency into the theory of rational action, in order
to formalize the idea that individuals often decide from a team perspective, which may
automatically unveil common routes to coordination. Intuitively, everyone should do his
part to achieve the best possible outcome for the group. We elaborate on the fundamen-
tal assumptions adopted from instrumental rationality, showing that TR still inherits the
idea of opportunistic choice, including one important detail: in theory, a team can derive
a decision only on information commonly available, hence, its members should not use
their entire private information. In an experiment in which teams are given a chance to
coordinate on a particular pattern of behavior before a modification of the stage game
offers opportunities to improve on the team goal, we test whether such restrictions are
consistent with actual behavior. Our observations throw considerable doubt on the idea
of opportunistic team reasoning as a guide to coordination. First, we find that individ-
uals tend to stick to accustomed behavioral patterns, while TR categorically denies such
influence of past behavior on future choices. Second, we find significant differences in the
behavior of subjects in accordance with their particular situation, suggesting that indi-
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vidual behavior is at least partly determined by private information, in contradiction to
optimal play from a team perspective.
Why does TR obviously fail, albeit its intuitive plausibility, and although it seems so
appealing as a normative theory of choice? Our results may indicate a misapprehension of
the triggers for reasoning as a team, rather than a misconception of TR as such. According
to Bacharach, acting as a “teamer” requires team identification; Sugden additionally adds
that “teamers” need mutual assurance that their peers reason in the same way. We argue
that both conditions are not sufficiently exclusive, and too easily fulfilled. Our discussion
also highlights that TR does not ascribe the reasoning process itself to collectives, but to
each individual’s mind. Without doubt, modeling collectives agency is hard theoretically.
But teams might act in their own momentum: peers communicate and collaborate, such
that the team itself would constitute the agent who actually makes a decision.
All five chapters are self-contained in the sense that they include their own introductions
and can be read independently. The respective appendices are attached in chronological
order to the end of the fifth chapter, and contain the instructions of the experimental
protocols as well as supplementary figures and tables.
Chapter 1
Peer Effects in Risk Taking∗
1.1 Introduction
Decision-making under risk is mainly studied at the individual level. Yet, an increasing
body of research documents peer effects in risk taking. Peers have a large impact on
stock market participation (e.g., Shiller, 1984; Hong et al., 2004), investment decisions
(Bursztyn et al., 2014) and insurance choices (Cai et al., forthcoming), among others.1
A main source of peer effects are preference interactions, in the terminology proposed by
Manski (2000), whereby individual preferences depend on the actions of others.2 A key
open question is, how do preferences depend on others? Which factors matter?
As Manski (2000) writes, preference interactions may arise from “everyday ideas” such as
envy or conformism. In other words, in environments with complete information, peer ef-
fects may be generated because individuals care about other’s outcomes (envy) or because
they care about other’s choices (conformism), or both. Much attention in the literature
on peer effects has been given to envy, a central concept in models of distributional so-
cial preferences.3 These types of preferences have been used to explain peer effects in
risk taking, for example, in asset pricing (e.g., Gal´ı, 1994; Gebhardt, 2004, 2011). Less
attention has been given to preferences where the choices of peers, irrespective of their
externalities on outcomes, have a direct impact on an individual’s behavior. A central
rationale why choices may matter is provided by studies in social psychology, which show
∗This chapter is based on joint work with Marta Serra-Garcia.
1Peers might generally influence risk and other economic attitudes (Ahern et al., forthcoming). Peers
also affect credit decisions (e.g., Banerjee et al., 2013; Georgarakos et al., 2013), savings decisions (e.g.,
Duflo and Saez, 2002; Kast et al., 2012) as well as different teenager (risky) behaviors (for an overview, see
Sacerdote, 2011). Generally, peer effects are important in education (e.g., Sacerdote, 2001; Duflo et al.,
2011), in labor (e.g., Falk and Ichino, 2006; Mas and Moretti, 2009; Card et al., 2010), and pro-social
behavior (e.g., Ga¨chter et al., 2013).
2See Manski (2000) for an overview of the sources of social interaction effects, which include market
interactions, expectations interactions and preference interactions.
3Different models of distributional preferences have been proposed in the literature, for example, by
Fehr and Schmidt (1999), and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) (for a survey, see Camerer, 2003; Fehr and
Schmidt, 2006).
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that individuals are often driven by a norm to conform to others’ behavior (e.g., Cialdini
and Trost, 1998; Cialdini and Goldstein, 2004). In models of conformity, others’ choices
provide a social anchor to which individuals conform (Festinger, 1954). However, most
existing studies on risk taking focus on the effect of outcome comparisons: in the typical
settings peers either do not choose, or their payoffs and choices are directly linked. Hence,
one cannot distinguish between explanations for peer effects based solely on distributional
social preferences and those that allow choices to matter. This paper examines peer effects
in simple decisions under risk and tests whether these can be explained by preferences
over others’ payoffs, preferences over others’ choices, or both. The main contribution
is to show that peer choices play a significant role and, hence, that peer effects (in our
environment) can only be explained by a combination of preferences over others’ payoffs
and choices.
To be able to cleanly identify peer effects, we use a controlled lab experiment in which
individuals make risky choices, first individually and then in groups of two.4 One player
is assigned to be the first mover (peer) and the other the second mover (decision maker).
Risky choices are made between two simple lotteries, with at most two outcomes and same
probabilities, and there is complete information.5 We examine behavior in three main
treatments. In the first treatment, the peer chooses among lotteries (Choice treatment).
In the second treatment, the peer is randomly allocated a lottery (Rand treatment). In the
third treatment, as a control, the peer is asked to make a random draw, an act completely
unrelated to lotteries or payoffs. Since there are only two equally-likely outcomes, we refer
to this as the Coin treatment.
A further question we address is how decision-making changes in the presence of peers.
Depending on the type of preference interaction, peer effects may lead to imitation or
deviation (Clark and Oswald, 1998). To identify the direction of peer effects, as well as
to avoid feedback effects, we elicit the decision maker’s choices conditional on the peer’s
choice, allocation or unrelated act. This allows us to observe four different strategies.
The decision maker may condition his choice on the peer’s choice, allocation or act, by
either imitating or deviating.6 Or the decision maker may choose not to condition. In
this case he either makes the same or changes the choice that he made individually, both
being irrespective of the peer’s choice, allocation or act. We say peer effects occur if the
decision maker chooses not to stay with his individual choice.7
4See Manski (1993) for a discussion of the problems with the identification of peer (or social interac-
tion) effects.
5We label one lottery as riskier than the other, in terms of variance.
6In Coin, the definition of imitation and deviation is arbitrary, as the decision maker cannot condition
on the lottery of the peer but an unrelated random outcome, odd or even, as we detail below.
7We define peer effects with special respect to our experimental setting. We may, for example, also
define peer effects in terms of imitation and deviation, in which case our main results would still hold.
However, since decision makers are confronted with a peer in every treatment, we use the most careful
definition of peer effects.
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Our results show that peer effects differ significantly when the peer is allocated a lottery
compared to when he chooses a lottery, though payoffs remain constant across treatments.
Decision makers choose not to stay with their individual choices in 18% of the cases in
Rand, and in 33% of the cases in Choice, i.e., peer effects almost double. Hence, choices
of the peer matter, above and beyond their direct impact on payoffs. Second, peer effects
are not significantly different between Rand and Coin, where decision makers change their
individual choices in 17% of the cases. Thus, somewhat surprisingly, the possibility to
condition on a peer’s allocated lottery does not lead to stronger peer effects than the
possibility to condition on an unrelated act of the peer.
In Coin and Rand, decision makers exhibit a similar likelihood to condition their choices
on the peer. However, while they are equally likely to imitate or deviate in Coin, they
are significantly more likely to imitate in Rand. This indicates that, conditional on being
affected by the peer’s presence, individuals seem to exhibit preferences over others’ payoffs
and, in particular, these are such that individuals prefer to imitate their peers. From Rand
to Choice, the increase in peer effects mainly stems from a significant increase in the
frequency of imitation. Hence, in our environment, peer effects cannot only be explained
by concerns about others’ payoffs relative to own. This implies that a parsimonious
explanation of preference interactions in risk taking needs to allow peer choices to matter.
We examine two alternative explanations for why peer choices matter. First, one may
consider a more flexible specification of distributional preferences, by which these change
depending on whether the peer makes choices or not. Intention-based models of social
preferences (e.g., Blount, 1995; Bolton et al., 2005) and studies of fairness considerations
in risk taking (e.g., Cappelen et al., 2013) suggest that the strength of relative payoff
concerns might depend on whether the peer actually makes a choice and, if so, whether
she chooses to take on more or less risk than the decision maker. We examine whether
this can explain the increase in peer effects from Rand to Choice by deriving predictions
on comparative statics across treatments under such assumptions. First, we consider an
increase in envy, i.e., the disutility from falling behind the peer, when the peer makes
choices. This would increase the likelihood of imitation and, at the same time, increase
the importance of expected payoff differences between lotteries, as these are relevant for
(expected) payoff comparisons. We also examine the possibility that, when peers make
choices, individuals especially dislike falling behind a peer who makes a safe choice. In
this case, when the peer chooses among lotteries, we should observe a stronger increase
in imitation towards the safer compared to the riskier lottery.
A second, alternative explanation for the increase in peer effects is, broadly speaking, that
individuals are influenced by a norm to conform to others. More specifically, according
to Festinger’s (1954) theory of social comparison, individuals care about making correct
choices and, in the absence of objective measures of correctness, consider others’ choices
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as an anchor for correctness. Hence, if individuals exhibit such a preference to conform,
peer choices should matter. They should increase the likelihood of imitation in Choice
and this increase should not systematically depend on the type of lottery, risky or safe,
or its expected payoff.
Given there was complete information, peer effects in our experiment cannot be explained
by a model of rational social learning (e.g., Bikhchandani et al., 1998).8 In the presence of
complete information, under standard assumptions of rationality and self-interest, decision
makers do not learn from others.9
Our results reveal that the increase in imitation from Rand to Choice occurs both towards
safer and riskier lotteries. At the same time, the expected payoffs of the lotteries do not
play a systematic role in the increase in imitation. The latter suggests that the increase
in imitation is not driven by an increase in envy. The former is at odds with an increase
in envy that is dependent on how much risk the peer chooses to take. These findings
are broadly in line with an explanation that choices matter due to a norm to conform to
others. As an additional test, we structurally estimate a model of relative payoff concerns
and a model based on social comparison theory, where individuals derive a constant utility
from conforming to the peer’s choice or allocation. We allow utility parameters to vary
across treatments and find that, under a model of relative payoff concerns, preference
parameters do not change significantly when moving from Rand to Choice. In contrast,
the utility from conforming increases significantly in Choice. The model based on social
comparison theory fits our data significantly better, which provides further suggestive
evidence that a reason why choices of peers matter may be due to a norm to conform to
others.
Recent laboratory experiments have documented peer effects when peers are allocated
lotteries (see Trautmann and Vieider, 2011, for an overview). Bault et al. (2008), Rohde
and Rohde (2011) and Linde and Sonnemans (2012) report that lotteries and outcomes
allocated to peers affect, in varying degrees, individual risky choices and emotions. Our
control treatment, Coin, provides new insights relative to these previous results. It reveals
that unrelated acts of peers may generate equally large peer effects. Allocations of the
peers’ lotteries may hence be seen as affecting the type of peer effect, imitation versus
deviation, conditional on there being a peer effect. Two other related studies show that
8To increase the salience of complete information in our experiment, instructions were read aloud, for
both potential roles in the experiment, and roles were assigned randomly within the same session. Also,
we designed the lotteries to have at most two outcomes to minimize complexity. For a given probability
distribution with respect to the good and bad outcome, we implemented six pairs of lotteries, keeping
the risky lottery fixed. The safe lottery was degenerate for half of choice situations, and involved two
outcomes for the other half. The number of outcomes of the safe lottery, which can be viewed as a
measure of complexity, does not have a significant influence on peer effects.
9However, decision makers who exhibit preferences for conformity may learn about the correctness
of their choice. In the famous experiments on conformity by Asch (1956) individuals conform to peers
choosing an incorrect answer, though individually they are able to identify the correct answer.
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observing either the desired risky choices of others (Viscusi et al., 2011) or their past
choices (Cooper and Rege, 2011) significantly affects risk taking. In Cooper and Rege
(2011) individuals are put in groups of six and provided either with private or social
feedback. The comparative statics reveal that individuals move to safer choices with
social feedback. This suggests that social regret, a form of relative payoff concerns, is a
better explanation for the peer effects in their setting compared to conformity. In line
with their results, we find a similar movement towards safer choices when decision makers
can condition on the peer’s lottery, within each treatment, Rand and Choice. A main
contribution of our study is to show that, over and above relative payoff concerns, the
choices of peers play a significant role. Hence, when modeling preference interactions in
risk taking it may be misguided to focus only on relative payoff concerns.
Our experiment also complements studies testing the channels of peer effects in other
environments. Ga¨chter et al. (2013) and Goeree and Yariv (2007) examine whether peer
effects are driven by distributional social preferences or social norms (or a norm to act like
others), in a gift-exchange game and a social learning environment, respectively. While
Ga¨chter et al. (2013) find that peer effects can be explained by distributional social pref-
erences, Goeree and Yariv (2007) find that conforming behavior cannot be explained
by distributional social preferences, but is consistent with a preference for conformity.10
Additionally, two recent field experiments focus on separating social learning from prefer-
ence interactions. Cai et al. (forthcoming) show that social learning matters most in the
context of rainfall insurance in China, while Bursztyn et al. (2014) find that preference
interactions also play a significant role in investment decisions in Brazil.
In different environments, policy makers as well as private companies may be interested
in influencing risky choices of individuals. In this respect, our findings can be important
from a policy perspective. Our results suggest that whether peers are viewed as having
made choices, e.g., they have actively chosen to buy insurance or to purchase a financial
product, relative to having been endowed or given that same product, may be important
for the spread of risky choices. A specific example are pension plan choices, where peers
may be viewed as having chosen a plan or as following the default plan (under automatic
enrollment).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 1.2 we describe the experi-
mental design and procedures in detail and derive testable hypotheses. Our main results
are presented and discussed in section 1.3. Section 1.4 concludes.
10There are a variety of studies examining social comparison effects in games such as public good
games or coordination games (e.g., Falk and Fischbacher, 2002; Falk et al., 2013). In social learning
environments, C¸elen and Kariv (2004) also study herding behavior, and identify substantial herding
behavior.
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1.2 Experimental design
1.2.1 Treatments
Our experiment elicits multiple choices between two lotteries, A and B, with at most two
possible outcomes. A always has a larger variance than B. We refer to A as the risky
option or lottery, and B as the safe one.11 The exact lotteries are described in section
1.2.2 below.
In the first part of the experiment (Part I), subjects make lottery choices individually. In
the second part (Part II), they make the same choices, but in a different order, and in
groups of two. In each group, one subject is assigned to be first mover and the other to be
second mover.12 We consider a weak form of a peer: The decision maker (second mover)
only knows that the peer (first mover) is a subject in the same session, but she remains
anonymous throughout.13 In Part II risks are perfectly correlated across group members:
a single draw of nature determines the payoffs of both members. Perfect correlation is
common in risk taking environments in which peer effects have been studied. Among
others, risks are perfectly correlated in stock purchases as well as for many investment
products, such as that considered by Bursztyn et al. (2014). They are also almost perfectly
correlated in the weather insurance considered by Cai et al. (forthcoming).14
In our two main treatments the decision maker can condition his choice in Part II on
his peer. In the first treatment (Rand) the peer does not make a decision in Part II,
instead she is exogenously (randomly, with equal probability) allocated lottery A or B.
In the second treatment (Choice), the peer chooses lottery A or B. Additionally, in a
control treatment (Coin), the decision maker can make choices conditional on the peer,
but based on a dimension that is unrelated to the lottery choice situation. At the end
of the experiment, the peer rolls a computer-simulated die, by clicking a button on the
screen, and the decision maker can condition his choices on whether the outcome is odd
or even. For simplicity, we refer to this as a coin flip.
We use the strategy method in Part II, which allows us to observe the strategy of the
decision maker conditional on the two possible choices, allocations, or the unrelated act
of the peer. This allows us to examine four potential strategies of second movers:
i) Imitate: choose A if the peer has A or odd, B if the peer has B or even,
11In terms of risk preferences B cannot be labeled as safe since it does not necessarily yield a certain
payoff. In comparison to A, we still label it as safe, for simplicity, as its variance is always smaller. But
note that a risk averse individual does not necessarily prefer B over A.
12Groups remain the same for the whole of Part II. All choices are made without any feedback until
the end of the experiment. During Part I participants only know there will be a Part II in the experiment,
but do not know anything about the decisions they will be asked to make.
13Throughout, we will refer to the peer as “she” and the decision maker as “he”.
14At the end of the experiment, individuals are informed about their payoff and, if Part II is drawn
for payment, the choice and payoff of the other individual in the group.
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ii) Deviate: choose A if the peer has B or even, B if the peer has A or odd,
iii) Revise own choice: make a different choice than in Part I, independent of the peer,
iv) No change: make the same choice as in Part I.
Note that in Coin the definition of imitation and deviation is arbitrary, as there is no direct
link between the lottery choice of the decision maker and that of the peer. Additionally,
while the last strategy, no change, implies the absence of a peer effect, the first three
strategies all involve different forms of peer effects. As an overall measure, we define a
peer effect to occur if the individual switches, i.e., chooses a different lottery in Part II
than in Part I for at least one potential choice, allocation or act of the peer (also compare
footnote 7).
The strategy method avoids any feedback effects, by keeping information about the risk
preferences or consistency of the peer absent, during the experiment. At the same time, it
may potentially affect the choices made by subjects, which we can control for by analyzing
conditional choices in the Coin treatment. Brandts and Charness (2000) actually find
that the strategy method does not generally generate differences in treatment effects, and
Cason and Mui (1998) do not find an effect of the strategy method in a dictator game
where the effects of social information are studied.15
1.2.2 Lotteries
The lotteries presented to subjects are summarized in Table 1.1. A yields the same payoffs
throughout, a payoff mgA = 20 in the good state (g) which occurs with probability p, and
a payoff mbA = 0 in the bad state (b). The payoffs of B are similar to those of an insurance
product, mgB = 20 − (1 − p)cf and mbB = 0 + c − (1 − p)cf , with the same probabilities
as A. Compared to A, in each state a “premium” of δ = (1− p)cf is subtracted, while in
the b state B pays a coverage c. We vary c, p and f across decision problems.
We use the notation mgpm
b in Table 1.1 to define a lottery that pays mg with probability
p and mb with remaining probability 1−p. First, we divide the lotteries into three groups:
lotteries with p = 0.2, p = 0.5 and p = 0.8, and within each group we create six decision
problems: two with f = 1.2, two with f = 1 and two with f = 0.8. Throughout the
paper, when f = 0.8, B has a higher expected value than A (EVB > EVA), when f = 1,
EVB = EVA, and when f = 1.2, EVB < EVA.
16 For each possible combination of p and
15Similarly, in two additional treatments, we do not find evidence suggesting the strategy method had
an effect in our setting. More specifically, we conducted a Base treatment in which choices were made
twice, in Part I and Part II, without the strategy method and without social feedback. We also conducted
an Anticipation treatment, without the strategy method, but where individuals were aware they would
be given feedback about the peer’s choice at the end of the experiment. Consistent with the effects of
our main treatments, we observe peer effects increase significantly with anticipated social feedback, from
occurring in 6.7% of the decisions in Base to 17.5% in the Anticipation treatment (Mann-Whitney test,
p-value=0.016).
16We will use the terms expected value and f interchangeably.
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f , c is either 20 or 15. We label lotteries with c = 20 as certainty lotteries, and those with
c = 15 as uncertainty lotteries.17
Nr. Lottery A Lottery B c f EVA EVB
Panel A: 20/80 Lotteries
1 200.20 0.801 20 1.2 4.00 0.80
2 200.20 5.600.20.60 15 1.2 4.00 1.60
3 200.20 4.001 20 1.0 4.00 4.00
4 200.20 8.000.23.00 15 1.0 4.00 4.00
5 200.20 7.21 20 0.8 4.00 7.20
6 200.20 10.400.25.40 15 0.8 4.00 6.40
Panel B: 50/50 Lotteries
7 200.50 8.001 20 1.2 10.00 8.00
8 200.50 11.000.56.00 15 1.2 10.00 8.50
9 200.50 10.001 20 1.0 10.00 10.00
10 200.50 12.500.57.50 15 1.0 10.00 10.00
11 200.50 12.001 20 0.8 10.00 12.00
12 200.50 14.000.59.00 15 0.8 10.00 11.50
Panel C: 80/20 Lotteries
13 200.80 15.201 20 1.2 16.00 15.20
14 200.80 16.400.811.40 15 1.2 16.00 15.40
15 200.80 16.001 20 1.0 16.00 16.00
16 200.80 17.000.812.00 15 1.0 16.00 16.00
17 200.80 16.801 20 0.8 16.00 16.80
18 200.80 17.600.812.60 15 0.8 16.00 16.60
Table 1.1: Decision problems
Each panel in Table 1.1, if divided by the level of c, can be seen as a multiple decision
list (e.g., Holt and Laury, 2002). We presented decision problems individually, instead
of using a list format, to have maximum control over the individuals’ information and
potential reference point. The order of the lotteries was randomized across Part I and II.
The position of lottery A and B on the screen (left or right) was also randomized across
subjects to avoid systematic reference point effects (Sprenger, 2010).
1.2.3 Experimental procedures
Sessions were conducted in MELESSA (Munich Experimental Laboratory for Economic
and Social Sciences) at the University of Munich. Each session lasted approximately
one hour. Instructions were handed out in printed form and read aloud by the exper-
17We also included two additional choices to serve as controls for the certainty effect (Kahneman and
Tversky, 1979; Andreoni and Sprenger, 2010). We analyze these decisions and the role of peers in a
separate working paper.
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imenter at the beginning of each session.18,19 The experiment was computerized using
zTree (Fischbacher, 2007). In total, 188 subjects participated in the main treatments
of the experiment (68 in Coin, 60 in Rand, and 60 in Choice). Their average age was
24 years and roughly 65% of all participants were female. Fields of study were almost
equally distributed over 20 different fields, ranging from medicine, through cultural studies
to business and economics.
One choice from one part was randomly selected at the end of the experiment for payment.
If Part I was selected for payment, then one decision problem was drawn for each partic-
ipant. If Part II was drawn, one decision problem was selected for each and every group
only. Thus, for both group members the same decision problem was payoff-relevant.20
Subjects were paid a show-up fee of 4 Euro additionally to their earnings from their
lottery choices, yielding in total an average of 15 Euro per subject.
1.2.4 Hypotheses
A large literature argues that individuals have preferences over their outcomes (payoffs)
relative to others. It is usually assumed that individuals dislike payoff differences, espe-
cially falling behind others, i.e., they want to “keep up with the Joneses”.21 A widely used
model of relative payoff concerns is that by Fehr and Schmidt (1999), in which individuals
dislike being behind but also dislike earning more than the peer.22
Across Rand and Choice payoffs remain the same. Hence, independently of the specific
18The instructions of the Choice treatment can be found in appendix A.2, the instructions of the other
treatments can be obtained from the authors.
19In every treatment, subjects were provided with an answer sheet at the beginning of Part I, which
displayed every decision problem in the same order as presented in Part I and on which they could record
their decisions made in Part I.
20To ensure credibility, one participant was randomly selected as assistant at the end of the experiment.
The assistant drew one ball from an opaque bag containing balls corresponding to each part and from a
second bag with balls corresponding to each decision problem. For each decision problem, the respective
combination of black and white balls was put in an opaque bag and the assistant again drew one ball.
Once all draws were done, payoffs were computed and subjects were paid out in cash.
21This literature started with Veblen (1899) and Duesenberry (1949), who argued that conspicuous
consumption choices can be explained by a desire to signal a superior status, prowess or strength. A
game-theoretic literature has focused on the implications of status concerns on conspicuous consumption
(see, e.g., Hopkins and Kornienko, 2004) and conformity (see, e.g., Bernheim, 1994). Here we focus
on ex-post payoff differences between the decision maker and his peer, and measure strategy choices of
decision makers who make conditional choices for each of the two possible lotteries of the peer. Related
studies on social preferences under risk (e.g., Trautmann, 2009; Saito, 2013) point out that individuals
may exhibit ex-ante relative payoff concerns, i.e., dislike inequality in expected payoffs. In our setting,
such concerns yield qualitatively the same predictions, since risks are perfectly correlated. By choosing
the lottery of the peer, decision makers can equalize expected payoffs both in Rand and Choice.
22In the context of risk taking in the presence of others, whether individuals exhibit a desire to be
ahead or not may depend on the situation (see Maccheroni et al., 2012, for a discussion). In our context,
in which payoff differences are relatively small and the situation allows for a simple comparison with
the peer, we would rather expect individuals dislike falling behind others, but enjoy being ahead. In
appendix A.1.1 we propose such a model in which decision makers are loss averse with respect to the
peer’s outcome, and derive conditions under which peer effects are expected to occur. Note that assuming
a dislike to being ahead of the peer would even strengthen the incentive to imitate the peer.
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functional form of relative payoff concerns, if these are the central motive behind peer
effects, these should be the same in Rand and Choice. Relatedly, in Coin, decision makers
cannot condition on the lotteries of the peers. Hence, no conditioning is expected.23 This
leads to the following Hypothesis.
Hypothesis 0: Peer effects are the same in Rand and Choice. Peer effects are weaker
in Coin than in Rand and Choice.
Note that Hypothesis 0 relies on the assumption of perfectly correlated risks. This allows
for potential imitation of both risky and safe choices. In contrast, under idiosyncratic
risks, relative payoff concerns a` la Fehr and Schmidt (1999), may imply that choosing the
safe lottery is the unique equilibrium, as shown in Friedl et al. (2014).
While the assumption of relative payoff concerns is central in the literature, recent evidence
as well as a large literature in social psychology suggest that not only payoffs may matter,
but that the fact that the peer makes active choices may be an important factor generating
peer effects.
In particular, recent evidence suggests that relative payoff concerns depend on whether the
peer makes a choice or not (e.g., Falk and Fischbacher, 2006). For example, in ultimatum
and battle-of-the-sexes games, Bolton et al. (2005) show that when payoff differences are
the result of a fair random draw individuals are less likely to react negatively to receiving a
lower payoff. In the context of our experiment, this suggests that disadvantageous payoff
differences in Rand, which are the result of a 50-50 allocation of A or B to the peer,
may be disliked less strongly than in Choice. Hence, when moving from Rand to Choice,
the dislike of falling behind may increase.24 This change directly increases the weight
on (negatively valued) payoff differences in the decision maker’s utility, which increases
the likelihood of imitation. Payoff differences in expectation, at the same time, crucially
depend on how A and B relate in terms of their expected values. Thus, if the disutility
from falling behind is more pronounced in Choice compared to Rand, the effect of choices
by the peer, relative to allocations, should also depend on expected values of A relative
to B.
Suppose the expected value of A equals that of B (f = 1). In this case, the marginal
increase in disutility from falling behind when choosing A or B is of the same magnitude.
However, if lottery A yields a higher expected payoff (f > 1), the marginal increase is
stronger in magnitude in case the decision maker chooses B and the peer chooses A than
vice versa. This implies a stronger incentive to imitate A compared to B. The same
23In Coin payoff differences cannot be eliminated with certainty, unless the decision maker is certain
about the peer’s choice. While conditional choices are not expected, we could observe revisions which are
driven by relative payoff concerns.
24In appendix A.1.2, we provide details on the following argument using the model of relative payoff
concerns introduced in appendix A.1.1.
1.2 Experimental design 20
rationale applies to the case where EVA < EVB. Hence, if a dislike of being behind the
peer increases from Rand to Choice, not only does imitation increase, but this increase in
imitation depends on f .25
Hypothesis 1A: Moving from Rand to Choice, imitation increases equally towards A
and B if f = 1. It increases more towards A than towards B if f > 1 and less if f < 1.
Alternatively, recent evidence on fairness considerations in risk taking (Cappelen et al.,
2013) suggests that relative payoff concerns may depend on whether the peer chose to
take on more or less risk. They show that individuals share less when others took on
more risk, compared to when they took the same amount of risk but their luck differed.
This suggests that relative payoff concerns would increase in Choice, and this increase
would be stronger when the peer chooses the safe lottery B.26
Hypothesis 1B: Moving from Rand to Choice, imitation towards B increases more than
towards A.
An extensive literature on social comparisons in social psychology proposes a different
mechanism through which peer choices might be important. According to Festinger (1950,
1954), humans have a drive to evaluate their own opinions and own attitudes. In the ab-
sence of an objective, non-social measure, individuals measure the “correctness” of their
own opinions and own attitudes by comparison with others.27 When there are discrepan-
cies between the attitudes of individuals in a group, Festinger predicts that individuals
will reduce these discrepancies, either by communicating with others (influence) or by
changing their attitudes towards those of the group (conformity). Festinger (1954) also
argues that the strength of the influence of others will depend on how divergent their sit-
uations are from the individual’s situation. The closer others’ situation is, the more likely
it is to be an important anchor for the evaluation of “correctness”. Empirically, there is a
wide range of evidence in support of these predictions in studies in social psychology (for
a review see, Cialdini and Trost, 1998, and Cialdini and Goldstein, 2004).
25There are potentially different ways to model how relative payoff concerns are altered in Choice. For
example, one could introduce a weighting factor in Choice, to increase all parameters that define relative
payoff concerns as given in Fehr and Schmidt (1999). Qualitatively, it still increases the importance of
f . In appendix A.1.2 we show that predictions remain the same as long the decision maker suffers more
from being worse off than suffers from being better off. One may also assume that λ decreases instead of
increases. Though not as intuitive, our predictions on comparative statics with respect to f would also
hold in this case, although in opposite directions.
26We should additionally note that the effect outlined in Hypothesis 1A would also play a role here.
In particular, it would imply that the increase in imitation towards B would be more dependent on f
than the increase in imitation towards A. In particular, for f = 1, imitation towards B would increase
significantly more than towards A. This difference would increase even further when f > 1, and would
be smaller when f < 1.
27According to Festinger, “an opinion, a belief, an attitude is “correct”, “valid”, and “proper” to the
extent that it is anchored in a group of people with similar beliefs, opinions and attitudes.” Festinger
(1950).
1.3 Results 21
Our treatments can be interpreted as changing the social anchor. First, in Choice, the
decision maker can condition his choice on the choice of his peer, i.e., the peer’s choice
is the social anchor. Second, in Rand, the decision maker can condition his choice on
the lottery allocated to the peer. Hence, the situation of the peer is less similar and
can be seen as a weaker social anchor. Though this type of “difference” is not directly
discussed by Festinger, if we apply the concept of divergence in terms of the situation of
the peer, we would predict a weaker influence of the peer in Rand.28,29 This should lead
to more imitation in Choice, independent of lottery characteristics. The increase should
be symmetric with respect to the two available options, A or B, and should not differ
depending on f .30 We close this section with our last hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1C: Moving from Rand to Choice, imitation towards A and B increases
equally, and does not depend on f .
1.3 Results
1.3.1 Decisions in Part I
We start with a brief review of decisions in Part I. We find no significant differences
across treatments in individual decisions in Part I, as expected. Table 1.2 describes
the average frequency with which A was chosen, over all decisions, by first and second
movers, respectively, in each treatment. First movers choose A on average between 17.3%
and 23.3% of the time, second movers choose A between 17.0% and 22.5% of the time.
The Mann-Whitney (MW) tests reported in the bottom part of Table 1.2 reveal that the
differences are not significant.
% of A choices in Part I
First Mover Second Mover
Coin 17.3% 19.9%
Rand 20.2% 21.7%
Choice 23.3% 17.0%
Mann-Whitney test, p-values:
Coin vs. Rand 0.7431 0.7458
Coin vs. Choice 0.3622 0.4139
Rand vs. Choice 0.5607 0.3783
Table 1.2: Average frequency of A choices in Part I
28When discussing the effect of similarity with the other’s situation, Festinger illustrates his argument
using as an example the case of a college student who is not likely to compare himself to immates from
an institution for the feeble minded to evaluate his own intelligence (Festinger 1954, p.120).
29In the Coin treatment, the decision maker can condition his choice on the outcome of a coin toss by
the peer. In this case, the anchor is most distant from the decision maker’s choice, as it is unrelated to
his choice or payoffs.
30See appendix A.1.3 for a straightforward model based on social comparison theory.
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Choices in Part I display a strong variance depending on the decision problem. If B has a
lower expected payoff (f > 1), a vast majority of decision makers chooses lottery A when
p = 0.2 (88.8% and 71.1%). This frequency drops to 19.7% and 20.6% when p = 0.5 and
to 17.5% and 16.2% when p = 0.8. Instead, when B has a higher expected payoff (f < 1),
it is chosen in the majority of all cases. In the intermediate cases, where A and B have
the same expected payoff (f = 1), the frequency with which A is chosen again varies from
over 26% when p = 0.2 down to 7.0% when p = 0.5.31 Hence, on average decision makers
are risk averse, as is usually observed in experiments.32
1.3.2 Peer effects by treatment
Figure 1.1 compares the average frequency with which decision makers switch with respect
to Part I. As defined above, a switch is a change in lottery choice with respect to Part I,
for at least one of the two potential choices made by the peer.
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Note: Switching takes value 1 if the second mover changes his choice in Part II for at least one of the
possible choices of the first mover with respect to the choice made in Part I for the same decision. Error
bars in Figure 1 (a) represent ±1.645 SE, a 90% confidence interval.
Figure 1.1: Peer effects by treatment
In Coin, subjects switch in 17% of the cases, while they switch in 18% of the cases in Rand.
This difference is not significant (MW-test, p-value=0.53). The switching frequency differs
31A detailed overview of choices in Part I is provided in Table A.1 in appendix A.3.1.
32We also controlled for consistency of decisions in Part I. If we assume that subjects have CRRA
preferences and given the design of our lotteries, we can classify second movers as consistent or inconsistent
decision makers. We find across different probability panels, controlling for certainty, that at most 15.4%
of decisions patterns are inconsistent. If we exclude inconsistent decision makers from our sample our
results remain qualitatively the same.
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significantly - goes up to 33% - in Choice (MW-test, p-value=0.03 compared to Coin and
0.07 compared to Rand).33 Hence, peer effects are significantly larger in Choice, than in
Coin and Rand. This leads to Result 1.
Result 1. Peer effects are significantly stronger in Choice than in Rand. Peer effects do
not differ significantly in Rand and Coin.
Based on Result 1 we reject Hypothesis 0. Peer effects in risky choices are significantly
different when decision makers can condition on the peer’s choices, relative to allocated
lotteries and unrelated peer actions. Surprisingly, peer effects are not significantly stronger
when decision makers can condition on the peer’s allocated lotteries relative to her unre-
lated acts.
To examine where peer effects stem from, we examine the strategies adopted by decision
makers when switching. Figure 1.2 displays the frequency with which decision makers
choose to (1) imitate the peer, (2) deviate from the peer or (3) revise their choice from
Part I (irrespective of the peer).34
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Figure 1.2: Strategy choices by treatment conditional on switching
Not surprisingly, given the lack of a link between the unrelated act of the peer and her
lottery choice in Coin, the frequency of imitation (3.6%) is similar to that of deviation
(3.3%). In comparison, in Rand, the frequency of imitation increases to 8.9% and that
33At the individual level, the distribution of switching rates also differs across treatments. It is sig-
nificantly different in Choice, compared to Rand and Coin (Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, p-value=0.02
compared to Coin, p-value=0.09 compared to Rand). But does not differ significantly across Rand and
Coin (Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, p-value=0.96). Figure A.1 in appendix A.3.1 displays the distribution
of switching rates by treatment.
34Table A.2 in appendix A.3.1 displays the frequency of each strategy choice for each decision, by
treatment.
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of deviation decreases to 1.1%. The increase in imitation is marginally significant as
displayed in Table 1.3, column (1), based on a multinomial logit regression. Interestingly,
adding the frequency of imitation and deviation reveals that decision makers condition
their choice on the peer in 6.9% of the cases in Coin and in 10% of the cases in Rand.
This difference is not significantly different, as shown in column (4) of Table 1.3. Hence,
while decision makers do not condition their choices more frequently in Rand than in
Coin, when doing so, they adopt the strategy of imitating significantly more often.
In Choice imitation is significantly more frequent, and occurs in 19.6% of the cases. As
shown in Table 1.3, column (1), the likelihood of imitation increases significantly in Choice
relative to Coin. Further, it also increases significantly with respect to Rand (t-test, p-
value=0.0582). In turn, decision makers are significantly more likely to make conditional
choices (column (4)) in Choice than in Coin (t-test, p-value=0.021) and Rand (t-test,
p-value=0.0646).
In contrast to imitation, deviation (column (2) of Table 1.3) and revisions (column (3) of
Table 1.3) are not significantly affected by Rand and Choice, relative to the decision to
stay with Part I choice. Two lottery characteristics influence the decision to revise: (i)
if the lottery has a probability of 0.5, the likelihood of revising decreases, and (ii) if the
expected value of A is equal or smaller than that of B (f ≤ 1), it increases.
The findings so far are summarized below.
Result 2. R1
a) Conditional choices are significantly more frequent in Choice than in Rand and Coin.
At the same time, conditional choices are not more frequent in Rand than in Coin.
b) Imitation is significantly more frequent in Choice than in Rand and Coin. Imitation
is also more frequent in Rand than in Coin.
Hence, when decision makers can condition their choices on peers we mainly observe an
increase in imitation, relative to when they can condition on their allocated lotteries or
unrelated act of the peer. At the same time, on the “intensive” margin, for those decision
makers who condition, imitation is the most frequently used strategy in Rand, but not in
Coin. Thus, the results so far reveal that relative payoff concerns are present when the
peer is allocated a lottery. However, actions of the peer matter in addition to their effect
on payoffs. In what follows we investigate the increase in imitation when the peer makes
active choices and examine whether it is consistent with Hypotheses 1A, 1B or 1C.
Before doing so, we briefly address switching by the peer in our empirical analysis. Peers
on average switch in 12.9% of the cases in Coin, 48.0% in Rand and 11.7% in Choice.
The switching rate is close to 50% in Rand, since lotteries are randomly assigned to the
peer with probability 0.5. Switching does not differ significantly across Coin and Choice
(MW-test, p-value=0.6962).
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Strategy choice Likelihood of
Imitate Deviate Revise conditional choice
Rand 0.088* -0.022 -0.027 0.042
[0.051] [0.016] [0.028] [0.057]
Choice 0.170*** -0.023 0.016 0.132**
[0.058] [0.017] [0.031] [0.059]
p = 0.5 -0.01 -0.001 -0.072*** -0.012
[0.020] [0.008] [0.024] [0.020]
p = 0.8 -0.002 -0.007 -0.009 -0.009
[0.022] [0.008] [0.018] [0.022]
f = 0.8 0.017 0.014** 0.098*** 0.032**
[0.016] [0.007] [0.017] [0.016]
f = 1 0.021 0.012 0.070*** 0.035**
[0.016] [0.008] [0.016] [0.017]
Certainty 0.002 0.001 -0.004 0.004
[0.010] [0.006] [0.010] [0.012]
N 1692 1692
Pseudo-Loglikelihood -1163.39 -599.53
Pseudo-R2 0.0697 0.0464
Note: This table presents estimated marginal effects from a multinomial logit regression on the strategy
choice, taking no change as the base outcome, in columns (1) to (3), and marginal effects from a logit
regression on the decision to condition on the peer (imitate or deviate) in column (4). Rand and Choice
denote dummies for each treatment, where Coin is the omitted category. The variables p = 0.5 and
p = 0.8 refer to the lotteries with these probabilities, taking p = 0.2 as omitted category. f = 0.8 and
f = 1 are dummy variables for the expected value of A versus B, as defined in Table 1.1. Certainty
takes value 1 if lottery B is degenerate, 0 otherwise. All regressions include individual characteristics as
controls: gender, a dummy for business or economics major and age. Standard errors are presented in
brackets and clustered at the individual level. ∗∗∗, ∗∗,∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level,
respectively.
Table 1.3: Determinants of strategy choices in Part II
1.3.3 Imitation
Figure 1.3 below displays the average frequency of imitation towards A on the left-hand
side, and towards B, on the right-hand side. Within each chart, imitation is divided by
f and treatment.
The first two main features of imitation in the data are that (i) the frequency of imitation
towards B is on average higher than that towards A, both in Rand and Choice, and (ii)
moving to Choice the average rate of imitation increases towards both A and B. To
examine the alternative hypotheses 1A–1C in detail, we regress the likelihood of imitation
on treatment, on the lottery held by the peer, and on lottery characteristics, including
separate regressions depending on f . Results are presented in Table 1.4.
According to Hypothesis 1A, when f < 1, imitation towards B should increase more
strongly than that towards A. If f > 1, we would expect the opposite to occur. And, if
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Figure 1.3: Imitation towards A and B, by f and treatment
f = 1, we would expect no difference in the increase. The results are presented in columns
(2), (3) and (4) of Table 1.4. The interaction between Choice and imitation towards B is
only significant, and negative, when f = 1, contrary to Hypothesis 1A.
To test Hypotheses 1B we consider the interaction term between Choice and imitation
towards B over all choices (column (1)). This term is not statistically significantly different
from zero, hence, not consistent with Hypothesis 1B. Further, considering effect of f on
imitation, we find that the increase in imitation in Choice is similar for all f , except for
when f = 1 and imitation is towards B. Hence, in a majority of the cases the increase
in imitation does not depend on f , but not all. This is partly consistent with Hypothesis
1C. This leads to Result 3.
Result 3. Imitation
a) Imitation is on average more frequent towards the safe lottery B than towards the
risky lottery A, in Rand and Choice.
b) The increase in imitation in Choice is not significantly different towards B than
towards A.
c) If f = 0.8 and f = 1.2, the increase in imitation towards B in Choice is not
significantly different from that towards A. If f = 1, the increase in imitation
towards B is significantly weaker than the increase in imitation towards A.
To sum up, the evidence reveals that the increase in imitation in Choice is not significantly
stronger towards the safe lottery, nor does it feature the comparative statics with respect to
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Probability of imitation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All choices If f = 0.8 If f = 1 If f = 1.2
Choice 0.134** 0.079 0.123* 0.180**
[0.065] [0.072] [0.074] [0.073]
Towards B 0.134*** 0.098* 0.173*** 0.179
[0.037] [0.057] [0.051] [0.117]
Choice * Towards B -0.061 0.053 -0.222** -0.044
[0.048] [0.077] [0.107] [0.122]
p = 0.5 0.019 0.115*** -0.003 -0.045
[0.031] [0.042] [0.045] [0.041]
p = 0.8 0.023 0.112*** -0.01 -0.01
[0.032] [0.040] [0.040] [0.042]
Certainty 0.008 -0.01 0.019 0.009
[0.014] [0.026] [0.024] [0.018]
f = 0.8 -0.016
[0.025]
f = 1 0.014
[0.024]
Observations 1080 360 360 360
Pseudo-loglikelihood -414.34 -135.06 -148.23 -119.95
Pseudo-R2 0.0635 0.0915 0.0474 0.1281
Note: This table presents estimated marginal effects from logit regressions on the probability of imitation.
All independent variables are defined as in Table 1.3. All regressions control for individual characteristics:
gender, a dummy for business or economics major and age. The estimated marginal effects remain with
the same sign and similar in size, if we use OLS regressions to control for potential biases in the sign of
the interaction effect (see Ai and Norton, 2003). Standard errors are presented in brackets and clustered
at the individual level. ∗∗∗, ∗∗,∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Table 1.4: Determinants of imitation
f that would have been expected should the disutility from falling behind have increased.
These facts are broadly in line with Hypothesis 1C. However, these are indirect tests
of Hypotesis 1C, based on the aggregate data. A further test of Hypothesis 1C can be
provided by structurally estimating a model of preferences that incorporate a social utility
term. This enables us to use all individual decisions and test parameter restrictions across
treatments.
In particular, the evidence so far suggests that (a) assuming decision makers derive a
constant utility from conforming to other’s behavior (independent of payoffs), we should
observe an increase in this utility from Rand to Choice, and (b) assuming relative pay-
off concerns change in Choice, we should observe a change in the parameters governing
relative payoff concerns from Rand to Choice. We test these conjectures by structurally
estimating two models of social utility. All details about what follows can be found in
appendix A.3.2. In our estimation we assume the decision maker to exhibit utility that
is additively separable into consumption and social utility. In a model of relative payoff
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concerns, we assume that negative payoff differences with respect to the peer enter neg-
atively into utility and are weighted by a “social” loss aversion parameter λ ≥ 0, while
positive payoff differences enter positively and have a weight of one. In a model based on
social comparison theory we assume a constant utility γ from conforming to the peer’s
choice. Based on decisions in Rand and Choice we estimate these parameters, in distinct
models, and test for treatment differences in λ and γ.35
Our findings reveal that, in a model of relative payoff concerns, decision makers exhibit
significant loss aversion with respect to their peer’s payoff (λ > 1), but this disutility does
not change significantly across treatments. In a model based on social comparison theory,
decision makers gain significant utility from choosing the peer’s lottery (γ>0). Further,
this utility is significantly larger in Choice compared to Rand. In terms of goodness of fit,
the model of relative payoff concerns is significantly inferior to a model based on social
comparison theory. Overall, these results suggest that the substantial increase of peer
effects when peers make active choices may be explained by a norm to conform to others.
1.4 Conclusion
This paper examines peer effects in risk taking. We test whether peer effects can be
explained by preferences over others’ outcomes or whether preference interactions also
depend on others’ choices, in addition to distributional concerns. Our main result is that
peer effects increase significantly when peers choose among lotteries, relative to when they
are allocated a lottery. This reveals that choices play a significant role, on top of payoffs.
At the same time, imitation of the peer is the predominant strategy adopted by those who
are affected by the presence of others. Generally, this suggests that peer effects in risk
taking are explained by both relative payoff concerns and a direct preference over peer
choices.
We examine two alternative explanations for why choices of peers matter. First, pref-
erences over others’ payoffs might change if peers make choices. This may result in an
increase in envy, i.e., the disutility from disadvantageous payoff differences, or envy may
be particularly strong when peers choose safe options. Alternatively, according to social
35Another approach could be to simultaneously estimate parameters defining relative payoff concerns
and an additional utility from conforming to the social anchor. However, imitation (or deviation) can very
generally be explained by a positive (or negative) estimate of γ as well as by λ > 1 (or λ < 1). Identifying
both parameters, for both treatments, simultaneously, is not possible with our data, but would be an
interesting task for future work. Another approach might be to estimate mixture models, a procedure that
we applied in a previous version of this paper. Mixture models have been used to estimate risk preferences
in heterogeneous populations, amongst others by Conte et al. (2011) and Harrison and Rutstro¨m (2009).
However, in our setting, assuming heterogeneity with respect to whether decision makers derive a social
utility or not, causes the following concern. The probability to be of a certain type enters into the log-
likelihood function as a multiplicative weight of the social utility, and in this way scales the estimates of
λ and γ. Moreover, it leaves one additional degree of freedom.
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comparison theory (Festinger, 1954), peer choices might be perceived as a decision anchor
and measure for “correctness” of individual preferences, giving rise to a norm to conform
to others’ behavior. Comparative statics reveal that when moving from peer allocations
to peer choices, imitation increases both towards safe and risky lotteries. It also does
not vary systematically with payoff differences, as would be expected by an increase in
envy. Hence, at the aggregate level, the increase in imitation when peers make choices is
in line with a norm to conform to peers. Structurally estimating these models provides
additional suggestive evidence for this result.
Our results contribute to understanding how peers affect risky choices, including stock
market participation, investment choices and insurance purchases. They suggest that not
only relative payoffs matter, but also the act of choosing between risky prospects. This can
have important implications for the spread of risky choices. For example, it suggests that
communicating others’ risky choices may have large consequences even in environments
where all individuals are equally well informed. At the same time, it reveals that imitative
behavior in risk taking is most likely to spread when peers make active choices. Hence,
campaigns that give “gifts” to some individuals or endow them with a particular risky
asset to leverage demand may only have limited success.
Overall, as argued by Shiller (1984), “investing in speculative assets is a social activity”.
It is thus important to understand what “social” actually means, and to understand how
others might shape economic decisions.
Chapter 2
Conflicting Risk Attitudes∗
2.1 Introduction
Conflict is pervasive in many different kinds of groups, ranging from small and large so-
cieties to organizations and teams (Simmel, 1955; Coser, 1956). Conflict, both violent,
e.g., war, and non-violent, e.g., disagreements, has very harmful economic effects. Op-
portunities to trade or invest are forgone when two parties cannot reach an agreement.
Conflict can also lead to sabotage and destruction. Understanding when conflict is most
likely to arise is especially important in developing countries, where it strongly hinders
the improvement of economic and social conditions (Blattman and Miguel, 2010).
To understand why, consider that in small-scale societies with imperfect credit and insur-
ance markets and a paucity of formal savings instruments, a dense network of relationships,
many of them kin-based, governs investment behavior (Fafchamps, 2003). Examples in-
clude the joint purchase of large, indivisible capital goods (a plough, an irrigation pump);
informal risk-sharing arrangements (IRSAs) in case the investment goes wrong; and gifts
or informal loans to help finance an investment, often with an expectation of reciprocity.
The myriad ways in which people in small-scale societies in developing countries, when it
comes to their investment behavior, are tied through informal arrangements would sug-
gest a tremendous scope for disagreement, and if not settled, for conflict. One plausible
motive would be when one party is more cautious, i.e., more risk averse, than the other,
so that conflict may result from disagreement about the amount of exposure to risk of
the investment that parties are jointly engaged in. In this paper we examine conflict from
a microeconomic perspective, focusing on the role of heterogeneous risk preferences in
determining interpersonal conflicts in rural villages in Uganda.
From a theoretical perspective, conflict may be modeled as the outcome of a failed bar-
gaining process (e.g., Fearon, 1995). In the context of farming, where investments are
often made jointly by groups of farmers, bargaining situations may be at the heart of so-
∗This chapter is based on joint work with Marta Serra-Garcia, Ben D’Exelle, and Arjan Verschoor.
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cial tensions. Consider two farmers who face the decision of how much to invest for their
farming activities, e.g., in buying a plough. Assume they will equally share the payoffs
from harvesting and the investment is indivisible. A central aspect of this decision, given
the uncertain weather conditions, is how much risk to take. If risk preferences are private
information, each farmer may have an incentive to misrepresent them during bargaining.
This may lead to failed agreements (Kennan and Wilson, 1993) and generate interper-
sonal conflict between the two farmers. This is especially likely to be the case if their risk
preferences differ substantially. In this paper, we investigate empirically whether such a
relationship between risk attitudes and conflicts exists. We ask, are two individuals with
different risk attitudes more likely to suffer from interpersonal conflict?1
Our study focuses on a society that has historically suffered from violence among its
people, the Bagisu people, in Eastern Uganda (Heald, 1998). Within this region, we
collect information on interpersonal conflict among pairs of adults living in the same
village. In particular, we ask whether village members get along well or not, inquiring in
a sensitive manner about past conflict. Additionally, we collect information about a wide
range of socio-economic variables and other characteristics of the social link between each
pair of adults. Two weeks following the survey, we elicit individual risk attitudes in an
incentivized experiment.
Our empirical approach is based on the examination of the relationship between con-
flict and risk attitudes, focusing on whether the likelihood of a conflictual relationship
between two linked individuals is determined by the absolute difference in their degrees
of risk aversion, controlling for other relevant individual and pair characteristics. Since
the composition of rural villages cannot be exogenously changed, our results cannot be
interpreted as causal evidence. However, focusing on different subgroups of the popu-
lation and conducting an analysis based on random links, as detailed below, provides
suggestive evidence for a particular direction of the relationship. Further, providing cor-
relational evidence is nevertheless important for several reasons. To our knowledge, no
previous study has examined the determinants of interpersonal conflict, as the focus in
the literature is often on friendships or, generally, positive social ties. Second, we elicit
an incentivized measure of risk attitudes, and not only relate conflict to individual socio-
demographic characteristics. Third, interpersonal conflict may be at the very heart of the
violent episodes that the Bagisu people often suffer. Hence, understanding its potential
sources may be valuable in deterring future violence.
Our results reveal that an increase in the difference in risk attitudes between two individ-
uals significantly increases the likelihood of conflict, controlling for as many differences in
1By interpersonal conflict we refer to conflictual disputes among individuals, i.e., conflicts on the
micro level. Our definition of interpersonal conflict thereby abstracts from conflicts between groups in
society, violent strikes or protests, and civil war. For an overview of the economic literature on civil war,
for example, we refer the reader to Blattman and Miguel (2010).
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other characteristics as possible, as well as for relationship characteristics. More precisely,
a one unit increase in the difference in risk attitudes (where these can differ by a maxi-
mum of six units), increases the likelihood of conflict by 2 percentage points. Relative to
the general frequency of conflicts in our sample, 21.5%, this corresponds to an increase of
roughly 10% in the likelihood of conflict.
We find that differences in risk attitudes are significantly related to the presence of in-
terpersonal conflicts only among kin, i.e., where blood-ties exist. At the same time,
differences in risk attitudes are significantly related to conflicts among pairs of male sub-
jects. These results are in line with the argument that bargaining among farmers may
lead to conflict. As Heald (1998) reports, most farming decisions are made within families,
where land was often shared through ancestors. Further, such decisions are often made
by males. Such results are also in line with recent evidence from Attanasio et al. (2012),
who find that close friends and relatives are less likely to form risk sharing groups if their
risk preferences are different.2
While differences in risk attitudes could lead to conflict for the reasons stated above, the
opposite could just as well be true. Individuals who experience interpersonal conflict may
break off relationships, decrease their social contact and over time diverge in their risk
attitudes. Our finding that the role of risk attitudes is especially important in conflicts
among kin, where social relationships are relatively unlikely to break, makes such a channel
appear unlikely. To nevertheless explore this possibility in further detail, we exploit
the fact that individuals from different villages do not have social contact, while almost
everyone within a village knows each other and, hence, has either a non-conflictual or a
conflictual relationship.3 We randomly generate links between individuals across villages
and thereby simulate a distribution of differences in risk attitudes among individuals
who have no social relationship. If conflict leads to the breakage of links and in turn to
segregation of risk attitudes, we would expect the difference in risk attitudes among those
who are randomly linked to be similar to those who have conflictual links. However, we
do not find this to be the case. Differences in risk attitudes are significantly larger among
individuals who experienced conflict. Further, a marginal increase in the difference in risk
attitudes is significantly related to an increase in the likelihood of conflict, relative to a
random link.
We explore whether the level of risk aversion, instead of heterogeneity, is directly related
to conflict. For example, individuals who are more risk seeking could also be more likely
to exhibit interpersonal conflict. However, we do not find that risk attitudes differ sig-
nificantly on average between individuals who experienced a conflict at least once and
those who never did. Additionally, between pairs with the same risk attitude, we examine
2To control for potential differences in the economic links between pairs, in our analysis we control
for the prevalence of loans and gifts within each tie.
3Only in 1 pair out of 918 we find that individuals report not to know each other.
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whether the degree of risk aversion relates to the likelihood of conflict. We do not find
evidence for this either. Also, a potential further step would have been to investigate par-
ticular kinds of conflicts between pairs of individuals. However, among the Bagisu people
in rural eastern Uganda sources of conflict are often expressed in terms of vague accusa-
tions of “witchcraft” and “theft” (Heald, 1998), making it difficult to cleanly differentiate
between sources.
This paper provides novel evidence on a potential source of interpersonal conflict, namely
differences in risk attitudes. Our evidence suggests that among individuals who frequently
make joint economic decisions, relatives and males, the likelihood of conflict may increase
with differences in their risk attitudes.4 This finding may help us understand future
conflict between groups that make joint economic decisions, including small societies, kin
or teams in organizations. This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 briefly reviews
the most closely related literature on conflict and risk attitudes, focusing on studies on
developing countries. Section 2.3 describes the design of both survey and experiment.
In section 2.4 we summarize the descriptive statistics of our data with respect to socio-
economic characteristics and risk attitudes, before we lay out the empirical strategy in
section 2.5. Results are reported in section 2.6. Section 2.7 provides a discussion and
section 2.8 concludes.
2.2 Related literature
Our work has been inspired by three distinct literatures. The first literature that has
provided motivation is the accounts by sociologists that differences between individuals
are likely to be at the center of conflict. For instance, Deutsch (1969) argues that “A
conflict may arise from differences in information or beliefs [...]. It may reflect differences
in interests, desires or values.” (Deutsch, 1969, p.8). Since differences between individ-
uals could be along various dimensions, it is unclear which attributes matter most, and
under which circumstances they matter. Research in organizational science that studies
conflict in teams, for example, documents that differences in demographic characteristics,
such as age and ethnicity, are related differently to different kinds of conflict (e.g., Pelled
et al., 1999). If individuals make joint economic decisions, differences in individual risk
attitudes generate a potential for conflict. As mentioned above, in bargaining situations,
in which there is incomplete information, disagreements may occur in theory (e.g., Ken-
4Relatedly, in the context of the intergenerational transmission of risk attitudes Dohmen et al. (2012)
report that a correlation between risk attitudes of parents and their children is significantly weaker if
children frequently fought with their parents. While their finding – based on a subsample of the German
population and, hence, documented in an industrialized and highly developed country – is surprisingly
consistent with our results, Dohmen et al. (2012)’s analysis is restricted to a very particular part of social
networks, namely parents and their children. Instead, we focus on a broader category of kinship, also
consider non-related individuals and control for other characteristics of social links.
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nan and Wilson, 1993). In appendix B.1 we outline a very stylized model of bargaining
over a risky investment and show that disagreements over the amount to invest, which
can be interpreted as conflict, arise when rather risk seeking individuals make proposals
to very risk averse individuals. Experimental evidence on bargaining over lotteries has
indeed shown that disagreements occur frequently between individuals with opposite risk
preferences (Roth et al., 1988).5
The second literature that has motivated our study is that on risk sharing situations.
From a theoretical perspective, risk sharing agreements are possible even if individuals
have different risk attitudes (Mazzocco and Saini, 2012). However, if the agreement
strongly disfavors one party relative to the other, then even though the agreement takes
place, the disfavored party may hold a grudge against the other. Thus, disagreements
(or even agreements) in joint decision-making under risk could translate to individuals
developing a conflictual relationship, especially within closely linked groups.
The third literature that we have drawn inspiration from is that on the determinants of
civil conflict. Conflict is especially pervasive in developing countries and a large litera-
ture has emerged with the aim of understanding its sources. One strand of the literature
finds that increases in inequality and polarization within a society make the emergence
of conflict more likely (e.g., Esteban and Ray, 1994, 2011).6 Although measures of in-
equality and polarization are mainly defined in terms of income, Esteban and Ray (1994)
suggest that other individual attributes across which people might differ should be taken
into account when examining the determinants of conflict, which thus would include risk
preferences.
Our study is related to a number of recent studies of risk attitudes, risk sharing and
social ties. The first is the literature that examines the impact of exposure to violent
conflict, war or bomb attacks, on individual risk attitudes (e.g., Voors et al., 2012; Callen
et al., 2014). For example, Voors et al. (2012) find that individuals who were exposed to
the consequences of civil war in Burundi are more risk-seeking. Our study differs from
theirs in that we focus on interpersonal conflict between two individuals and in particular
examine the relation to difference in risk attitudes of the individuals involved.7
5A potential caveat in the context of bargaining over risky investments between farmers could be
that their risk preferences could be observable over time, e.g., from other risky decisions. However,
if individuals fail to agree in their first bargaining situation, and this generates a significant conflict
between the two parties, the information revealed ex-post may no longer be considered (as their link is
then “broken”).
6Prominent examples of other determinants of conflict in society include macroeconomic shocks –
particularly variation in growth rates (see, e.g., Miguel et al., 2004) or in commodity prices (Besley and
Persson, 2008; Dube and Vargas, 2013, and Bazzi and Blattman, 2014, among others).
7The impact of exposure to war and violence has been studied also in other regards. Rohner et al.
(2013) show that ethnic conflicts in Uganda during the early 2000s had detrimental effects on trust,
but fostered ethnic identity. Bauer et al. (2014) find in the Republic of Georgia and Sierra Leone that
exposure to civil war during middle childhood and early adulthood significantly strengthened pro-sociality
concerns towards one’s in-group, but not out-groups.
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A second set of studies related to our study examines risk preferences and risk sharing
arrangements in poor locales, typically among small farmers. In developing countries,
risk attitudes play a particularly important role due to the risky decisions that farmers
face.8 Moreover, to examine and improve risk coping strategies in the absence of formal
insurance markets, risk sharing groups received considerable attention lately. Starting
with Townsend (1994), several studies examined risk sharing agreements using survey
data (among others, Dercon and Krishnan, 2000; Fafchamps and Lund, 2003; De Weerdt
and Dercon, 2006; Fafchamps and Gubert, 2007; Karlan et al., 2009). Other studies
used lab experiments in the field, for example, to examine how different enforcement
mechanisms and social relationships influence the formation of risk sharing groups (e.g.,
Barr and Genicot, 2008; Barr et al., 2012a,b).9 Most closely related to the present study is
the paper by Attanasio et al. (2012), which examines the formation of risk sharing groups
and shows that relatives and friends are more likely to form risk sharing groups. Our paper
differs from them in that we examine the presence of antagonistic social relationships, and
whether these are related to differences in risk attitudes.
The third related literature examines the influence of social ties on behavior. Gener-
ally, recent experimental studies have focused on friendship compared to “other” ties. In
particular, several studies have examined whether individuals are more generous towards
their friends than towards others, where the latter might be either anonymous, unknown
people or simply not their best friends (Leider et al., 2009; Bran˜as-Garza et al., 2010;
Goeree et al., 2010). Conflicts, though common to many relationships and with poten-
tially detrimental consequences for outcomes in society, have not been addressed in this
literature.
2.3 Survey and experimental design
We conduct fieldwork that consists of a survey of social links, followed by an experiment
that elicits risk attitudes. Every subject completed both tasks. Survey and experiments
were conducted towards the end of November and in the beginning of December 2012
in Sironko District, eastern Uganda.10 For this study, we first randomly selected five
8Early studies studied the risk attitudes of farmers (e.g., Binswanger, 1980). Also, as argued by Lipton
(1968); Norman (1974); Wolgin (1975); Schluter and Mount (1976), and Scott (1976) risk preferences of
farmers might play an important role for the adoption of new technologies and agricultural practices.
This is confirmed by a recent study that relates farmers’ experimentally measured risk attitudes to the
adoption of a superior form of cotton production (Liu, 2013).
9Another strand of the experimental literature has shown that group decision-making under risk and
uncertainty differs considerably from individual decision-making. We refer to Conradt and List (2010)
and Isenberg (1986) for an overview on group decision-making, and to Trautmann and Vieider (2011) for
an overview of social interaction effects under risk and uncertainty. Group decisions may exhibit a risky
shift, i.e., groups appear less risk averse than individuals, depending on the probabilities at hand.
10Background information on Sironko and its people can be found in appendix B.2.
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subcounties from Sironko District. Within every subcounty approximately ten villages
were randomly selected. For each one we took a census of households and their household
members. Next, on average 20 households per village were randomly drawn to participate
in the study and from these one adult per household was randomly chosen to be invited
to participate in our study. We decided to invite only one adult per household to decrease
potential side payments within households. In total 275 individuals from 34 villages
participated in both survey and experiment.11 In the rest of this section we first describe
the survey and then provide a detailed outline of the experiment.
2.3.1 Social survey
Subjects were visited at home by trained local interviewers.12 The survey consists of two
main parts. In the first part we elicited the social links between all participants who
lived in the same village as the respondent. In the second part we collected individual
socio-economic characteristics.
The social links among participants within a village were elicited as follows. In an inter-
view, the respondent was given the name and presented with a picture of one of his village
members who also participated in our study. First of all, he13 was asked whether he knew
the other person. If not, we proceeded to the name and picture of the next village member
on our list. If yes, he was asked, are you close friends? If the answer was no, he was asked
do you get along well? Based on the last two questions we define a dichotomous variable
as a measure for interpersonal conflict. This is equal to one if the respondent denied to
be close friends with the other and additionally reported that they did not get along well
in the past. Given that direct questions on conflicts may have adverse effects in these
small societies we decided to inquire about possible conflicts among village members in
a subtle and non-provocative manner. The alternative of asking a respondent directly
whether or not a conflictual relationship exists was deemed as potentially disruptive by
key informants who we consulted when designing the questionnaire; at the same time,
they intimated that, in this local culture, respondents would answer ”no” to the question
”do you get along well?” to indicate that they are in conflict. Given our knowledge about
the local culture and the sensitivity of conflict elicitation, we deem this therefore to be
the most correct way to measure personal conflicts.
Next, we elicited the kinship relation between the respondent and the village member.
They were asked whether they were related and if so, what kind of kinship existed, includ-
11We recruited subjects for two independent studies, both funded by the same research grant. A
random share of the whole subject pool was assigned to the present study.
12At the time when the survey was conducted participants did not have any information or knowl-
edge about what might happen in the experiment. However, they knew that they would be invited to
participate in an experiment some weeks later.
13We refer to every subject as “he” throughout the paper.
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ing blood relationships (parents, siblings, uncles, cousins, etc.) and affinal kin (related by
marriage, i.e., in-laws). In subsequent questions, the respondent was asked whether they
belonged to same social groups (including saving group, burial society, friendship group,
farmers’ group, microfinance group, drinking group, religious group) and whether they
were neighbors. Further, they were asked whether they had given or received a loan or
gift, in cash or in kind. The list of questions, in the sequence as they were asked in this
part of the survey can be found in Table B.1 in appendix B.4.
In the second part of the survey we collected information on socio-economic characteristics
of the respondent. These include gender, age, religion, ethnicity, and marital status.
They also capture whether the respondent is the head of his household or not, his level of
education and his occupation. We also asked about possible illnesses or disabilities.
The survey then proceeded to measure the household’s ownership of assets, including
dwelling characteristics, vehicles, livestock and land. To construct a wealth index we
conducted a principal component analysis, following Filmer and Pritchett (2001).14
2.3.2 Experiment
Two weeks after the survey, the experiment took place. In the experiment participants’
individual risk attitudes were elicited. We used the elicitation method of Gneezy and
Potters (1997), in which a decision maker chooses how much to invest into a risky asset,
but we framed it as a lottery choice task, for continuity with previous studies on risk
taking in developing countries.15 Starting with 6000 Ugandan Shillings (about 1.5 times
the local daily wage), the decision maker chooses how much to invest in an asset that
yields a net return of 100% with probability 0.8 or is lost completely, with probability 0.2.
We framed this task as choosing one out of seven different lotteries which are presented
in Table 2.1.
Assuming CRRA preferences, choosing lottery A, for example, implies a higher degree
of relative risk aversion than lottery B or C. Hence, lottery choices serve as an ordinal
measure for individual risk attitudes. Translated into values from 1 (A) to 7 (G), this
measure covers a wide range of risk aversion.16
14In particular, the wealth index is determined by a principal component analysis, based on the
number of rooms in the household’s dwelling; the material the floor is made of (e.g., earth and cow dung
or cement); the main source of lighting in the dwelling (e.g., electricity or different forms of lanterns);
the number of indigenous, exotic and crossed cattle; the number of goats; the total size of land owned
by the household; the number of vehicles owned by the household, thereof bicycles and motor vehicles;
the number of durable goods such as generators, stoves, sofas, beds, radios, televisions, jewelry, watches,
phones, and household appliances; and the number of equipment owed by the household, i.e., storage
facilities, livestock stalls, watering cans, insecticide pumps, coffee pulping machines, wheel barrows, and
animal pulled ploughs.
15Examples of studies on risk taking in developing countries, that use a similar method include Bin-
swanger (1980); Henrich and McElreath (2002); Attanasio et al. (2012).
16In appendix B.5, we elaborate on difficulties in using alternative measures of risk attitudes, such as
certainty equivalents, instead of direct choices.
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High outcome Low outcome
Lottery p = 0.8 p = 0.2 µ σ CRRA range
A 6,000 6,000 6,000 0 8.13 to infinity
B 7,000 5,000 6,600 800 2.69 to 8.13
C 8,000 4,000 7,200 1,600 1.55 to 2.69
D 9,000 3,000 7,800 2,400 1.03 to 1.55
E 10,000 2,000 8,400 3,200 0.70 to 1.03
F 11,000 1,000 9,000 4,000 0.38 to 0.70
G 12,000 0 9,600 4,800 - infinity to 0.38
Table 2.1: Lotteries
Note: Amounts stated in Ugandan Shillings (UGX); 1000 UGX ≈ 0.39 USD (as of October 14, 2013).
µ is the expected value, σ indicates the standard deviation of the lottery. Based on expected utility
theory and assuming constant relative risk aversion, the CRRA parameter r refers to a utility function
U(x) = x1−r(1 − r)−1. For example, F is the optimal choice for an expected utility maximizer with
0.38 ≥ r ≥ 0.70.
Each lottery was described to participants verbally and graphically (see Figure B.1 in
appendix B.3.1). For example, for option A a green and a white counter were both worth
6,000 UGX; for option D a white counter was worth 9,000 UGX and a green counter was
worth 3,000 UGX.17 Subjects were then asked to choose one lottery. Before doing so, each
subject was asked to answer four control questions.18
At the beginning of each session participants were informed that they would be able to
earn money and that their decisions were confidential. Then everyone was asked to take
a seat in the meeting room. Chairs were arranged in the room such that no subject could
see what another subject was looking at. At the end of the experiment, draws were made,
using a bag with counters, and participants received their payments in private.19 Overall,
15 sessions were conducted with on average 18-19 subjects and maximally 22 subjects. In
each session all participants belong to the same subcounty, but could come from different
villages. In total 275 subjects participated, of whom 252 correctly answered the control
questions. Only these subjects are included in the analyses below.20
17We also also showed them real money while explaining the value of each counters and demonstrated
how counters would be drawn out of a bag.
18For example, “If you chose option C, how much would you go home with if you picked a white counter
out of the bag?”. The complete instructions can be found in appendix B.3.1.
19After this choice task, subjects participated in a second task, independent of the first one; details
can be found in appendix B.3.2.
20We excluded 23 participants. These people only had little education (primary education or less),
only about two years of schooling on average. About 78% of them were female. Table B.2 in appendix
B.4 provides the above individual characteristics for both analyzed and initial sample. While these do not
differ substantially, we control for individual characteristics in our analysis. Comparing the subsample
which was dropped for the analysis to the analyzed sample we find that the proportion of female is
larger (Fisher exact test p-value 0.004); the frequency of being married is smaller (Fisher exact test p-
value 0.029); the number of years at school is smaller (MW-test p-value < 0.01); and the median age is
higher (MW-test p-value 0.035). Household size (MW-test p-value 0.119) and differences in occupation
(Fisher exact test p-value 1.000 (for primary occupation), 0.265 (for general farming activities)) are not
significantly different. Further, we do not find that the analyzed sample and the initial sample which
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2.4 Descriptive statistics
This section provides the descriptive statistics of our data with respect to individual socio-
economic characteristics (section 2.4.1) and behavior in the experimental task (section
2.4.2).
2.4.1 Socio-economic characteristics
Table 2.2 presents the summary statistics of the participants’ socio-economic character-
istics. Forty-nine percent of participants were female. Age varies from 18 to 70, the
average participant being approximately 40 years old. Sixty-one percent were heads of
their household, eighty-one percent were married, and the average household consisted
of about six members.21 A vast majority earned most of their income by farming activi-
ties. In fact, ninety-six percent were involved in farming, though not necessarily as their
primary occupation. Around seventy percent attended only primary school. Catholicism
and Protestantism are the most prevalent religions, both practiced by nearly forty percent
of our participants.
2.4.2 Risk attitudes
In the experiment subjects were asked to make exactly one decision. They choose one
out of the seven lotteries given in Table 2.1. Table 2.3 reports the distribution of choices
observed in the analyzed sample. 22.6% chose lottery E which paid (a salient amount
of) 10,000 UGX with 80% chance and 2,000 UGX with 20% chance. Only 9% chose D,
while a similar fraction of 14.7% and 13.1% chose the extremes A (very risk averse) and
G (very risk loving), respectively.
Hence, we observe considerable heterogeneity in individual risk attitudes. To test whether
risky choices can be explained by individual characteristics, we run an ordered logit re-
gression to predict the likelihood to choose a particular lottery based on individual char-
acteristics as potential determinants of risk attitudes. As reported in Table 2.4 we find
that the exogenous variables gender, age and religion have a significant impact on risk
tolerance.
Interestingly, we find that men are significantly more risk averse than women. This result
is in line with existing studies in small scale societies, which found a tendency (though
not significant) towards higher risk aversion for men, e.g., Henrich and McElreath (2002)
or Gneezy et al. (2009). As expected, we find that age is negatively correlated with risky
also includes subjects who failed in the control tasks differ significantly with respect to risk attitudes.
Subjects excluded from the analysis were on average slightly more risk averse, though not significantly
so (MW-test on the average choice, p-value 0.107).
21In the visited villages it is possible that more than one person in the household takes on the role of
the household head.
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Mean Std. Dev.
Gender 0.49 0.50
Age 40.23 13.36
Household Head 0.62 0.49
Married 0.81 0.39
Number of people in household 6.04 2.77
Farming as primary occupation 0.85 0.36
Farming activities 0.96 0.20
Education (type) 1.13 0.57
Years of schooling 5.21 2.87
Education type Freq. (%)
Primary 70.2
Secondary 19.1
Tertiary 1.6
None 9.1
Religion Freq. (%)
Catholicism 38.9
Protestantism (Anglicanism & other) 39.3
Islam 11.5
Born Again 9.9
Seventh Day Adventists 0.4
Table 2.2: Summary statistics
Note: These summary statistics refer to N = 252 subjects who participated in the social survey and the
experiment.
Lottery
A B C D E F G
Frequency 37 31 36 23 57 35 33
in % 14.68% 12.30% 14.29% 9.13% 22.62% 13.89% 13.10%
Table 2.3: Distribution of risk attitudes
Note: Absolute and relative frequency of elicited risk attitudes in the experiment.
choices in the experiment, meaning that older participants are significantly more risk
averse than younger people. This result is consistent with other studies, e.g., Binswanger
(1980), who finds that younger people exhibit relatively more risk seeking behavior. Also,
Henrich and McElreath (2002) report that age had a negative, though not significant
impact on the willingness to take risk in Chile and Tanzania.
In our sample, Protestants are significantly more risk seeking compared with other Chris-
tians or Non-Christians. This is in line with findings in Dohmen et al. (2011) based on the
German SOEP panel, who report that Catholics, other Christians and Non-Christians are
significantly less willing to take risks compared to Protestants. However, evidence on the
relationship between risk attitudes and religion is mixed. In two representative samples of
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the Dutch people, for example, Noussair et al. (2013) find that Protestants are more risk
averse compared to Catholics, but Renneboog and Spaenjers (2012) report that Catholics
are significantly more risk averse than non-religious people, while Protestants are not.
Regarding other individual characteristics, we do not find that individual risk attitudes
are significantly correlated to years of schooling, marital status and the wealth index.
Risk Attitudes
Coefficients Odds Ratio
Gender 0.396* 1.486*
[0.211] [0.314]
Age -0.0186* 0.982*
[0.0103] [0.010]
Protestant 0.590** 1.804**
[0.237] [0.427]
Years of Schooling -0.0257 0.975
[0.0365] [0.036]
Married -0.244 0.784
[0.494] [0.387]
Wealth index 0.0735 1.076
[0.0817] [0.088]
Observations 252
Log-lik. -474.2
Table 2.4: Ordered logit regression
Note: This table reports the coefficients and odds ratios of an ordered logit regression. The dependent
variable refers to the lottery choice and takes on values from 1 to 7, with 1 being the most risk averse
and 7 the least. Gender, Protestant and Married are dummy variables taking on value one for females,
protestants (Anglicans or others) and married subjects, respectively.
Standard errors are clustered on the session level and reported in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
2.5 Empirical strategy
This section first describes how we construct a dataset of links (dyads) between different
participants (section 2.5.1). Then, we specify the regression approach (section 2.5.2) and
provide summary statistics regarding the specific links in our sample (section 2.5.3).
2.5.1 Classification of links
In the social survey we elicited each participant’s links to any other participant from the
respondent’s village (as described in section 2.3.1). Based on all interviews we construct
a dataset in which each observation refers to two respondents, i and j, whose link was
documented in the survey. In the following we refer to one observation as a dyad and to
the dataset as the dyadic dataset.
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We categorize a link between i and j either as a no-conflict link or a conflict link to
distinguish between those village members who get along well and those who experienced
conflicts.22 We apply the “or-matching”, i.e., define a conflict link to exist if either i or
j (or both) indicated a conflict in the social survey. Table B.3 in appendix B.4 provides
details on the distribution of conflict links, with respect to kin, generation, and gender.
Next, based on i and j’s risk attitudes, in the following denoted by RAi and RAj, re-
spectively, we define the difference in their risk attitudes, δRAij , as the absolute distance
between RAi and RAj.
Beyond that, for each dyad ij, we observe the individual socio-economic characteristics
of i and j (as outlined in section 2.4.1) as well as other characteristics of the link between
i and j. More specifically, based on the socio-economic survey we measure absolute
distances in age (in years), wealth (wealth index) and education (ordered categories of
primary, secondary, tertiary school); we also code differences in gender, marital status
and occupation, whether they belong to different ethnic groups, and whether they differ
in their ability to work.
In addition to differences in socio-economic characteristics, the social survey collects fur-
ther information about a link, which we include in our analysis: whether i and j are
neighbors, belong to the same social groups, received or offered a loan and/or gift to
the other one, and whether they are kin.23 Our definition of kin captures a broad mea-
sure for being related. Not only close relatives, i.e., parents and their children, but also
relatives over two generations, such as grandparents and their grandchildren or cousins,
are classified as kin. Although people in our sample might be more likely to be related
compared to developed countries, kinship constitutes an important component within the
social network of Ugandan people (as in other African rural societies). Kin live in the
same or neighboring households, hence, sharing proximity and time. Moreover, families
share and jointly utilize land, which is passed on from generation to generation.
2.5.2 Model specification
In the data analysis we estimate logit models based on our dyadic dataset, to regress the
likelihood of a conflict link on differences in individual characteristics as well as charac-
teristics of links.24 Summary statistics of the covariates can be found in Table B.4 in
22As noted earlier, only one pair of individuals agreed to not know each other, in which case we would
say that no link exists. This observation is excluded in the analysis reported in section 2.6.1.
23We define the category kin similar to the one of conflict, i.e., based on the “or”-matching. This
means, a kin link is assumed to exist if at least one of both respondents claimed that a kin link exists.
The same applies to the classification of neighbors, group members, and exchanges of gifts and loans.
24These covariates control for characteristics that might be correlated with both differences in risk
attitudes and the likelihood of conflict. The characteristics of social links might induce an endogeneity
bias. For example, individuals who experienced a conflict might be less likely to exchange loans or gifts,
or participate in the same social group. We control for this by testing whether results change if social link
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appendix B.4.
We use the following notation to specify dyad ij:
cij ∈ {0, 1} is an indicator for a conflict link between i and j;
δRAij denotes the difference in i and j’s risk attitudes;
∆Eij is a row vector of differences between i and j’s socio-economic characteristics;
∆Sij is a row vector of characteristics of i and j’s link;
vij denotes the village of i and j;
Sij is a row vector that indicates in which experimental session(s) i and j partici-
pated.25
Then, the likelihood for the presence of a conflict, i.e., cij = 1, is assumed to be given by
Pr
(
cij = 1 | δRAij ; ∆Eij; ∆Sij; vij;Sij
)
= F
(
α + δRAij β + ∆
E
ijγ + ∆
S
ijκ+ vijξ + Sijη + ij
)
,
(2.1)
where F (x) = (1− exp(x))−x denotes the cumulative standard logistic distribution func-
tion. We estimate the parameters in equation (2.1) based on a dyadic regression approach
in which we cluster standard errors at the village level. We include village fixed effects
and session fixed effects for both participants. Since all links (and observed conflicts)
concern relationships within villages, controlling for village specific unobservables as well
as for correlations at the village level is particularly important.26
2.5.3 Dyadic dataset
Our sample consists of 917 dyads; the composition of their links is summarized in Table
2.5.27 Around one fifth (21.5%) of remaining dyads are categorized as conflict links.
characteristics are excluded as independent variables. This is not the case. We will refer to additional
results in the appendix where relevant in section 2.6.
25Note that for all dyads it holds that i and j come from the same village. In contrast, i and j do
not necessarily participate in the same experimental session since invitations to particular sessions were
randomized at the subcounty level.
26Alternatively to clustering to the village level, we could also cluster in two dimensions with respect
to both sessions of i and j. This approach, actually developed for panel data analysis in finance (see
e.g., Cameron et al., 2011; Thompson, 2011), is not optimally suited for our dataset because the number
of sessions is substantially smaller than the number of villages. But as discussed in Petersen (2009)
clustered standard errors “are consistent as the number of clusters grows” (p. 440); and, hence, clustering
on the village level provides the more conservative approach which also cleanly controls for within-
village correlations. When conducting a two-dimensional clustering dyadic regression, the results remain
qualitatively the same. Another approach would be to cluster on the subcounty level since all participants
of each experimental session belong to the same subcounty. However, since our dataset only covers five
different subcounties, following the argument above, the number of clusters is insufficiently small. One
could also estimate dyadic ols models to regress the differences in risk attitudes on a conflicts dummy
and other independent variables; again, results remain qualitatively the same.
27Note that we observe multiple links for each participant within his or her village. On average, for
each respondent we elicited his or her link to eight other participants, respectively (standard deviation =
2.4; same for initial and analyzed sample).
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Almost 40% of our sample are classified as kin. Among those, 16.5% correspond to
conflict links, compared to 24.5% among village members who are not related. Hence,
conflicts within families seem to be less likely than across families.28
% of conflicts N (ties)
All 21.48% 917
Kin
No 24.56% 566
Yes 16.52% 351
Senior/Junior 18.59% 156
Same generation 14.87% 195
Gender
Female-Female 20.10% 194
Female-Male 26.81% 470
Male-Male 12.65% 253
Table 2.5: Dyadic dataset
Due to random sampling nearly half of all dyads, 51.3%, are formed by one man and
one woman, 21.2% by two women and 27.6% refer to two men.29 Conflict links occur
least frequently between men, only in 12.7% of all respective dyads. In comparison,
26.8% of mixed gender pairs and 20.1% of all female-female dyads experienced a conflict,
respectively.
2.6 Results
This section examines whether differences in individual risk attitudes are related to the
likelihood with which individuals experience conflicts. First, we report estimation results
based on the dyadic dataset of links among village members (section 2.6.1). In a second
step, we apply a simulation based approach which allows us to compare existing links
(no-conflict links or conflict links) to randomly generated links across villages (section
2.6.2).
2.6.1 Conflict links and differences in risk attitudes
Figure 2.1 displays the distribution of differences in individual risk attitudes by the cate-
gory of dyads, i.e., distinguishing between no-conflict and conflict links. Averaging over
the sample (Figure 2.1(a)), the distribution shifts to the right for individuals who experi-
28The difference in the likelihood of a conflict link between kin and nonkin is confirmed to be significant
in dyadic regression models, which we report in the subsequent analysis (section 2.6.1).
29We noted earlier that more women than men failed in the control task.
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enced a conflict relative to those who did not. This shift is even more pronounced within
kin (Figure 2.1(b)), but not apparent for non-kin (Figure 2.1(c)).
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Figure 2.1: Distribution of differences in risk attitudes
Note: These graphs display the distribution of differences in individual risk attitudes, for the analyzed
sample (a), for kin (b), and nonkin dyads (c).
Our regression analysis reveals a persistent and significant influence of differences in in-
dividual risk attitudes on the likelihood of conflicts. Table 2.6 reports the estimated
marginal effects based on two model specifications and different subsamples. Consider-
ing all ties, columns (1) and (2), the probability of conflict increases by 2 percentage
points when the difference in risk attitudes increases by one unit. Relative to the average
frequency of conflict, namely 21.5%, this corresponds to an increase by roughly 10%.30,31
Two other individual characteristics increase the likelihood of conflict significantly, differ-
ences in age and gender. If we compare the magnitude of their effect in terms of standard
deviations to that of differences in risk attitudes, we find that an increase in one standard
deviation in difference in risk attitude increases the log odds ratio of conflict by 0.215.
This effect is the same as the effect of increasing age by one standard deviation, 0.235,
30This interpretation treats the independent variable δRA in a cardinal way. To test whether this
assumption is justified we ran some robustness checks and estimated logit models with dummy variables
for small and large differences in risk attitudes. The results remain qualitatively the same and are
presented in Table B.5 in appendix B.4.
31Table B.6 in appendix B.4 presents estimates from models which do not include social link charac-
teristics as covariates. As previously noted, results do not change significantly.
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and half that of changing gender from a same-gender link to a different-gender link, 0.419.
Hence, in terms of magnitude, differences in risk attitudes are important as well.32
In contrast, two factors contribute to significantly decreasing the likelihood of conflict:
belonging to a different religion and belonging to a different social group. Both findings
suggest that conflicts are likely to occur among those village members who frequently meet,
for example, in religious gatherings, drinking groups or microfinance meetings. Further,
interpersonal conflicts are significantly less likely within families relative to unrelated
village members. Overall, different risk attitudes are significantly related to conflict.
We examine in which subsamples differences in risk attitudes are most likely to be related
to conflict. First, we examine kin and nonkin dyads, in columns (3) and (4) of Table 2.6.
Remarkably, the relationship between differences in risk attitudes and the presence of
conflicts is the more pronounced within families, in terms of magnitude and significance.
We find that one unit increase in the difference in risk attitudes increases the probability
that kin experience conflicts by 5 percentage points. Further, differences in age do not
significantly affect the likelihood of conflicts within families, although they still do in
non-related dyads.33
Second, we examine whether differences in risk attitudes play a different role across differ-
ent gender combinations in a dyad. Columns (5), (6) and (7) report the estimation results
for three disjoint subsamples, for dyads where both individuals are female (column (5)),
for individuals who are of different gender (column (6)), and both male (column (7)).34
We find that differences in risk attitudes are significantly related to the presence of con-
flicts only for male-male dyads. In contrast, for pairs of mixed gender or two women, any
relationship is insignificant. Moreover, women among each other seem to be concerned
about different issues compared to other gender pairs. In particular, having a different
marital status significantly increases the likelihood of conflict, by 19 percentage points.
Conflicts between men, on the other hand, are significantly influenced by differences in
age, by whether village members are neighbors or belong to the same social groups. Im-
portantly, an increase in the difference in risk attitudes by one unit increases the likelihood
of conflict by 4 percentage points between two men.
32The coefficients of the dyadic logit model are presented in appendix B.4, Table B.7.
33Given the significant correlation between age and individual risk attitudes (section 2.4.2), we ran
additional estimations in which we control for whether relatives belong to the same generation, such as
siblings or cousins, or to different generations, such as parents and their children or aunts/uncles and
their nieces/nephews. Again, differences in risk attitudes are significantly related to the presence of
conflicts, magnitudes and significance remain unchanged, but generation does not matter significantly for
the likelihood of conflicts.
34Due to limited sample size it is not feasible to estimate regressions for subsamples that distinguish
between different gender pairs as well as between kin at the same time.
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Our results so far can be summarized as follows.
Result 1. Differences in risk attitudes are significantly and positively related to conflict.
This relationship is particularly strong for kin and among men.
2.6.2 Conflict versus random links: a simulation approach
So far, we have relied on the dataset of existing links which we observed at the village
level. In our data, every dyad is either in conflict or no conflict. There are no dyads
(except for one) in which two individuals within a village report not to know each other,
i.e., where there is no link at all. In this section we exploit the fact that individuals
from different villages do not have a link and thereby generate random links, between
pairs of people who do not know each other. The question we ask is, are differences in
risk attitudes in links with conflict similar to links between individuals who do not know
each other? If the answer is yes, this would indicate a relationship from conflict to risk
attitudes, by which conflict may break a relationship and lead individuals who potentially
had similar risk attitudes to evolve towards risk attitudes as different as those of people
who do not know each other. If the answer is no, this would provide supportive evidence
for the fact that the relationship could go the opposite way: differences in risk attitudes
leading to conflict.
More precisely, for each individual we formed 100 links by randomly selecting individuals
from different villages, without replacement. Appending these random links to our initial
set of observations yields a dyadic dataset which allows for three categories of dyads.
Under the assumption that social interaction mainly happens within villages, random
links provide some insights on individuals who do not (or only rarely) know each other.35
Table 2.7 summarizes the differences in risk attitudes for dyads of all three categories. We
find that differences in risk attitudes differ considerably in their means. The average is
largest for those who experienced a conflict, and smallest for those who know each other
and get along well. For random links, the mean difference in risk attitudes is close to the
midpoint between no-conflict and conflict links.
As a next step, we ask whether an increase in the difference in risk attitude is equally likely
to predict a conflict link and a random link. To do so, we estimate an ordered logit model
in which we regress the likelihood to observe a particular category of dyad, i.e., no-conflict
link, conflict link, or random link, on differences in risk attitudes and other socio-economic
35We could have created random links across different villages but within the same subcounties, in
which case villages of randomly linked individuals might be more similar. To generate links across villages
and subcounties, however, makes random links more comparable to links between individuals who do not
know each other. In either case, both approaches yield results that are qualitatively and quantitatively
similar.
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No conflict Conflict No tie
Mean difference in risk attitude 2.21 2.33 2.26
Std. Error 0.061 0.115 0.010
Table 2.7: Mean differences in risk attitudes - by category of link
Note: This table reports the average of absolute values in risk attitudes (δRA) and their standard errors by
three categories of links: no-conflict link, conflict link, based on existing ties in the dataset, and random
link, based on simulated ties.
characteristics.36 Analogously to models estimated in section 2.6.1, we include village and
session fixed effects of both individuals, and standard errors are clustered on the village
level.37 We find that differences in risk attitudes significantly increase the probability that
individuals experience conflicts compared to the probability that individuals are randomly
linked, as shown in Table 2.8. In contrast, an increase in the difference in risk attitudes
does not imply a significant change in the likelihood for being randomly linked and for
getting along well, i.e., no-conflict. The effects might seem small in their magnitude, but
given that in the extended sample only 0.75% of dyads have interpersonal conflicts, an
increase in the likelihood for such a conflict by 0.06 percentage points is relatively large
and close to 8%. The findings that conflicts are significantly correlated to differences in
age, gender, and religion, are once more confirmed.
Result 2. In a sample of existing links between village members and randomly generated
links across different villages, differences in individual risk attitudes are largest for conflict
links. Relative to random links a marginal increase in the difference in risk attitudes is
significantly related to an increase in the likelihood of conflict.
2.7 Discussion
We find that individuals are significantly more likely to report a conflictual relationship
when the difference between their individual risk attitudes is larger. This tendency is
particularly pronounced within families and for male-male dyads. Further, differences
in risk attitudes are significantly larger in dyads with reported conflictual links than in
random dyads.
To the best of our knowledge this is the first paper to identify close interdependencies
between interpersonal conflicts and risk attitudes. The finding that individuals who differ
36Note that information about the social relationship is not available for simulated ties, and hence,
variables from the social survey are not included in these regressions.
37For randomly generated links, individuals i and j do not come from the same village. Hence,
clustering only on i’s village might not completely rule out biased standard errors. However, we address
this concern by letting each individual appear as person i in at least one observation, and by including
fixed effects of i and j’s villages and sessions.
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No conflict Conflict
Difference in RA -0.000565 0.000647**
[0.000593] [0.000319]
Age distance -0.000017 0.000100**
[0.000078] [0.000043]
Diff. Gender -0.001942 0.004231***
[0.001871] [0.001178]
Diff. Ethnicity -0.004858 0.003684
[0.003610] [0.003474]
Diff. Marital Status -0.003244 0.001381
[0.002269] [0.001686]
Diff. Religion -0.020476*** -0.005972***
[0.005475] [0.001726]
Education distance -0.000612 0.000075
[0.001503] [0.000910]
Wealth distance -0.000445 -0.00035
[0.000573] [0.000381]
Diff. Occupation -0.003782 -0.001269
[0.002335] [0.002179]
Diff. in Disabilities -0.001076 0.002768**
[0.001529] [0.001292]
Observations 26,117
Category of interest as % of all observations 2.76% 0.75%
Log-lik. -3787
Table 2.8: Ordered logit regression: likelihood for link categories
Note: This table reports the marginal effects of an ordered logit regression. The dependent variable refers
to the category of link, i.e., no-conflict link (column (1)), conflict link (column (2)); random link is the
base category. Independent variables are defined as in Table 2.6.
Regression includes village and session fixed effects, for both individuals in each dyad. Standard errors
are clustered on the village level and reported in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
in their attitudes towards risk are more likely to experience conflicts with each other is
novel to the literature on risk attitudes as well as to the literature on the endogenous
formation of risk sharing groups (both reviewed above). We close this paper with some
remarks on possible ways in which risk attitudes may relate to conflict and comments on
identifying correlation versus causality.
2.7.1 Risk levels or differences?
One may conjecture that conflict may be driven by levels or risk aversion, which perhaps
correlate with some personality traits, and not necessarily with differences in risk attitudes
within a dyad. We address this possible confound in two ways. First, we find that the
average risk attitude elicited in the experiment does not differ significantly between those
people who actually report a conflict at least once compared to those who never report
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a conflict (Fisher exact test p-value 0.297).38 Second, we estimate dyadic logit models
following the approach used in section 2.6.1. For dyads where individuals are similar in
terms of their risk attitudes we test whether the level of risk attitudes (which ranges from
1 to 7) has an effect on the likelihood of a conflict to be present. Results can be found
in Table B.8 in appendix B.4. We find that (i) conditional on having exactly the same
risk attitudes (δRA = 0), and (ii) conditional on a difference by only one unit (δRA = 1),
the likelihood of a conflict link is not significantly related to the absolute degree of risk
attitudes (RA itself). Hence, Result 1 and Result 2, reported above, are not driven by
the possibility that the level and not the difference in risk attitudes is related to conflict.
2.7.2 Correlation and causality
Exogenously varying differences in risk attitudes among inhabitants of the villages studied
in eastern Uganda is not something we have attempted in this study. We are hence able to
draw conclusions about correlations, but do not prove statements of causality. Although
identifying directions of causality is an important task, randomly assigning individuals to
villages or groups for the sake of obtaining an exogenous source of variation in differences
in risk attitudes, and thereby to be able to observe a causal link to conflict, is clearly
morally objectionable, the more so since in rural eastern Uganda interpersonal conflicts
relate to serious disputes and often result in violence.
Nonetheless, we ask ourselves, which mechanism seems more likely to explain the relations
observed in our data? On the one hand, individuals might experience interpersonal conflict
because they differ in their risk attitudes, as suggested by existing results on bargaining
under risk and heterogeneous preferences. On the other hand, individuals might differ in
their risk attitudes because they experienced conflicts in the past and consequently give
each other a wide berth in the future. In the long run, by breaking links opponents might
join different peer groups and assimilate to their groups’ (mean) attitudes. It may also be
possible that both causalities might exist at the same time: differences in risk attitudes
might lead to conflicts, and conflicts might even strengthen differences in risk attitudes,
generating segregation with respect to attitudes and a high frequency of conflicts.
We do not find much evidence in favor of a causal effect of interpersonal conflicts on
differences in risk attitudes. Further, our results are strongly driven by kinship. Belonging
to the same kin, however, makes it more difficult – or more costly in economic terms –
to break an existing link. If conflicts explain differences in risk attitudes, then we should
expect to observe a correlation between conflict links and differences in risk attitudes not
only within certain subsamples.
38In our sample, we find that the majority of subjects (220) actually never report a conflict with
anyone. Among those who report a conflict with at least one of their peers, the frequency of reported
conflicts is quite uniformly distributed over (0,1]. Only one subject reports to have conflicts with all of
his peers.
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2.8 Conclusion
This paper examines whether interpersonal conflict is related to differences in individ-
ual attitudes, particularly to differences in attitudes towards risk. Our fieldwork in rural
Uganda includes a social survey to identify links between village members, which is fol-
lowed by an experiment to elicit risk attitudes. Our sample covers nearly one thousand
dyads of individuals and provides detailed information about socio-economic characteris-
tics as well as characteristics of social relationships. With the exception of only one dyad,
all village members know each other. Out of these existing links more than a fifth, 21.5%,
report interpersonal conflict.
We find a persistent and significant relationship between the presence of conflict links
and differences in risk attitudes: a larger difference is significantly related to a higher
likelihood for interpersonal conflict. Interestingly, this relationship is particularly driven
by kin, but not found to be significant for non-related village members. More precisely, for
kin, a one unit increase in the difference in risk attitudes corresponds to a four percentage
points increase in the likelihood of conflict, raising the frequency of conflict links within
families by more than 20%. With respect to gender, we find a significant correlation only
among males, in contrast to social ties between women or individuals of different gender.
To extrapolate our analysis to links between individuals who are very unlikely to know
each other, we use a simulation approach and randomly generate links across villages. If
conflicts are likely to result in the severing of links, as a result of which differences in
risk attitudes might increase, we would expect risk attitudes to be similar across random
and conflict links. However, differences in risk attitudes are significantly larger among
conflict links. Consistent with our previous results we find that a marginal increase
in the difference in risk attitudes correlates to a significant increase in the likelihood of
conflict links, relative to randomly generated links. Moreover, we do not find any evidence
that risk attitudes per se are correlated to personal attributes which might be related to
interpersonal conflict.
An important novelty of this paper is our focus on negative interpersonal links, conflict,
instead of positive relationships, such as friendship, and to links with only little or no
depth. In that sense, our paper provides the first evidence which relates differences in in-
dividual attitudes to interpersonal conflict. Our evidence suggests that among individuals
who frequently make joint economic decisions, kin and males, the likelihood of conflict
increases with differences in their risk attitudes. Examining which particular types of
conflict relate to differences in attitudes towards risk, and how these could potentially be
prevented, will be an important step for future research. Our results explicitly show how
fragile interpersonal relationships might be under heterogeneity in risk attitudes.
Chapter 3
An Anatomy of Ambiguity
Attitudes∗
3.1 Introduction
In decision under uncertainty, risky prospects with known probabilities are often distin-
guished from ambiguous prospects with unknown or uncertain probabilities. Inspired by
a classic article by Daniel Ellsberg (1961), it is typically assumed that people dislike am-
biguity and adjust their behavior in favor of known-probability risks, even at significant
costs. A large literature has studied the consequences of such ambiguity aversion for
decision-making in the presence of uncertainty. Building on decision theories that assume
ambiguity aversion, this literature shows that ambiguity can account for empirically ob-
served violations of expected utility-based theories (“anomalies”). In financial economics,
ambiguity aversion has been employed to explain phenomena such as the equity premium
and risk-free rate puzzles (Maenhout, 2004; Collard et al., 2011; Gollier, 2011; Ju and
Miao, 2012), and the stock market participation puzzle (Dow and Werlang, 1992; Easley
and O’Hara, 2009). Alary et al. (2013) and Snow (2011) show that ambiguity aversion
influences optimal insurance take-up, deductible choice, and self-protection activities. In
health economics, Berger et al. (2013) find that ambiguity about the diagnosis or the
treatment of a medical condition affects patients’ treatment choices, while Hoy et al.
(2014) explain the low take-up of costless genetic tests by ambiguity aversion. Ambiguity
aversion has also been employed in economic models of climate change to motivate rapid
emission cuts (Millner et al., 2010; Farber, 2011). Many of these results have served to
motivate regulation and policy (see Farber, 2011).
These theoretical contributions presume a universally negative attitude towards ambigu-
ity. Such an assumption seemed descriptively justified on the basis of an experimental
literature following Ellsberg’s original article. Many studies have implemented an urn-
∗This chapter is based on joint work with Martin G. Kocher and Stefan T. Trautmann.
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choice experiment proposed by Ellsberg to identify ambiguity attitudes (see section 3.2),
and have predominantly found ambiguity aversion. However, as Ellsberg (2011) argues in
a recent commentary at the occasion of the 50th anniversary of his seminal article, the
predominance of ambiguity aversion in experimental findings might be due to a narrow
focus on the domain of moderate likelihood gains, as in his original examples. While
fear of a bad unknown probability might prevail in this domain, people might be more
optimistic in other domains, hoping for ambiguity to offer better odds than a known-risk
alternative.
Trautmann and van de Kuilen (forthcoming) review the empirical literature on ambiguity
and find evidence for a more complex pattern of attitudes: while ambiguity aversion is
the predominant finding in the domain of moderate likelihood gains and low likelihood
losses, for moderate likelihood gains and low likelihood losses ambiguity seeking is often
reported. Notable, many of the above cited theoretical contributions in economics and
finance concern applications in which unlikely events and loss outcomes are important. A
rejection of universal ambiguity aversion would therefore have important implications for
the empirical relevance of these theoretical findings. In particular, if ambiguity seeking
is predominating in important domains, theoretical analyses may fruitfully consider the
implications of ambiguity loving for economics and finance.
However, a rejection of universal ambiguity aversion on the basis of the above review
results should be considered with care. The basic Ellsberg paradigm is easy to implement,
and has consequently been studied in hundreds of experiments. In contrast, conducting
experiments with losses and identifying ambiguity attitudes for low likelihood events is
complex. This has led to significant design heterogeneity across domains, which could
potentially explain the differences in observed attitudes. Existing studies on these domains
are much fewer, with basically no studies that consider all four domains with an identical
design in terms of financial incentives and elicitation procedures (see appendix C.1 for
an overview of existing studies that report on all four domains, and Table C.1 and C.2
for their design features). Given the importance of ambiguity attitudes for economic
theorizing and policy, a careful measurement of these preferences across the gain and loss,
and across the low and moderate likelihood domains is warranted. The current paper
presents such measurements, and also studies ambiguity attitudes for mixed prospects
where both gains and losses may be incurred. The next section presents the design of the
tasks and incentives, which have been designed to minimize differences across domains
and to minimize potential biases that could have led to ambiguity seeking in previous
studies.
Section 3.3 describes basic properties of the data and section 3.4 presents results for
the pure outcome domains (either gain or loss). Section 3.5 presents results for mixed
prospects. Despite skewing our design towards ambiguity neutrality, we find clear evidence
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for the pattern predicted by Daniel Ellsberg in his 2011 commentary. Section 3.6 concludes
with a short discussion of the implication of these findings for the modeling of ambiguity
preferences.
3.2 Measurement of ambiguity attitudes
3.2.1 Prospects and domains
We elicit attitudes towards uncertain prospects defined on the outcome domain of gains
or losses, and involving either low or moderate likelihoods. Participants make choices
between ambiguous prospects and risky prospects. A risky prospect that pays ex with
probability p ∈ [0, 1] and ey otherwise is denoted xpy. An ambiguous prospect that pays
ex if event E occurs and ey otherwise is denoted xEy. Ambiguity attitudes are iden-
tified by comparing participants’ preferences between risky prospect xpy and ambiguous
prospect xEy, where E is defined such that exchangeability of events implies that the
subjective probability B(E) equals p. In particular, the ambiguous prospects are imple-
mented as bets on the color of a marble drawn from a bag with an unknown distribution
of colors, but with the participant being indifferent between betting on either of these
colors. Details on the procedure are given in section 3.2.3.
In the experiment we implement either moderate likelihood events with p = 0.5, or low
likelihood events with p = 0.1. The outcomes x and y vary across experimental conditions.
In treatments with pure outcome domains, x equals either e20 in the gain conditions,
or −e20 in the loss conditions, while y always equals e0. In treatments with mixed
prospects, x equals e10 and y equals −e10, or vice versa. All conditions are shown in the
first three columns of Table 3.1, which defines the conditions in terms of the properties of
the risky prospect employed in the comparison between risk and ambiguity.
# colors used Expected
Outcome (Subjective) to implement value of Predicted
Treatmenta domain probability ambiguous events risky prospect attitudeb
20.50 Gain p = 0.5 2 10 AA
(−20).50 Loss p = 0.5 2 -10 AS
20.10 Gain p = 0.1 10 2 AS
(−20).10 Loss p = 0.1 10 -2 AA
(−10).510 Mixed p = 0.5 2 0 –
(−10).110 Mixed p = 0.1 10 8 –
10.1(−10) Mixed p = 0.1 10 -8 –
Table 3.1: Treatments in a between-subjects design
Notes: a: risky prospect shown; b: based on pattern observed in the literature; AA=ambiguity aversion;
AS=ambiguity seeking.
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3.2.2 Measurement
We measure ambiguity attitudes in a between-subjects design with each subject par-
ticipating in exactly one of the seven treatments shown in Table 3.1. Our preference
elicitation procedures are designed to minimize (and control for) potential biases due to
the measurement method itself. To this end, we measure attitudes in two stages. In stage
1, we elicit a direct binary choice between a risky prospect and its matched ambiguous
prospect. While this choice provides the simplest test of ambiguity attitudes and involves
basically no design issues, it only allows us to categorize subjects into ambiguity averters
and ambiguity seekers (with neutrals included in both categories).
In stage 2, we then elicit probability equivalents q for the ambiguous prospect: we find the
risky prospect xqy such that the participant is indifferent between the prospect xqy and
xEy. Note that if preferences are not ambiguity neutral, B(E) implied by exchangeability
need not be equal to q. Differences in q across subjects allow us to identify ambiguity
attitudes more precisely. In particular, for gain prospects, a smaller q implies stronger
ambiguity aversion as the decision maker is willing to accept a lower known chance of
a gain in exchange for the unknown chance implied by E. For loss prospects a larger
q implies ambiguity aversion as the decision maker is willing to accept a larger known
chance of a loss in exchange for the unknown chance implied by E.
We elicit probability equivalents using a choice list consisting of nine binary choices, where
choice i elicits the preference between the ambiguous prospect xEy and a risky prospect
xqiy. The known probability qi increases when going down the list of choices, while the
outcomes x and y, and event E remain constant across choice items i. Table 3.2 shows
the probabilities qi used in the choice lists for moderate and for low likelihood events.
Prob. qi conditional on baseline likelihood p
Decision item blabla p = .5 p = .1
1 0.25 0.01
2 0.30 0.04
3 0.35 0.07
4 0.40 0.10
5 0.45 0.13
6 0.50 0.16
7 0.55 0.19
8 0.60 0.22
9 0.65 0.25
Table 3.2: Choice lists for eliciting probability equivalents
Notes: Entries are known probabilities qi; x, y, and E are constant across choices in this list and depend
on the treatment (see Table 3.1).
When going through the choice list, a participant is presented with choices in which the
known-risk prospect is initially very unattractive (for gains; opposite reasoning for losses),
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and subsequently becomes more attractive. If the initial risky prospect is less attractive
than the ambiguous prospect and the ninth risky prospect is more attractive than the
ambiguous prospect, there will be a probability qi at which the decision maker is indifferent
between the two prospects. We use the choice item at which the participant switches
from a preference for ambiguous to a preference for risky to approximate her probability
equivalent. Formally, for a subject who switches to risky after item i ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , 9} the
probability equivalent q is given by
q =

q1 − 12(q2 − q1) if i = 0;
1
2
(qi+1 + qi) if i ∈ {2, 3, . . . , 8};
q9 +
1
2
(q9 − q8) if i = 9;
where i = 0 means that the participant chooses risky already in the first choice option,
and i = 9 means that she never switches to risky. Hence, we take the midpoint between
probabilities as an estimate, or, if necessary, extrapolate a probability equivalent at the
boundaries of the choice list.1
While the stage 1 binary choices should not be prone to biases caused by the elicitation
procedure, elicitation procedures that measure more detailed preferences are typically
affected by design effects. The list of choices used to measure probability equivalents was
designed to minimize design-driven biases, while accounting for the prior evidence and the
structural differences between low and moderate likelihood prospects. Thus, we included
the direct choice between xEy and xpy roughly in the middle of the choice list, skewing the
list modestly towards the direction of ambiguity aversion for modest likelihood prospects
and towards ambiguity seeking for low likelihood prospects. This design aims to reduce
biases resulting form highly skewed choice lists for low likelihood prospects relative to
modest likelihood prospects, while at the same time reducing the risk of having many
subjects at the boundary of the choice lists by disregarding the previous evidence. In
particular, because previous studies reported probability equivalents in the range of 0.3
for modest (p = 0.5) and 0.2 for low likelihood (p = 0.1) prospects (Trautmann and van
de Kuilen, forthcoming), we wanted the choice list to cover these values away from the
boundaries of the list. The inclusion of the basic comparison between xEy and xpy allows
us to assess the robustness of the initial choice in the second occasion, and in particular
when it is included in a full list of choices. The comparison of the option selected in
1In a third stage of the experiment we also elicited certainty equivalents for the risky prospect xpy
as a measure of risk attitude. We observe the typical reflection effects between gains and losses, and
overweighting of small and underweighting of large probabilities. In particular, we find significant risk
aversion for gains with moderate likelihoods and for losses with low likelihoods; and significant risk
seeking for the mirrored domains and likelihoods. We do not observe any significant correlations between
ambiguity and risk attitudes, similar to findings reported by Cohen et al. (1987), Di Mauro and Maffioletti
(2004), or Levy et al. (2010). We do not discuss this part of the study in the current paper.
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stage 1 and stage 2 for this choice item provides us with a measure for the consistency of
ambiguity attitudes across tasks (Binmore et al., 2012; Charness et al., 2013).
3.2.3 Experimental procedures
Following the classic Ellsberg thought experiments, risky and ambiguous prospects are
implemented as opaque bags which are filled with exactly 100 chips of different colors.
In the moderate likelihood treatments (p = 0.5), bags contain at most two colors; in the
low likelihood treatments (p = 0.1), bags contain at most ten different colors. At the
beginning of the experiment and before any instructions for stage 1 are handed out, we
ask each participant to choose a personal “decision color” from the list of possible colors,
which will remain fixed throughout the experiment. At that point, participants are not
aware of any experimental details, thus their beliefs about events in the Ellsberg tasks
cannot affect their color choice. Participants are informed that the selected color will be
relevant for determining their payoffs.2
For the ambiguous prospect, an opaque bag has already been filled with 100 colored chips
at the time when subjects enter the laboratory. The distribution of colors is unknown to
subjects as well as to the experimenters, though we do allow participants to inspect this
bag as soon as the experiment is over.3 For each risky prospect xqiy we prepare a bag that
contains exactly qi× 100 red chips and (1− qi)× 100 chips of the remaining colors. Thus,
the prospect pays x if a red chip is drawn from the respective bag, and y if another chip is
drawn. In contrast, the ambiguous prospect pays x if a chip of the participant’s personal
decision color is drawn from the ambiguous bag, and y otherwise. By letting subjects
choose their personal decision color it is obviously impossible for the experimenter to
trick subjects or bias the distribution of colors in the ambiguous bag (Charness et al.,
2013). Additionally, in the instructions of each part, we remind subjects that they have
chosen their decision color themselves. Further, to facilitate an understanding of risky
prospects, the corresponding distributions of chips are placed on a table in the lab room,
visible to participants during the experiment (see Figure C.1 in appendix C.2).
At the beginning of the experiment subjects receive an endowment of e20. This endow-
ment is identical across treatments to avoid any effects from variations in initial wealth.
Additionally, one stage of the experiment is randomly selected to be payoff relevant for
all participants in a particular session at the end of the experiment. Within a choice list,
one decision item is randomly selected to be paid out. This selection is randomized at
2In the low likelihood treatments popular colors such as red, blue and green are chosen most often;
apart from that color choices are distributed quite evenly. Details are provided in Figure C.3 and Table
C.4 in appendix C.4.
3Before the experiment, a student assistant blindly drew 100 chips from an opaque bag filled with in
total roughly 1000 chips of all respective colors. From the instructions subjects only learn that a student
assistant drew 100 chips from a bag that contains considerably more than 100 chips.
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the individual level. Because the experiment was computerized (using zTree; Fischbacher,
2007), we aimed to ensure credibility regarding design and procedure (i) by implementing
prospects in a concrete and verifiable way; (ii) by allowing subjects to define the ambigu-
ous prospect through their individual decision color; and (iii) by randomly selecting one
participant as an assistant at the end of the experiment. This person is in charge of ran-
domly selecting the payoff-relevant stage, of filling the risky bags, and of finally drawing
one chip out of each bag. Each step is performed in front of the other participants, and
outcomes are entered on the assistant’s computer screen.4 Any earnings are added to the
initial endowment.
While subjects might earn up to e40 in the gain treatments, they might end up with zero
income in the loss treatments. In order to smooth expected income across treatments we
added an effort task based on Raven’s progressive matrices (Raven et al., 1998) at the end
of the experiment, in which subjects can earn an additional amount, which is negative in
the gain, and positive in the loss treatments.5 We do not provide any feedback on the
outcome of preceding stages during the experiment and instructions are not handed out
until the previous task had been finished. Sample instructions for the 20.50 treatment are
provided in appendix C.2.
3.3 Data description
In total 501 subjects participated in 21 experimental sessions, with three sessions for each
treatment condition. 58% of participants were female, the average age was 24.5 years,
and 21% were economics or business students. The experiment lasted roughly one hour
and participants earned on average e22.30 (approx. $29.30 at the time the experiment
was conducted).
We did not enforce single switching points in the choice list of stage 2, and as often
observed, some subjects switched more than once between ambiguous and risky prospects
when moving down the list. If the person chooses ambiguity in the first and risk in the
last choice item (for gains and mixed prospects with x > 0; vice versa for losses and mixed
prospects with x < 0), we deal with these violations of monotonicity by calculating the
4First, the assistant drew one ball out of an opaque bag containing three numbered balls, to determine
the payoff relevant stage. If stage 1 was selected, the assistant filled one opaque bag with the distribution
of chips defining the risky prospect xpy. If stage 2 was selected, the assistant filled nine opaque bags,
one for each decision item of the respective choice list. In total, ten different bags might be relevant, one
ambiguous and nine risky ones. The assistant then drew one chip from each bag.
5Subjects have to solve ten effort tasks, which presented them with 3×3 matrices of graphical figures,
with one cell left blank. Within 45 seconds, the subject had to select the correct figure out of six different
options, filling in the blank to complete the logical sequence of the matrix. In the gain treatments subjects
incur a loss for every incorrect answer; in the loss treatments subjects earn a positive amount for every
correct answer; in the mixed treatments subjects either face positive, negative or no incentives, which
depends on whether xpy yields a negative, positive or zero expected value, respectively.
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probability equivalent as the midpoint over the range defined by her first and by her last
switching point. If the person does not start from ambiguous and eventually switch to and
remain at risky, such a calculation is impossible and we drop the respective observation
from the sample of stage 2 choices.6 This leaves us with 289 stage 1 choices and 280 valid
stage 2 probability equivalents in the pure outcome treatments, and 212 stage 1 choices
and 204 valid stage 2 probability equivalents in the mixed outcome treatments.
We classify subjects as ambiguity averse or ambiguity seeking as follows. In the stage 1
direct choice, a subject is classified as ambiguity averse (seeking) if she prefers the risky
(ambiguous) prospect. In stage 2, for gain treatments (and in mixed with x > 0) a subject
is classified as ambiguity averse (seeking) if the probability equivalent q is smaller than p
(is larger than p). Analogously, in the loss treatments (x < 0) a subject is classified as
ambiguity averse (seeking) if the probability equivalent q is larger than p (is smaller than
p).
While binary choices in stage 1 do not allow identifying indifference between the am-
biguous and risky prospect, ambiguity neutrality can be detected on the basis of stage
2 probability equivalents. Ambiguity neutrality implies indifference between risky and
ambiguous prospect if and only if q = p (where p = 0.5 or p = 0.1). Thus, ambiguity
neutral subject will either switch in the decision item in which the known probability qi is
equal to p, or in the subsequent one.7 In the following we first give results without specific
consideration of ambiguity neutrality, and then discuss its extent and its impact on the
elicited pattern of attitudes in more detail. We subsequently analyze the consistency of
ambiguity attitudes across stages 1 and 2.
3.4 Ambiguity attitudes for pure outcome domains
3.4.1 Basic results
The left panel of Table 3.3 summarizes the results for the pure-domain treatments based
on the whole sample.8 The table indicates the direction of the preference in each condition
and stage (AA ambiguity aversion; AS ambiguity seeking; insignificant effects in parenthe-
ses). We replicate the typical finding of ambiguity aversion in the classic Ellsberg setting
6Overall the rate of inconsistencies was low: 5.8% of all choice lists involved inconsistencies (5.2%
in pure domains and 6.6% in mixed domains), and only 3.4% of all choice lists had to be dropped
from the sample (3.1% in pure domains and 3.8% in mixed domains). These rates are well within the
bounds typically observed in empirical studies. Results do not change substantially if we instead drop all
choice lists involving multiple switching, or if we exclude stage 1 observations for those people who were
inconsistent in stage 2 (shown in Table C.5 and C.6 in appendix C.4).
7That is, in the comparison between qi and p they may choose either option since they are indifferent.
Details and a graphical representation of neutrality are provided in appendix C.3.
8All tests reported in the paper are two-sided tests. We acknowledge that the predicted fourfold
pattern of attitudes could generate one-sided hypotheses. The interpretation of our results would not
change if one-sided tests were used accordingly.
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(i.e., 20.50): a minority of 38.9% prefers the ambiguous prospect in stage 1 (binomial test,
p=0.076), and probability equivalents are modestly, but significantly smaller than 0.5.
Whole sample Distinct from neutrality b
# obs. Stage 1: Stage 2: # obs. Stage 1: Stage 2:
Stage 1 ambiguous probability Stage 1 ambiguous probability
Treatment (Stage 2) choices (%) equivalenta (Stage 2) choices (%) equivalenta
20.50 72 (70) 38.9 AA* .48 AA*** 26 (26) 15.4 AA*** .43 AA***
(−20).50 73 (71) 47.9 (AA) .53 (AA) 17 (16) 64.7 (AS) .43 AS**
20.10 71 (67) 57.7 (AS) .12 AS*** 21 (20) 71.4 AS* .15 AS***
(−20).10 73 (72) 63.0 AS** .09 (AS) 25 (24) 28.0 AA** .15 AA*
Table 3.3: Ambiguity attitudes for pure outcome domains
Notes: a: median; b: classification as described in section 3.3; direction of effect: AA=ambiguity averse;
AS=ambiguity seeking; *,**,*** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level; Part 1: two-sided
binomial test against p=0.5; Part 2: two-sided t-test against probability equivalent=0.5/0.1.
In contrast, for the other outcome domains we do not find any ambiguity aversion. Behav-
ior in the moderate likelihood loss domain is indistinguishable from ambiguity neutrality
(defined here as 50% of subjects choosing either prospect in stage 1, and q = 0.5 in stage
2). For the two low likelihood prospects we observe ambiguity seeking, although the
preference is only statistically significant in stage 2 for 20.10 and in stage 1 for (−20).10.
That is, considering all domains, there is little evidence for universal ambiguity aversion:
pooling all stage 1 choices from pure domain treatments does not indicate any ambiguity
attitude (binomial test, p=0.556); classifying subjects as ambiguity averse or ambiguity
seeking according to their probability equivalent, we again no significant tendency to-
wards ambiguity aversion (binomial test, p=0.106). However, we also observe that the
pattern of attitudes shown in the left panel of Table 3.3 is not consistent with the fourfold
pattern identified in the literature (shown in Table 3.1, column 6), because the pattern
would predict ambiguity aversion for the (−20).10 loss treatment. In contrast, significant
ambiguity seeking is found in this domain.
3.4.2 Accounting for ambiguity neutrality
A significant share of the participants exhibits ambiguity neutrality as defined in section
3.3. Columns 1 to 4 in Table 3.4 show that the share of ambiguity neutral subjects in
the pure outcome domains falls in the range 62.9% up to 77.5% (related histograms of
probability equivalents are provided in Figure C.2 in appendix C.3). These are large
percentages. With respect to the basic Ellsberg domain 20.50 that suggests that while
many subjects have a tendency to make ambiguity averse choices, the strength of these
preferences might in fact be modest.
As described in section 3.3, ambiguity neutral subjects may make choices in different
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Treatment
l20.50l l(−20).50l l20.10l l(−20).10l (−10).510 (−10).110 10.1(−10)
62.9% 77.5% 70.2% 66.7% 82.4% 67.2% 81.2%
Table 3.4: Ambiguity neutral subjects by treatment
Notes: Entries report percentages of subjects with probability equivalent in the interval [0.475, 0.525]
in treatments with moderate likelihoods, and in [0.085, 0.115] in treatments with low likelihoods. See
section 3.3 for details.
ways that are both consistent with their preferences but lead to different categorizations
in terms of ambiguity attitude. This might affect the observed patterns of attitudes in
the four domains of interest. The right panel of Table 3.3 shows results including only
those subjects who are not identified as ambiguity neutral. Although the sample sizes
are strongly reduced, a highly significant and consistent (across stages) pattern emerges:
strong ambiguity aversion for moderate likelihood gains and low likelihood losses, and
strong ambiguity seeking for moderate likelihood losses and low likelihood gains. That
is, participants who are not ambiguity neutral strongly reveal the fourfold pattern of
ambiguity attitudes suggested by the review of the literature. Moreover, because the
pattern obtains for both binary choices and probability equivalents, it seems unlikely
that it is driven by choice list design effects that might have influenced previous results.
However, we observe that the deviations from neutrality in the stage 2 task are more
modest than some reports in the literature, suggesting that our design reduced biases in
the elicitation methods.9
3.4.3 Consistency across elicitation tasks
The consistency of ambiguity attitudes over repeated choices in the same experiment has
been questioned in some studies (Binmore et al., 2012; Du¨rsch et al., 2013; Stahl, 2014).
The inclusion of the stage 1 choice between xEy and xpy in the stage 2 choice lists allows
us to examine consistency on the individual level. Table 3.5 shows results.
Overall consistency across stages is high, with the standard Ellsberg task 20.50 being at
the lower end of the range of consistency rates with about 72% of participants choosing
9We noted in section 3.2.2 that choice lists in stage 2 are modestly skewed (such that the choice
between xEy and xpy is not centered within a list; compare Table 3.2). If subjects, however, tend
to switch towards the center of a list, stage 2 choices might be biased. More precisely, probability
equivalents would be biased downwards in moderate likelihood treatments, overestimating ambiguity
aversion in the gain domain and ambiguity seeking in the loss domain, and biased upwards in low likelihood
treatments, overestimating ambiguity seeking in the gain domain and ambiguity aversion in the loss
domain. Especially ambiguity neutrals, not identified in stage 1, might be biased towards non-neutral
attitudes in stage 2. Yet, stage 1 choices are unaffected by any such bias and, thus, can be used as a
control: if the design of stage 2 choice lists overestimates the reported fourfold pattern of attitudes, we
would expect to observe different results (over the whole sample) in stage 1 compared to stage 2. This is
clearly not the case given the high consistency rates, as discussed next in section 3.4.3, across elicitation
tasks, in each cluster.
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Treatment
l20.50l l(−20).50l l20.10l l(−20).10l (−10).510 (−10).110 10.1(−10)
Including
72.9%* 88.7%* 82.1%* 79.2%* 72.1%* 74.6%* 78.3%*
ambiguity neutrals
Excluding
88.5%* 93.8%* 80.0%* 75.0%* 75.0% 63.6% 92.3%*
ambiguity neutrals
Table 3.5: Consistency of ambiguity attitude
Notes: Entries report percentages of subjects who make consistent choice in the identical choice item in
stage 1 and stage 2 of the experiment. * indicates that the percentage is larger at the 5% significance
level than expected under random choices (50% consistency).
consistently. Ambiguity neutrals may choose differently in both stages simply because
they are indifferent between the risky and the ambiguous prospect. However, excluding
ambiguity neutrals we find similar rates of consistency, with rates increasing in some
treatments and decreasing in others.10
3.5 Ambiguity attitudes in the mixed domain
Under the benchmark assumption of universal ambiguity aversion, the mixed domain re-
ceived little attention in ambiguity research. However, with the fourfold pattern emerging
from empirical the literature, the mixed domain becomes an important testing ground for
models of ambiguity attitude that can account for domain specificity (Tversky and Kah-
neman, 1992; Klibanoff et al., 2005; Abdellaoui et al., 2011). It also relates more directly
to the type of prospects experienced by decision makers in financial markets, medical
decisions, or legal decisions, for example.
We consider three mixed prospects: a symmetric prospect with an equal chance to win
or lose e10; an advantageous prospect (−10).110 with a low likelihood loss and a high
likelihood gain event; and a disadvantageous prospect 10.1(−10) with a low likelihood gain
and a high likelihood loss event. As Table 3.4 shows, there are many ambiguity neutral
subjects also for the mixed outcome domain, and we therefore report results for both the
whole sample, and the sample restricted to subjects who are not classified as ambiguity
neutral. Results are shown in Table 3.6.
Three insights obtain from Table 3.6. First, there is little evidence of (universal) ambiguity
aversion for mixed prospects. Second, there is less consistency of the pattern of attitudes
across stages than for the pure domains: neither the full nor for the reduced sample reveal
a consistent pattern for all three prospects. Third, the only robust finding concerns the
ambiguity seeking observed for the prospect 10.1(−10).
10Additional arguments why results reported in section 3.4.2 should not be confounded by inconsistent
preferences are provided in appendix C.5.
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Whole sample Distinct from neutrality b
# obs. Stage 1: Stage 2: # obs. Stage 1: Stage 2:
Stage 1 ambiguous probability Stage 1 ambiguous probability
Treatment (Stage 2) choices (%) equivalenta (Stage 2) choices (%) equivalenta
(−10).510 73 (68) 34.2 AA*** .53 (AA) 16 (12) 37.5 (AA) .43 (AS)
(−10).110 69 (67) 58.0 (AS) .12 AA*** 23 (22) 56.5 (AS) .15 AA**
10.1(−10) 70 (69) 67.1 AS*** .12 AS** 13 (13) 84.6 AS** .15 AS**
Table 3.6: Ambiguity attitudes for the mixed outcome domain
Notes: a: median; b: classification as described in section 3.3; direction of effect: AA=ambiguity averse;
AS=ambiguity seeking; *,**,*** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level; Part 1: two-sided
binomial test against p=0.5; Part 2: two-sided t-test against probability equivalent=0.5/0.1.
3.6 Conclusion
In this paper we elicit the ambiguity attitudes of more than 500 participants in four pure
and three mixed outcome domains, at different levels of likelihood. Our measurement
methods were designed to minimize biases caused by the elicitation method. In particu-
lar, we aimed to provide a conservative test of the ambiguity seeking tendencies observed
in the previous literature. We also minimized design heterogeneity across domains: het-
erogeneity in terms of payoffs (real vs. hypothetical; endowment vs. no endowment), in
terms of the presentation of the ambiguous prospects (Ellsberg urns, second order prob-
abilities), and in terms of the degree to which participants’ beliefs about the distribution
of colors in the Ellsberg urns are controlled for.
We find no evidence for universal ambiguity aversion as it is assumed by basically all
theoretical applications in various subfields of economics and finance today. A large share
of the participants in our experiments can be categorized as ambiguity neutral. For those
subjects who reveal clear deviation from neutrality, a fourfold pattern of ambiguity atti-
tudes strongly emerges from the data: ambiguity aversion is found for modest likelihood
gain (as in the classic Ellsberg paradox) and low likelihood loss prospects. Ambiguity
seeking is found for low likelihood gain prospects and modest likelihood loss prospects. In
all domains, a large group of subjects (a majority in fact) is close to ambiguity neutrality.
This points to the importance of heterogeneity in ambiguity attitude for market outcomes
(demonstrated in Bossaerts et al., 2010), across all domains of interest.
We find high but not perfect rates of consistency across stage 1 and stage 2 choices in
our experiment. These effects suggest that choice list format does affect respondents’ de-
cisions. Consequently, estimates of the absolute degree(s) of ambiguity aversion observed
some specific measurement should be interpreted with care: these levels will be affected
by idiosyncratic design effects. In contrast, as long as general patterns and comparative
results are central, more robustness can be expected.
Finally, with virtually all relevant problems in economics and finance relating to the
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mixed outcome domain, more empirical investigation of this domain seems warranted.
We provide a first measurement of ambiguity attitudes for mixed prospects. As for the
pure domains, we find little evidence of universal ambiguity aversion. Results seem also
less robust, however, than those for the pure domains. The challenge for descriptive
theoretical work on ambiguity will be to provide a model that can account for both the
pattern observed for the pure domains, as well as for the attitudes revealed in the mixed
domain.
Chapter 4
Social Anchor Effects in
Decision-making under Ambiguity
4.1 Introduction
Peer effects are documented in a variety of economic decisions, such as stock market par-
ticipation (Hong et al., 2004), insurance purchases (Cai et al., forthcoming), or investment
choices (Bursztyn et al., 2014). Many of these environments involve ambiguity rather than
risk, i.e., are characterized by distributions over outcomes which are likely to be unknown
(Keynes, 1921; Knight, 1921). “We might say, for example, that we do not know, when
we go on a railway journey, the probability of death in a railway accident, unless we are
told the statistics of accidents in former years; or that we do not know our chances in a
lottery, unless we are told the number of the tickets.” (Keynes, 1921, p. 31). Similarly,
we might argue that investors usually do not know expected returns in exact numbers,
nor do insurance customers perfectly assess the probability for a loss. Likewise, when
choosing pension plans contributors are not able to predict interest rates curves in fixed-
income markets. Not surprisingly, people often appear to be averse against ambiguous
compared to risky situations. Intuitively, individuals may not feel confident in assessing
true probabilities, especially if outcomes might entail detrimental consequences. Such
ambiguity aversion might inhibit individuals from taking up costless genetic tests (Hoy
et al., 2014) and explain the stock market participation puzzle (Dow and Werlang, 1992;
Easley and O’Hara, 2009), among other examples. At the same time, ambiguity aversion
has been found to correlate with irrational appraisals of ambiguous situations, such as
over-pessimistic beliefs about probabilities or a perceived lack of information (Keren and
Gerritsen, 1999). These behavioral biases do not seem consistent with normative models
of individual decision-making under uncertainty. Furthermore, in contrast to risk aver-
sion which might, for example, protect individuals from irrecoverable economic shocks by
buying insurance, ambiguity aversion might induce truly suboptimal decisions in terms
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of departures from subjective expected utility theory (Savage, 1954) and probabilistic
sophistication (Machina and Schmeidler, 1992). The conjecture that learning whether
others also fear (or even seek) ambiguous events might enforce such irrational behavior
appears straightforward. However, learning that others treat risk and ambiguity in a fairly
indifferent manner might also convey a doctrine of ambiguity neutrality. In this paper
I study individual ambiguity attitudes and examine how these attitudes are affected by
feedback about others’ choices under ambiguity.
Models on rational learning under ambiguity predict that Bayesian decision makers, who
update their beliefs about ambiguous probabilities, should asymptotically converge to-
wards ambiguity neutral preferences (see, e.g., Epstein and Schneider, 2007). In addition
to receiving signals about outcomes from ambiguous lotteries, learning about others’ deci-
sions might influence subjective probabilities of a probabilistically sophisticated decision
maker, or impact his1 confidence in the ambiguous environment.2 Some experimental
evidence indeed shows that social interaction might induce a shift in attitudes towards
ambiguity neutral preferences (Keck et al., 2011; Charness et al., 2013). In contrast, stud-
ies from social psychology suggest that choices of others generally provide an anchor to
which decision makers wish to conform (e.g., Festinger, 1954; Cialdini and Trost, 1998;
Cialdini and Goldstein, 2004). In the economic literature, models of distributional social
preferences, such as the concept of inequity aversion by Fehr and Schmidt (1999)3, have
rather been used to explain peer effects in terms of imitative behavior (for example, in
consumption choices or asset pricing, see Gal´ı, 1994; Gebhardt, 2004, 2011, respectively).
Either approach predicts changes towards the peer’s ambiguity attitude, suggesting that
prevailing attitudes might even be corroborated through feedback about others.
This paper provides additional evidence on shifts in ambiguity attitudes contingent on
learning the choices of peers. Following the standard two-color Ellsberg setting (Ellsberg,
1961) I elicit probability equivalents in a laboratory experiment, which reflect indifferent
preferences between a risky and an ambiguous prospect. Ambiguity attitudes are mea-
sured individually in a first part, and again in a second part, with respect to the same
prospects and using the same task. In a between-subjects design, I exogenously vary
whether lotteries are defined over gains or losses, and whether subjects are shown previ-
ous choices of another participant – additionally to their own – when making their choices
a second time. I refer to this as providing subjects with a social anchor of a peer.4 If a
1I refer to a decision maker as “he” throughout this paper.
2Epstein and Schneider (2007) introduce learning in the maximin framework of Gilboa and Schmeidler
(1989); in particular they allow a Bayesian decision maker to adjust his confidence as well as his beliefs.
Learning under ambiguity is also addressed in models by Huber (1973), Walley (1991), and Marinacci
(2002). Models that incorporate inter-temporal settings, such as Epstein and Wang (1994) and Epstein
and Schneider (2003) who build on the maximin model, establish a basis for these contributions.
3For a survey on models of distributional preferences see Camerer (2003) and Fehr and Schmidt
(2006).
4The term anchor is often used to describe “a stimulus or a message that is clearly designated as
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social anchor is available, subjects may have two incentives to take the peer’s decisions
into account: first, the rational information inherited in the peer’s decisions, providing
an additional anchor for evaluating the choice situation; second, having social preferences
with respect to the peer’s outcome. By comparing treatments with and without social
anchor, changes in ambiguity attitudes which may, e.g., be due to reconsideration or in-
creased familiarity with the experimental task, can be distinguished from changes that
result from learning others’ choices.
Generally, the data suggests that ambiguity attitudes constitute a stable part of prefer-
ences: 90% of subjects exhibit the same attitude (ambiguity aversion or ambiguity seeking)
in the first and in the second part, independent of having a social anchor available or not.
However, the intensity of these attitudes does by far not appear to be as robust, and
varies between Part 1 and Part 2 in 50% of all cases. In the analysis I, hence, particularly
focus on the frequency with which subjects change their probability equivalents, and on
the direction of shifts in ambiguity attitudes, conditional on such a change.
My key finding is that individual dynamics and peer effects in ambiguity attitudes con-
siderably differ in the loss compared to the gain domain. In the domain of gains, the
individual’s ambiguity attitude does not have any significant effects on the likelihood to
change or on the direction of a change, neither in the absence nor in the presence of a
social anchor. However, learning to be more ambiguity averse than a peer significantly in-
creases the likelihood to change, relative to the individual condition. That is, the relative
ambiguity attitude, i.e., the ambiguity attitude compared to the peer’s, matters. Fur-
ther, conditional on a change in probability equivalents, decision makers tend to imitate
their peer’s attitude, towards ambiguity aversion, seeking, or neutrality. Ultimately, the
provision of a social anchor in the gain treatments predominantly induces subjects who
perceive themselves to be comparably ambiguity averse to shift towards neutrality.
In the domain of losses, in contrast, individual attitudes significantly matter in the in-
dividual treatment, such that ambiguity seeking subjects are significantly more likely to
change compared to ambiguity averse ones. However, this relationship fades out when a
social anchor becomes available. In the social anchor treatments it is again the relative
ambiguity attitude that matters, but in a different way compared to the gain domain: if
peers learn to exhibit exactly the same attitudes, their likelihood to change is significantly
reduced, relative to the individual condition, which I label a reassurance effect. Again in
contrast to the gain domain, conditional on a change in probability equivalents, I observe
significant shifts from ambiguity seeking towards neutrality, with and without social an-
irrelevant and uninformative” (Kahneman, 1992, p. 308). I slightly deviate from this definition and use
the term to describe additional information which should be irrelevant for a rational and selfish decision
maker. In this setting, choices of others might, however, be relevant in individual decision-making if
individuals exhibit distributional preferences or perceive others to be more competent with respect to the
task.
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chor. Overall, these findings suggest that ambiguity seeking might not be particularly
robust in such settings (in line with experimental evidence as discussed below).
Moreover, I find that cognitive ability significantly and positively correlates to shifts to-
wards neutrality in the gain domain, while any relationship is of negligible relevance in the
loss domain. This suggests that ambiguity aversion in the standard Ellsberg setting might
be driven by bounded rationality, while ambiguity seeking might rather be of instinctive
nature.
Overall, my data suggests three main conclusions. The intensity of ambiguity attitudes
is likely to fluctuate, even if no social anchor is available; nevertheless, peers seem to be
important for decision-making under ambiguity; and being provided with a social anchor
seems to affect individual attitudes differently in the domain of gains compared to losses.
In the economics literature social interaction in decision-making under ambiguity has been
examined early on. In a seminal paper Curley et al. (1986) find evidence for the “Other-
evaluation hypothesis”. That is, if individuals anticipate negative evaluation by others,
they tend to make choices which are perceived to be most justifiable to others; and often,
the choice most easily justified seems to be the ambiguity averse.5 Intuitively, a bad
outcome might be indisputably deluded to bad luck if it results from a risky prospect,
which would not be as easy if it results from an ambiguous prospect. That the fear
of negative ex-post evaluation by others is likely to increase ambiguity aversion is also
confirmed by Trautmann et al. (2008) and Muthukrishnan et al. (2009). Basically, these
studies already suggest how sensitive ambiguity attitudes might be with respect to changes
in the social environment.
Two other studies are particularly related to the present paper. Keck et al. (2011) and
Charness et al. (2013) (in the following referred to by KDB and CKL, respectively) com-
pare ambiguity attitudes in the domain of gains, elicited in isolation and elicited after
face-to-face consultation with peers. Both studies find that social interaction causes a
shift in ambiguity attitudes towards neutrality. In CKL, this shift predominantly stems
from ambiguity seeking individuals and those who exhibit incoherent attitudes. KDB, on
the other hand, report that the shift towards neutrality is caused by a reduction in both
ambiguity aversion and ambiguity seeking.6 My results are consistent with their findings
5For example, Heath and Tversky (1991), Fox and Tversky (1998), and Fox and Weber (2002) show
that individuals become more ambiguity averse if they make choices in the presence of others who they
perceive to be more competent than themselves. Following the terminology of Watson and Friend (1969)
the Other-evaluation hypothesis is also referred to as the “fear of negative evaluation”, and is also ad-
dressed in Knight (1921), Fellner (1961), Ellsberg (1963), Roberts (1963), Toda and Shuford (1965) and
Ga¨rdenfors (1979).
6CKL also introduce incentives to persuade peers, which significantly increase peer effects but leaves
the tendency towards neutrality at the expense of ambiguity seeking and incoherent attitudes unchanged.
KDB additionally elicit decisions made in groups, and compare “shared consequences” to “individual
consequences” in outcomes. Group decisions also show a tendency towards ambiguity neutrality, which
is largely independent of payoff complementarities. In a different paper on group decision-making, Keller
et al. (2007) find that groups exhibit risk and ambiguity aversion and are likely to exhibit a cautious shift
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as they show that subjects take information about their peer’s attitude into account when
making individual choices. I observe significant shifts in ambiguity attitudes, although
not exclusively towards ambiguity neutrality, but predominantly so if losses are involved.
At this point, it is important to note that having a social anchor available compared to in-
teracting with others face-to-face might have very different effects. In particular, following
the arguments of CKL and KDB, face-to-face interaction might be even more powerful in
enforcing ambiguity neutrality as a persuasive argument (Burnstein and Vinokur, 1977).
This paper complements both studies in several respects. First of all, to cleanly isolate the
effect of peers, I implement a baseline treatment which allows me to control for changes in
ambiguity attitudes due to repeated decision-making. Thus, I control for the possibility
that individuals might move towards ambiguity neutral preferences if they are only given
the opportunity to reconsider their choices.7 In this way, I am able to show that significant
shifts from ambiguity seeking to ambiguity neutrality occur even if a social anchor is not
available. I also abstain from allowing face-to-face interaction between participants since
these are not under the control of the experimenter – although direct consultation might
induce stronger peer effects.8 Further, in my experiment subjects do not experience any
outcomes between successive decisions (as in the experiment of CKL), as this may cause
income effects or changes in ambiguity attitudes through the signal they received. More-
over, I particularly focus on the standard 50/50 Ellsberg setting which has been of most
interest in the experimental literature and, hence, in which experimental achievements on
individual ambiguity attitudes might be most reliable. Although empirical applications in
finance or insurance might often relate to asymmetric distributions, I constitute a foun-
dation of results in a well-studied setting that can be easily extended to, for example, low
probability events or ambiguity over mixed domains. Moreover, the elicitation method
allows me to cleanly distinguish between ambiguity aversion and ambiguity seeking, and
provides a measure for the intensity of these attitudes.9 In this respect, eliciting proba-
bility equivalents has been shown to identify ambiguity aversion, neutrality, and seeking
in various domains (see, e.g., chapter 3 of this dissertation). I restrict from using di-
when ambiguity is introduced.
7This has been neglected in both studies above. KDB implement a control treatment, but only to
validate that group choices are closer to ambiguity neutrality compared to individual choices.
8Keck and co-authors even state that “subjects were particularly instructed to take into account the
opinion and attitudes of group members when making their subsequent individual decisions” (Keck et al.,
2011, p. 21).
9CKL use a three-color Ellsberg design and employ a choice list including direct choices between
risk and ambiguity. They report a substantial fraction of ambiguity incoherent attitudes, which might
be partially due to the fact that the likelihood of the known and ambiguous colors change both at the
same time across decision items. KDB elicit certainty equivalents for risky and ambiguous gambles, using
multiple choice lists for different likelihoods and degrees of ambiguity. This implies that subjects fill
out a considerable number of choice lists with a considerable number of decision items. When receiving
feedback about others subjects may learn about their peer’s inconsistencies, and, moreover, disentangling
effects over time (e.g., individual decisions might be biased towards the end of the task), order effects
and peer effects, is statistically demanding.
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rect choice methods which might stimulate ambiguity aversion (Trautmann et al., 2011),
and which would not permit to identify changes in attitudes due to indifference between
ambiguity and risk. In the experiment I also minimize any suspicion of subjects that
ambiguous lotteries might be stacked against their favors. I do so by letting participants
choose their individual decision color which indirectly defines their ambiguous prospect.
Notably, all of the studies mentioned above involve prospects in the gain domain only.
But given that numerous experiments documented differences in ambiguity attitudes with
respect to the outcome domain, it seems obvious to extend this literature by studying
behavior in the gain and loss domain. More precisely, while there is broad consensus
about the persistence of ambiguity aversion in settings that involve prospects over gains
of moderate likelihoods, evidence on preferences over ambiguous prospects which involve
low likelihood events and/or losses are less clear-cut (see, e.g., Camerer and Weber, 1992).
If outcomes refer to losses some studies report ambiguity seeking, while others document
ambiguity neutrality as the predominant attitude.10 I contribute to the literature by
showing that individual and social dynamics as well as cognitive ability might shape
ambiguity attitudes in very different ways, depending on the specific outcome frame.
Examining the role of peers in choice under ambiguity and understanding when and why
consultation with others or receiving professional advice might be beneficial, has important
implications, e.g., for decision-making in finance. In this respect, field studies highlight
the role of observing other people’s behavior. For example, Bursztyn et al. (2014) report
that investment rates substantially increase if private investors can learn from their peer’s
investment choice, and if relative payoff concerns might additionally play a role. Cai
et al. (forthcoming) examine insurance demand in rural China and observe significant
spillover effects of insurance knowledge and experience, ultimately affecting insurance
demand. Yet, the particular sources of imitative behavior cannot be completely disclosed,
e.g., it is not clear whether such peer effects are due to changes in ambiguity attitudes or
due to other factors, such as changes in the willingness to take risk. While disentangling
the role of peers is difficult empirically (Manski, 1993), laboratory experiments provide an
important complement to field studies to identify the underlying sources of peer effects, by
cleanly controlling exogenous variations in the decision-making and social environment.
However, experimental studies on social interaction in ambiguous choice situations are
still rare, in contrast to studies on peer effects in decision-making under risk, which have
10Ambiguity seeking was reported by Casey and Scholz (1991); Di Mauro and Maffioletti (1996);
Ho et al. (2002); Abdellaoui et al. (2005); Chakravarty and Roy (2009); Baillon and Bleichrodt (2013);
Kothiyal et al. (2014); ambiguity neutrality was found by Einhorn and Hogarth (1986); Cohen et al. (1987);
Mangelsdorff and Weber (1994); Eisenberger and Weber (1995); Du and Budescu (2005); De Lara Resende
and Wu (2010); Trautmann and Wakker (2012); Tymula et al. (2012). Some studies also report a fourfold
pattern, documenting ambiguity aversion for prospects over gains of moderate likelihoods and losses of low
likelihoods, but ambiguity seeking for prospects over gains of low likelihoods and losses of high likelihoods
(Hogarth and Kunreuther, 1985; Kahn and Sarin, 1988; Hogarth and Kunreuther, 1989; Viscusi and
Chesson, 1999; Di Mauro and Maffioletti, 2004; Vieider et al., 2012).
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received great attention lately (for a recent survey see Trautmann and Vieider, 2011). This
paper takes one step to bridge the gap between field studies on peer effects in decisions
under ambiguity and laboratory studies on peer effects in risk taking. Whether social
anchors effects work differently depending on initial individual ambiguity attitudes is just
one question which can be tested in the lab.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 describes the experimental design, results are
presented in section 4.3. Section 4.4 provides a discussion of findings and concludes.
4.2 Experimental design
I conduct a laboratory experiment and examine individual ambiguity attitudes in the
absence and in the presence of feedback about others’ choices under ambiguity. By eliciting
individual choices twice, in Part 1 and Part 2 of the experiment, and comparing changes
in choices across treatments, I control for the variability of ambiguity attitudes, e.g., for
any effects which occur through familiarity of subjects with the particular elicitation task.
Part 1 and Part 2 are identical to a large extend: ambiguity attitudes are elicited with
respect to the same ambiguous prospect, using the same task which is described in section
4.2.1. The experiment is then based on a 2×2 between-subjects design with respect to two
dimensions, as outlined in detail in section 4.2.2: first, the outcome domain of lotteries
varies between gains and losses. Second, in Part 2, subjects either only face their own
choices made in Part 1, or they are additionally provided with a social anchor, that is,
learn the choice profile of another participant.
After Part 2, subjects face an intelligence test which is independent of any treatment
variation. It provides a measure for subjects’ cognitive ability and allows to smooth income
from Part 1 and 2 which might vary considerably between gain and loss treatments.11
Experimental procedure are summarized in section 4.2.3.
4.2.1 Elicitation task
Ambiguity attitudes are measured in terms of probability equivalents with respect to an
ambiguous prospect which is described by an urn, labeled A in the following.
Urn A contains in total 100 chips of two different colors (red and blue), reflecting the
standard Ellsberg setting of moderate likelihoods with an ambiguity neutral probability
p = 0.5. The distribution of red and blue chips is unknown to both subjects and the
experimenter. To ensure credibility and avoid any suspicion that urn A might be biased
against subjects, every participant is asked to select his individual decision color (red or
blue) in the very beginning of the experiment, i.e., before the instructions for Part 1 are
11In this task subjects had to solve ten questions on Raven’s progressive matrices (Raven et al., 1998),
each incentivized by a piece rate. Details can be received from the author.
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handed out. A subject’s decision color indirectly defines the ambiguous prospect that he
can choose to play in the experiment: if a chip is drawn from A that is of his individual
decision color, he is paid an amount x, and zero otherwise.
In the experiment subjects face a choice list with 21 binary choices between the ambiguous
prospect A and different risky lotteries, respectively. The risky lotteries are again repre-
sented by urns, each filled with a known distribution of 100 chips which are red or blue.
In decision item i (i = 1, . . . , 21) the respective risky urn, Ri, contains exactly qi · 100 red
chips and (1− qi) · 100 blue chips. Choosing Ri is equivalent to choosing a prospect that
pays an amount x if a red chip is drawn from Ri, and zero otherwise. Hence, the color
“red” takes on the same role for any Ri as the decision color for the ambiguous prospect
A. Within the choice list A and x remain constant, while qi increases monotonically.
If a subject switches from A to Rj (or vice versa), i.e., in decision item j, his probabil-
ity equivalent, denoted by q, is defined by the midpoint between qj−1 and qj. Thus, q
approximates the probability which makes him indifferent between risk and ambiguity.12
Comparing q and p then provides a measure for a subject’s ambiguity attitude, taking into
account the domain of outcome x (as explained in the following section). Using a choice
list instead of eliciting direct choices between a risky (with ambiguity neutral distribu-
tion) and ambiguous urn has the particular advantage that it allows to gain a measure
for the intensity of ambiguity aversion and ambiguity seeking, and to identify ambiguity
neutrality. If subjects would only face a direct choice between a risky and an ambiguous
prospect, then ambiguity neutral subjects might make opposite choices in Part 1 and Part
2 simply because they exhibit indifferent preferences.13
4.2.2 Treatment variation
Outcome domain. Expected Utility Theory still serves as the standard normative ap-
proach to model decision-making under uncertainty, as formalized by von Neumann and
Morgenstern (1947). Yet, in order to explain choices under uncertainty and incorporate
behavioral and cognitive biases, Prospect Theory was proposed as a descriptive approach
by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) (and revised in Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). One
key feature of Prospect Theory is that it assumes changes of wealth relative to a reference
point, instead of total wealth, to be carriers of utility, and, moreover, that losses loom
12More specifically, if a subject switches in decision item j ∈ {1, . . . , 21, ∅}, where j = ∅ denotes
that he never switches at all, then his probability equivalent is defined as follows: if j 6= ∅, 1, q is the
midpoint between qj−1 and qj ; if j = 1, q is extrapolated to q1 − 12 (q2 − q1); if j = ∅, q is extrapolated
to q21 + 12 (q21 − q20). qi ranges from 0.26 to 0.66, increasing in steps of 0.02; one item also captures
the ambiguity neutral probability p = 0.5 which would make an ambiguity neutral subject indifferent
between choosing the ambiguous and the risky prospect.
13I do not explicitly consider ambiguity neutrality. The choice lists are constructed such that probabil-
ity equivalents are midpoints of the intervals [0.26, 0.28], [0.28, 0.30], . . . , [0.64, 0.66], and hence should
never take on value 0.5. Since I am interested in changes in ambiguity attitudes between Part 1 and Part
2, this does not constrain the analysis.
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larger than gains. Such a framing effect is also commonly observed with respect to risk
attitudes and the shape of the utility function which is modeled as concave in the gain
domain, reflecting risk aversion, and as concave in the loss domain, reflecting risk lov-
ing preferences (Tversky and Kahneman, 1991). As previously noted, similar preference
reversals have also been documented in choices under ambiguity (see, e.g., Hogarth and
Kunreuther, 1985; Vieider et al., 2012).
To account for differing ambiguity attitudes in the gain and loss domain experimental
treatments either involve lotteries defined on the domain of gains or losses, with x = e10
in the gain, and x = −e10 in the loss treatments.
In the gain domain, the chance of winning x by choosing Ri increases with each decision
item i. In this case, subjects might choose the ambiguous urn A for low likelihoods pi,
but switch to a risky prospect at some j. Hence, if a subject’s probability equivalent q is
smaller than the ambiguity neutral probability p, i.e., q < p, he is classified as ambiguity
averse, and as ambiguity seeking if q > p. In the loss domain, in contrast, the chance
of loosing x from choosing Ri increases with each decision item i. Hence, subjects might
choose Ri for small probabilities pi, but switch to the ambiguous urn A at some j. In this
case, an individual is classified as ambiguity seeking if q is smaller than p, q < p, and as
ambiguity averse if q > p.
Social anchor. In Part 2, subjects are given the opportunity to reconsider their choices
from Part 1. Therefore, they are shown their own choice profile completed in Part 1. In
the individual treatments any information about others’ choices is excluded. In the social
anchor treatments, in contrast, subjects are randomly assigned to groups of two. That
is, each subject is randomly matched to another participant in the beginning of Part 2,
whom I might refer to as a peers in what follows. Additionally to viewing their own choice
profiles, they learn the choice profile of their peer. Screenshots of the complete choice lists
of the individual as well as the social anchor treatment in Part 2 are provided in Figures
D.2 and D.3, in appendix D.1. Table 4.1 summarizes the between-subjects design.
Predictions. Motivated by empirical regularities with respect to imitative behavior
commonly observed in the lab (such as in the seminal study of Asch, 1956) and in the
field (as previously discussed, among others, in financial decisions; e.g., Bursztyn et al.,
2014), one may easily come up with the following straightforward predictions. First, if
ambiguity attitudes are a stable part of individual preferences, one should expect that
choices in Part 1 and Part 2 reflect the same attitudes.
P1: In Part 2 subjects exhibit the same ambiguity attitude as in Part 1.
Second, if peer effects are still present in decision-making under ambiguity, as identified
in risky choices in the lab and in financial choices in the field, then one should expect that
imitative behavior lets peers converge to each others’ attitudes.
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Information
(about choice profiles in Part 1 provided in Part 2)
Outcome domain blab labIndividualblablab Social anchor
Gain
x = e10 x = e10
Own choices Own choices + peer’s choices
GAIN-IND GAIN-PEER
Loss
x = −e10 x = −e10
Own choices Own choices + peer’s choices
LOSS-IND LOSS-PEER
Two experimental sessions a` 20 subjects per treatment
Notes: x denotes the outcome of the binary prospect, which is different to zero; treatment labels printed
in italics.
Table 4.1: Between-subjects design
P2: Being provided with a social anchor makes subjects shift in their ambiguity attitudes
towards the peers’ attitudes.
Third, if shifts occur towards a peer’s attitude, then individuals should change their
probability equivalents more frequently in the presence than in the absence of a social
anchor.
P3: Being provided with a social anchor increases the frequency with which subjects
change the intensity of their attitudes.
However, as becomes clear in section 4.3, the dynamics behind changes in ambiguity
attitudes seem to be slightly more manifold and hard to capture by plain conjectures.
4.2.3 Experimental procedures
In the beginning of the experiment, when subjects have not seen any instructions about
Part 1, participants receive an initial endowment of e10 and select their individual deci-
sion color. Participants also learn that choices from some parts might be shown to other
participants in succeeding parts of the experiment. If individuals anticipate negative eval-
uation by others, as suggested by the “Other-evaluation hypothesis”, choices might be
biased towards ambiguity aversion in Part 1 and 2, in all treatments (as mentioned in
the introduction, see Curley et al., 1986). However, subjects are also told that they re-
main completely anonymous throughout the entire experiment, that outcomes are private
information, and that payments are made in private. Hence, I do not expect that this
information significantly affects individual ambiguity attitudes.
Risky and ambiguous lotteries are explained by using opaque bags which are filled with
plastic chips of different colors. To improve participants’ understanding of risky distri-
butions, the composition of colored chips of each Ri (i = 1, . . . , 21) is placed on a table
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in the middle of the lab room, visible to participants during the experiment (see Figure
D.1 in appendix D.1 for a picture). For the ambiguous prospect one opaque bag has
already been filled with 100 chips at the time when subjects enter the laboratory, and is
also placed on that table. I emphasize in the instructions that the distribution of chips
is unknown also to me as the experimenter, and I allow participants to inspect the bag
when the experiment is finished.14
Only Part 1 or Part 2 is randomly chosen, and within each part, only one decision item
is determined to be payoff relevant. In the individual treatments, the payoff relevant
part and decision item are randomly selected on the subject level. In the social anchor
treatments, however, within each group, one group member is paid for Part 1 while the
other is paid for Part 2, which is randomly assigned (and common knowledge from the
instructions). Then, the payoff relevant decision item is randomly selected on the group
level. In this way, each Part is still equally likely for each participant. Further, an
individual who exhibits relative payoff concerns with respect to the peer might have an
additional incentive to imitate the peer’s choices – since his choices in Part 2 can perfectly
fit those of the peer from Part 1. This argument holds as long as the individual dislikes
social losses more than they suffer from social gains, as already assumed in the classic
inequity aversion model by Fehr and Schmidt (1999).15
To implement the design in the most transparent way two participants are randomly
selected as assistants at the end of the experiment. One assistant fills all risky bags and
draws one chip from each risky and from the ambiguous bag, respectively. The other
assistant enters the colors on his screen, which determines final payoffs.16 All instructions
are handed out in printed version and read aloud to subjects. Instructions for any part
are not handed out before the preceding part is finished. Instructions for the gain domain,
for individual and social anchor treatments, are provided in appendix D.1.
Sessions were run at MELESSA, the Munich Experimental Laboratory for Economic and
Social Sciences at the University of Munich, in February 2014. The experiment was
computerized using zTree (Fischbacher, 2007). In total 160 subjects participated in 8
experimental sessions, with two sessions and 40 participants per treatment. 55% were
female, the average age was 24 years, and 26% were students with an economics or business
background.17 Participants earned on average e15.60 (appr. $21.30 at the time of the
14The composition was truly unknown to the experimenter: a student assistant blindly drew 100 chips
out of an opaque bag filled with far more than 100 chips of both colors.
15The experimental design can be slightly extended to compare effects from learning the peer’s choice
profile and from exhibiting distributional preferences. For example, in the social anchor treatments
payoff-relevant decision items and parts could be randomly selected on an individual level.
16In the interest of time, bags for Ri were only filled for decision problems 9 to 17 (symmetric around
p = 0.5). For the remaining risky bags of decision problems 1 to 8 and 18 to 21 the computer randomly
selected one color, according to the respective distribution of colored chips.
17Individual characteristics were balanced across treatments. Tow-sided Fisher exact tests yield p-
values above conventional levels (> 0.1) with respect to compositions in gender or economic/non-economic
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experiment) and the experiment lasted roughly one hour.
4.3 Results
In section 4.3.1 I first briefly comment on the dataset which is used for the empirical
analysis. Results on individual ambiguity attitudes are reported in section 4.3.2. Changes
in ambiguity attitudes are analyzed in section 4.3.3.
4.3.1 Data
The dataset consists of observations from 160 subjects. A subject’s probability equivalent
is derived from his choices in Part 1 and Part 2, denoted by qP1 and qP2, respectively.
As common in experiments on individual decision-making that use choice lists, some
subjects indicate a conflicting pattern of choices.18 In particular, a subject might switch
from prospect A to Ri (or vice versa) multiple times, since I do not enforce a single
switching point in the computer program. As long as his choice in the very first and very
last decision item indicates different lotteries (ambiguous or risky), q can be approximated
by the midpoint of probability equivalents defined by the first and last switch.19 However,
if a subject switches an even number of times, in which case his choice in the very first
and very last decision item would indicate the same type of prospect, defining a reliable
approximation of q is not possible. Also, as described earlier, a subject should switch
from ambiguity to risk in the gain domain, and from risk to ambiguity in the loss domain.
A reversed choice pattern does not seem rationalizable and might rather suggest that the
participant did not follow the task carefully enough. For the analysis presented below I
drop observations of those who exhibit an even number of switching points and who show
a reversed pattern of choices in either Part 1 or Part 2 (or both). This leaves us with 35
subjects in GAIN-IND and LOSS-IND, 36 in GAIN-PEER, and 38 in LOSS-PEER.20
In the social anchor treatments subjects can be assigned to three categories: those who are
more ambiguity averse compared to their peer, those who are less ambiguity averse com-
pared to their peer, and those who exhibit exactly the same attitude as their peer. Tech-
nically, distinguishing between these categories is only necessary in the PEER-treatments:
students. Only age differed slightly between GAIN-IND and GAIN-PEER, with average age of 25.1
compared to 22.5 years, respectively; Wilcoxon rank-sum test yields p-value 0.001.
18Violations of monotonicity are a common phenomenon in experiments, see, e.g., Birnbaum (1992);
Birnbaum et al. (1992); Birnbaum and Sutton (1992); Charness et al. (2007); Keck et al. (2011).
19Although, given the construction of the choice lists, q should never take on value 0.5, one subject in
Part 1 of LOSS-PEER switches multiple times, first between 0.38 and 0.40, and second between 0.60 and
0.62; taking the midpoint of both respective probability equivalents yields 0.5. Another subject in Part
2 of LOSS-IND also switches multiple times such that q is estimated as 0.5. Both subjects are classified
as ambiguity seeking/neutral.
20Results do not change if I generally drop those who switch multiple times. Details can be received
from the author.
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while all choices made in Part 1 are independent observations, choices in Part 2 are not
statistically independent between group members since peers learn each others’ Part 1
choices. Statistical tests, however, mostly require observations to be independent. I
therefore assign observations to two groups, with statistically independent observations,
each. Comparing probability equivalents in Part 1, I group those subjects who are more
ambiguity averse than their peer (Group 1), and those who are less ambiguity averse than
their peer (Group 2); if group members exhibit the same attitude one subject is randomly
assigned to one group and his peer to the other. Thus, these datasets of independent
observations also differ with respect to subjects’ relative ambiguity attitude. Where ap-
plicable I only report test results from two-sided tests, such as for t-tests or Fisher exact
tests.
Lastly, a measure for cognitive ability is given by the the number of correct answers in
the intelligence test (Part 3), ranging from zero to 10, with an average of 6.4 scores,
and 1.4 standard deviation. Besides age, gender and field of study, I also control for
cognitive ability in the regression analyses. Across treatments, cognitive ability does not
differ significantly (p-values of Kruskal Wallis tests >0.2 for each treatment comparison).
Neither do probability equivalents differ significantly with respect to cognitive ability
(rank-sum test; p-values 0.562, 0.681, for Part 1 and 2, respectively).21
4.3.2 Individual ambiguity attitudes
Table 4.2 summarizes the fraction of ambiguity averse subjects and the median probability
equivalents in Part 1 and Part 2, by treatment and subgroup. (Mean values of qP1 and
qP2 are discussed later in section 4.3.3, but can be found in Table D.2 in appendix D.2,
by treatment and subgroup.)
Within treatments, subjects predominantly exhibit ambiguity aversion in the gain domain,
while the majority of subjects are classified as ambiguity seeking in the loss domain, in
Part 1 and Part 2. Using t-tests and Wilcoxon sign-rank tests median probability equiva-
lents indicate significant ambiguity aversion in the gain domain and significant ambiguity
seeking in the loss domain in Part 1; p-values for all samples are provided in Table D.1 in
appendix D.2. The cumulative distribution functions of probability equivalents, presented
in Figure 4.1, are in turn left skewed, with means and medians below p = 0.5. Comparing
Figure 4.1(a) for Part 1 and Figure 4.1(b) for Part 2, does not reflect considerable changes,
suggesting that the distribution of ambiguity attitudes remains largely unaffected within
each treatment. In fact, as given in Table 4.2, patterns in ambiguity attitudes persists to
be significant in Part 2, and on the aggregate level, i.e., pooling data from Group 1 and
21Correlation coefficients between probability equivalents and the numbers of correct answers are -0.16
and 0.16 in the gain and loss domain in Part 1, respectively, and 0.07 and 0.01 in the gain and loss domain
in Part 2, respectively.
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Group 2 in the social anchor treatments, median values of qP1 and qP2 even coincide.
Part 1 Part 2 % consistent between
Treatment N % AA qP1 a % AA qP2 a Part 1 and 2b
GAIN-IND 35 88.6% 0.49 AA*** 88.6% 0.49 AA*** 82.9
LOSS-IND 35 31.4% 0.49 AS*** 37.1% 0.49 AS*** 82.9
GAIN-PEER 36 80.6% 0.45 AA*** 80.6% 0.45 AA*** 94.4
Group 1 19 94.7% 0.41 AA*** 94.7% 0.43 AA*** 100.0
Group 2 17 64.7% 0.49 AA** 64.7% 0.49 AA** 88.2
LOSS-PEER 38 39.5% 0.49 AS** 47.4% 0.49 AS** 81.6
Group 1 19 52.6% 0.51 (AA) 57.9% 0.51 (AA) 73.7
Group 2 19 26.3% 0.47 AS*** 36.8% 0.49 AS** 89.5
Notes: N denotes number of observations; AA=ambiguity averse; AS=ambiguity seeking; a: median;
b: classified as AA (AS) in Part 1 and in Part 2; two-sided t-test against p=0.5; *** (**, *) denotes
significance on level p < 0.01 (p < 0.05, p < 0.1).
Table 4.2: Distribution of ambiguity attitudes
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Figure 4.1: Cumulative distribution functions
However, distinguishing between those subjects who happened to be more ambiguity
averse than their peer (Group 1) and those who were less ambiguity averse than their
peer (Group 2), I find a slight shift towards ambiguity neutrality.22
Across treatments, ambiguity attitudes support the typical two-fold pattern with respect
to gains and losses. On the aggregate level, the distributions of ambiguity aversion in
Part 1 and Part 2 are significantly different between GAIN and LOSS treatments (χ2-test
and Fisher exact test; p-values for all subsamples are provided in Table D.3 in appendix
D.2).23 Moreover, results are more pronounced in Part 1, where differences are significant
22In GAIN-PEER the median probability equivalent increases by two percentage points for the rela-
tively more ambiguity averse subjects, while it remains unchanged for the relatively less ambiguity averse.
In contrast, in LOSS-PEER the median probability equivalent does not change for the more ambiguity
averse subjects, who are actually not statistically distinguishable from ambiguity neutrality.
23It is not possible to test for differences in ambiguity attitudes by comparing probability equivalents
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on the aggregate as well as for each subgroup, compared to Part 2. This variation allows
to examine changes in ambiguity attitudes anchored in an aversion against, or a preference
for ambiguity.
Across treatments, with respect to the feedback dimension, the distribution of probability
equivalents between IND and PEER treatments does not significantly differ in Part 1, as
expected (based on rank-sum tests for the distributions of probability equivalents, and
χ2-test and Fisher exact tests for the distributions of ambiguity attitudes; p-values of all
tests provided in Table D.4, appendix D.2).24
Lastly, Table 4.2 also reports on consistency: a subject is said to be consistent if he is
classified as ambiguity averse (seeking) in Part 1 and in Part 2. On the aggregate level,
consistency is high and lies between 81.6% in LOSS-PEER and 94.4% in GAIN-PEER.
Moreover, I do not find any systematic relationship between treatment and consistency
rates. In support of prediction P1, the distribution of attitudes does not differ between
Part 1 and 2 for any subgroup (McNemar change test; all p-values>0.1).
4.3.3 Changes in ambiguity attitudes
So far the data does not suggest substantial changes in ambiguity attitudes itself. However,
changes in the intensity of ambiguity attitudes seem to be more frequent. In the following,
I say that a change in a subject’s ambiguity attitude occurs if qP1 differs from qP2. I define
a shift in probability equivalents as the difference qP2 − qP1. This variable embodies the
direction and extent of changes in attitudes.
There might be heterogeneity in the likelihood to change across treatments, which in turn
might bias location parameters of shifts in ambiguity attitudes. For example, providing
a social anchor might per se influence frequencies of change. I therefore examine shifts in
ambiguity attitudes conditional on a change in a first step. In a second step, I examine
the likelihood that subjects actually change their probability equivalent between Part 1
and Part 2.
between GAIN and LOSS treatments. While q < 0.5 implies ambiguity aversion in the gain domain, it
corresponds to ambiguity seeking in the loss domain. Also, since choice lists are not symmetric around
0.5, recoding q does not offer a clean approach to test for differences between outcome domains.
24Only in Group 1 the relatively more ambiguity averse subjects appear significantly more ambiguity
averse in GAIN-PEER compared to GAIN-IND; but this holds for Part 1 as well as for Part 2 (rank-
sum test, p-values 0.037 and 0.056 for Part 1 and Part 2, respectively). In order to test Group 1 and
Group 2 samples of PEER treatments against comparable subsamples in the IND treatment, subjects
are randomly assigned to another participant and classified accordingly. In Part 2, the distribution of
ambiguity attitudes still does not differ significantly on the aggregate level.
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Shifts in ambiguity attitudes
Consider only those who actually change, i.e., qP1 6= qP2, who represent 50% of the whole
sample (as explicitly discussed later in this section).25 Then, Figure 4.2 pictures the aver-
age shift in probability equivalents, distinguishing by treatment, and by relative ambiguity
attitudes in the PEER treatments. In the individual treatments probability equivalents
decrease on average by three percentage points in the gain domain – corresponding to a
shift in 1.5 choice items in the choice list – and increase by two percentage points in the
loss domain. This shift towards ambiguity neutrality is only significant in the loss domain
(Wilcoxon sign-rank test; p-values 0.047).26
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Figure 4.2: Average shift between qP1 and qP2 (given change)
If a social anchor is available, average probability equivalents do not change on the ag-
gregate in the gain domain (see Table D.2, appendix D.2). Essentially, subjects move
towards their peer’s attitude: those who are less ambiguity averse than their peer become
more ambiguity averse, and vice versa. I observe a similar movement in the loss domain:
those who were more ambiguity seeking become more ambiguity neutral. The conver-
gence to peers’ attitudes is significant when comparing the absolute difference between
probability equivalents of the decision maker and his peer, between Part 1 and Part 2
(Wilcoxon sign-rank test; p-values 0.015, 0.036 for the more and less ambiguity averse
in GAIN-PEER, and 0.017 for the less ambiguity averse in LOSS-PEER). Those who
were more ambiguity averse (or closer to ambiguity neutrality) in LOSS-PEER move only
25In total, qP1 6= qP2 holds for 15 out of 35 subjects in GAIN-IND, for 18 out of 35 subjects in
LOSS-IND, for 22 out of 36 subjects in GAIN-PEER, and for 17 out of 38 subjects in LOSS-PEER.
26I provide average values of qP1 and qP2, by treatment and subgroup, for those who change and those
who do not change in Table D.2 in appendix D.2, where I also report the number of observations in each
cluster.
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slightly towards ambiguity seeking, which is not significant (p-value 0.629).27 Still, the
results strongly support prediction P2 in the gain domain, namely that subjects tend to
shift towards their peers’ attitudes.
Overall, if attitudes are volatile and therefore change, then attitudes seem to move to-
wards neutrality in individual conditions. Especially ambiguity seeking in the loss domain
appears to be less robust than ambiguity aversion or neutrality, since it significantly at-
tenuates both in the individual and social anchor condition. Moreover, imitative shifts in
the gain domain suggest that a social anchor affects individual choices differently in the
domain of gains compared to losses. This can be summarized as follows.
Result 1 (Shifts in attitudes conditional on changes in q). text
1. Without social anchor, subjects move towards ambiguity neutrality in the loss do-
main. A shift towards ambiguity aversion in the gain domain is not significant.
2. With social anchor, subjects move towards the peer’s ambiguity attitude (P2)
(i) towards both directions in the gain domain, but
(ii) only towards ambiguity neutrality in the loss domain.
In a next step, I test whether these dynamics might suppress (or enforce) prevailing
attitudes. Therefore, I estimate probit models which regress the likelihood that subjects
become more ambiguity neutral. Interdependencies between peers are controlled for by
clustering robust standard errors on the group level. Results are reported in Table 4.3.
In the gain domain, being provided with a social anchor significantly increases the like-
lihood for a shift towards ambiguity neutrality, relative to the individual treatment as a
baseline. This suggests that the slight shift towards aversion in GAIN-IND is counterbal-
anced in GAIN-PEER, where subjects tend to move towards the peer’s attitude, in both
directions. It also appears that the ambiguity averse are significantly more likely to move
towards neutrality, which is likely due to the scope for becoming even more ambiguity
averse being limited. However, this effect is significantly stronger in the IND compared
to the PEER condition suggesting that individual attitudes play a more prominent role
if a social anchor is not available (model (3); Wald test between coefficients of AA-IND
and AA-PEER, p-value < 0.01).
In the loss domain, in contrast, there is no significant difference in the likelihood to move
towards ambiguity neutrality between PEER and IND treatments. This is consistent with
the significant shifts towards neutrality in both treatments. Mirroring the previous finding
from the gain domain, ambiguity aversion makes a shift towards ambiguity neutrality
27Similarly, shifts are significantly different from zero for the relatively more ambiguity averse in GAIN-
PEER, Wilcoxon sign-rank test, p-value 0.010; for the relatively less ambiguity averse in GAIN-PEER and
LOSS-PEER, p-values 0.036 and 0.024; but not for the relatively more ambiguity averse in LOSS-PEER,
p-value 0.465.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
shift → AN GAIN GAIN GAIN LOSS LOSS LOSS
PEER 0.378** 0.373** 1.354*** -0.057 0.078 0.162
[0.131] [0.131] [0.285] [0.148] [0.146] [0.162]
AA 0.266 -0.454***
[0.172] [0.110]
AA-IND 1.225*** -0.221
[0.244] [0.231]
AA-PEER 0.218 -0.575***
[0.214] [0.137]
Cogn. ability 0.146*** 0.109*** 0.108** -0.016 -0.011 -0.014
[0.037] [0.041] [0.042] [0.056] [0.040] [0.039]
Observations 37 37 37 35 35 35
Log.-lik. -18.38 -17.62 -17.50 -20.79 -16.27 -15.65
Notes: Marginal effects of a probit regression on the likelihood to become more ambiguity neutral; inde-
pendent variables include a dummy variable for PEER treatments, where IND treatments are the baseline
category, a dummy variable for AA(-IND, -PEER)=ambiguity aversion (in IND, PEER treatment), and
the measure for cognitive ability. I control for gender, age and economic/business studies. Robust stan-
dard errors, clustered on group level; *** (**, *) denotes significance on level p < 0.01 (p < 0.05, p < 0.1).
Table 4.3: Probit model for shifts towards ambiguity neutrality
significantly less likely compared to ambiguity seeking. In this case, being classified as
ambiguity averse corresponds an average probability equivalent of 0.53, with median 0.51,
i.e., these subjects are relatively close to neutrality already. Moreover, the effect appears
to be driven by the PEER treatment (model (6)). Yet, this might be confounded by a
paradigm that is shown in the next section: the majority of subjects who actually change
in LOSS-IND is ambiguity seeking already (in contrast to LOSS-PEER), hence, providing
more scope for shifts towards neutrality.
Apparently, being of high cognitive ability significantly increases the likelihood for a shift
towards neutrality in the gain domain suggesting a cognitive component within ambi-
guity attitudes, whereas marginal effects are of negligible and insignificant size in the
loss domain. Hence, while ambiguity seeking migh instinctively decline, biases towards
ambiguity aversion might be overcome by rational reasoning.
Overall, complementing the previous findings, the provision of a social anchor results in
different dynamics in the domain of gains compared to losses.
Result 1 (Shifts in attitudes conditional on changes in q (cont’d.)). text
3. In combination, a social anchor significantly increases the likelihood for a shift to-
wards ambiguity neutrality in the gain, but not in the loss domain.
4. Cognitive ability significantly and positively correlates to shifts from ambiguity aver-
sion towards neutrality in the gain domain, while it is not of relevance in the loss
domain.
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Frequencies of change
So far, I examined effects conditional on changes in probability equivalents. But how
frequent are changes actually? And how do frequencies of change relate to treatment
variations? At a first glance, I observe an average frequency of change of 50% over the
whole sample. Thus, the intensity of ambiguity attitudes is likely to fluctuate, also if no
social anchor is available.
Figure 4.3 reports the average frequency of change, distinguishing by treatment in sub-
figure (a), and by treatment and ambiguity aversion in subfigure (b). Figure 4.3(a) again
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Notes: Bars are based on the following total numbers of observations. (a) GAIN-PEER: 35; LOSS-IND:
35; GAIN-PEER: 36; LOSS-PEER: 38. (b) N=(AS, AA). GAIN-PEER: (4, 31); LOSS-IND: (24, 11);
GAIN-PEER: (7, 29); LOSS-PEER: (23, 15).
Figure 4.3: Average frequency of change
suggests that social anchor effects differ in their nature between gain and loss domains.
Changes are more frequent in the gain domain if a social anchor is available compared to
the individual condition. This finding exactly reverses in the loss domain, where changes
are in fact less frequent if a social anchor is available compared to the individual condition.
Hence, there is no general support for prediction P3, namely that the presence of a social
anchor makes changes more likely.
However, turning to Figure 4.3(b), frequencies of change seem to be systematically cor-
related with individual ambiguity aversion in the individual treatments, independently of
the outcome domain. While 75% and 67% of the ambiguity seeking subjects change in the
gain and loss domain, respectively, this frequency drops to 39% for the ambiguity averse
subjects in the gain domain, and to only 18% for the ambiguity averse subjects in the
loss domain. The difference is significant for LOSS-IND (χ2-test and Fisher exact test;
p-values 0.008 and 0.012; p-values for all subsamples considered in Figure 4.3 provided in
Table D.5, appendix D.2), and remains significant on the aggregate level, pooling GAIN-
4.3 Results 85
IND and LOSS-IND (p-values 0.005, 0.007).28 In contrast, Figure 4.3(b) also shows that
frequencies of change are not systematical and less affected by ambiguity aversion if a
social anchor is available.
Why does the relationship between an individual’s ambiguity aversion and the likelihood
to change vanish in the presence of a social anchor? Figure 4.4 pictures the frequencies
of change in both PEER treatments, distinguishing by relative ambiguity aversion, i.e.,
between those who are more ambiguity averse, and those who are less ambiguity averse
than their peer (who might also be framed as more ambiguity seeking in the loss domain).
In LOSS-PEER, there are also four pairs of peers who indicated the same probability
equivalents, which does not occur in GAIN-PEER.29
I observe a monotonous relationship between relative ambiguity aversion and the likeli-
hood to change. The finding that subjects who are more ambiguity averse than their
peer change more frequently than subjects who are less ambiguity averse, parallels the
previous result that ambiguity aversion generally tends to decrease frequencies of change
in the individual treatments.
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Figure 4.4: Average frequency of change by relative ambiguity attitude
Do these patterns with respect to individual and relative ambiguity aversion possibly
interact? To answer this question I estimate probit models which regress the likelihood
to change on the presence of a social anchor using the individual condition as the baseline
28The difference is not significant in GAIN-IND (p-values 0.167, 0.292). This might be partially due to
the fact that the distribution of ambiguity averse and ambiguity seeking subjects is skewed: in GAIN-IND
only 11.4% are ambiguity seeking, while the vast majority of 88.6% are ambiguity averse (see Table 4.2).
In contrast, in the distribution in LOSS-IND is more symmetric, with 68.6% being ambiguity seeking and
31.4% being ambiguity averse. If there is a generally negative relationship between ambiguity aversion
and the variability of ambiguity attitudes (in the absence of a social anchor), this might (partly) explain
why changes are on average less frequent in the gain compared to the loss domain.
29In one of these groups, one subject was dropped due to violation of a consistency criterium; thus
Figure 4.4 only covers seven subjects in this group.
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category (model (1)); controlling for ambiguity aversion of the decision maker (2); and
allowing for the possibility that ambiguity aversion has a different impact in the IND
compared to the PEER condition (3). Then, I estimate the impact of learning to be less
or more ambiguity averse compared to the peer, relative to the baseline of having no social
anchor at all (models (4) - (6)).30
There are sizable effects in the gain domain; results are reported in Table 4.4. The provi-
sion of a social anchor increases (though only close to marginal significance) the likelihood
to change, consistent with Figure 4.3(a). Further, being more ambiguity averse than the
peer has a positive marginal effect on the likelihood to change relative to the individual
condition, significant at the 10% level. Consistent with Figure 4.4, this does not apply for
learning to be less ambiguity averse.31 This is also consistent with Result 1 3., namely that
a social anchor increases shifts towards ambiguity neutrality. While individual ambiguity
aversion does not significantly matter, high cognitive ability again has a significant and
negative marginal effect on the likelihood to change. This is particularly striking given
that initial probability equivalents and cognitive ability are not significantly correlated.
Hence, it rather suggests that the confidence in the “correctness” of one own’s choices in
the standard Ellsberg (gain) setting might correlate with ability in other cognitive tasks.
Turning to the loss domain, results are presented in Table 4.5. In line with Figure 4.3(b),
ambiguity aversion decreases the likelihood to change, but significantly so only in the indi-
vidual condition. Again, being provided with a social anchor generally has no significant
impact (models (1)-(3)). This suggests that ambiguity seeking goes along with a higher
variability of attitudes; but this relation fades out as soon as a social anchor becomes
available.32 Further, I observe a reassurance effect : compared to the baseline of having no
social anchor available, those peers who exhibit exactly the same ambiguity attitude are
less likely to change. Instead, those who are less or more ambiguity averse than their peer
are not significantly different in terms of their likelihood to change, compared to IND.
Hence, realizing that attitudes towards ambiguity are similar might serve as a confirma-
tion device. Reflecting Figure 4.4, marginal effects are significantly different comparing
those who are more ambiguity averse to those who have the same attitude as their peer.33
Since the impact of individual ambiguity aversion only significantly matters in IND, the
reassurance effect vanishes if I only control for a subject’s ambiguity aversion (model (5))
but not allow for differences between a subject’s ambiguity aversion in IND and PEER
30Coefficients of interaction terms in non-linear models might be biased in sign (see Ai and Norton,
2003). Thus, I only compare ambiguity aversion in the IND and PEER treatments to ambiguity seeking
in all treatments. Additionally, I estimated OLS regressions which yield qualitatively similar results.
31Coefficients are, however, not significantly different between PEER×less AA and PEER×more AA;
linear hypotheses tests, p-values>0.2.
32Coefficients of AA-IND and AA-PEER are significantly different based on linear hypothesis test;
p-values 0.094, 0.041, 0.063 for models (3), (6), and (8), respectively. I observe the same relationship in
the gain domain (Table 4.4), although effects are not significant in that case.
33Linear hypothesis test; p-values=0.056, 0.035 in models (4) and (6).
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Likelihood GAIN domain
to change (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PEER 0.152 0.153 -0.184
[0.106] [0.105] [0.267]
PEER 0.051 0.044 -0.204
× less AA [0.137] [0.142] [0.220]
PEER 0.242* 0.244* -0.048
× more AA [0.132] [0.134] [0.307]
AA 0.017 -0.036
[0.142] [0.161]
AA-IND -0.217 -0.221
[0.254] [0.252]
AA-PEER 0.173 0.099
[0.139] [0.189]
Cogn. ability -0.110** -0.111** -0.111** -0.118** -0.115** -0.114**
[0.039] [0.042] [0.041] [0.038] [0.041] [0.040]
Observations 71 71 71 71 71 71
Log.-lik. -44.15 -44.15 -43.41 -43.44 -43.42 -42.94
Notes: Marginal effects of a probit regression on the likelihood to change; independent variables are
given as in Table 4.3; dummies PEER×less (more) AA indicate whether the individual is less (more)
ambiguity averse than his peer; controls for gender, age and economic/business studies are included.
Robust standard errors, clustered on group level; *** (**, *) denote significance on levels p < 0.01
(p < 0.05, p < 0.1).
Table 4.4: Probit regression for the GAIN domain
(as in model 6). However, I also need to note that those peers who have the same ambi-
guity attitudes were predominantly ambiguity averse (6 subjects), compared to ambiguity
seeking (only 1 subject), which might also drive the overall effect of ambiguity aversion
in model (5). As a robustness check, I exclude observations of peers with identical ambi-
guity attitudes (models (7)-(8)), and the previous result remains unchanged: ambiguity
aversion significantly decreases frequencies of change in the absence, but does not play a
significant role in the presence of a social anchor.
Result 2 (Frequencies of change). text
1. In the absence of a social anchor individual attitudes matter for the likelihood of
change: ambiguity averse subjects change less frequently compared to ambiguity seek-
ing subjects; this is significant in the loss domain.
2. The presence of a social anchor affects the likelihood of change in particular settings:
(i) being more ambiguity averse than the peer increase the likelihood to change in
the gain domain;
(ii) having exactly the same ambiguity attitude as the peer significantly decreases
the likelihood to change in the loss domain.
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Likelihood LOSS domain
to change (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
PEER -0.050 -0.036 -0.161
[0.121] [0.117] [0.134]
PEER -0.059 -0.253 -0.206 -0.114 -0.194
× less AA [0.163] [0.198] [0.160] [0.163] [0.162]
PEER 0.075 -0.114 -0.077 0.112 -0.060
× more AA [0.154] [0.159] [0.175] [0.154] [0.176]
PEER -0.352* 0.107 -0.476**
× same AA [0.160] [0.156] [0.156]
AA -0.225** -0.222* -0.252*
[0.102] [0.111] [0.120]
AA-IND -0.445** -0.432** -0.442**
[0.169] [0.160] [0.166]
AA-PEER -0.066 0.024 -0.004
[0.129] [0.143] [0.157]
Cogn. ability -0.015 -0.004 0.000 -0.011 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
[0.033] [0.033] [0.032] [0.035] [0.035] [0.034] [0.040] [0.040]
Observations 73 73 73 73 73 73 66 66
Log.-lik. -48.63 -46.88 -45.62 -46.73 -45.34 -43.69 -42.10 -40.76
Notes: Marginal effects of a probit regression on the likelihood to change; independent variables are
given as in Table 4.4, PEER×same A-attitude is a dummy for whether the subjects has exactly the
same ambiguity attitude as his peer; controls for gender, age and economic/business studies are included.
Robust standard errors, clustered on group level; *** (**, *) denote significance on levels p < 0.01
(p < 0.05, p < 0.1).
Table 4.5: Probit regression LOSS domain
To evaluate the predictive power of the reported regressions I contrast predicted and
true values for models (1)-(6) (reported in Table D.6, appendix D.2). Model (6) indeed
performs best. While (4) and (5) overestimate the likelihood to change in IND for the
ambiguity averse, and underestimate the likelihood to change for the ambiguity seeking
subjects, the predictions for the likelihood to change conditional on the relative ambiguity
aversion in the PEER treatments remain the same across models (4)-(6).
Given that ambiguity seeking subjects in the loss domain are significantly more likely
to change in the individual condition, this attitude might not be particularly robust.
Moreover, individual attitudes might even predict the likelihood to change, however, only
if a social anchor is not available. For gains and in the presence of a social anchor, those
who learn to be more ambiguity averse than their peers switch more often. Based on
Result 1 which states that decision makers tend to shift towards their peers’ attitudes,
this is likely to induce a shift towards neutrality on the aggregate level. Nevertheless,
as noted earlier in section 4.3.2, actual attitudes are indeed quite stable, especially given
that the distributions of ambiguity averse and ambiguity seeking subjects do not differ
considerably between Part 1 and Part 2.
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4.4 Conclusion
In this paper I provide new experimental evidence on the effect of being provided with a
social anchor on attitudes towards ambiguity. Hereby, I focus on the standard Ellsberg
setting (Ellsberg, 1961), with an ambiguity neutral probability of 50%, for gains and losses.
In the experiment probability equivalents are elicited twice, in two consecutive rounds,
individually in Part 1, and again in Part 2. In the social anchor treatments, subjects are
provided with the choice profile of another participant from the first part when making
their choices a second time. To distinguish between the impact of a social anchor and a
general anchoring effect, everyone is shown his own complete choice profile from the first
part, in the individual and social anchor treatments.
My results generally support the common two-fold pattern of individual ambiguity atti-
tudes, indicating significant ambiguity aversion in the gain domain, and significant am-
biguity seeking in the loss domain. These preferences appear stable in the sense that if
individuals exhibit ambiguity aversion (seeking) in the first part, roughly 90% also do so
in the second part, independent of any treatment variation. In contrast, the intensity of
these attitudes does not prove to be as robust; in 50% of all cases subjects’ probability
equivalents do not coincide between Part 1 and Part 2.
In some respects, the availability of a social anchor seems to have rather weak effects. For
example, receiving a social anchor does not significantly alter the likelihood with which
subjects change their probability equivalents. In other respects, peers seem to be impor-
tant. For example, conditional on a change, I mostly observe shifts towards ambiguity
neutrality in the individual treatments, while subjects are very likely to converge towards
their peer’s attitude in the social anchor treatments. However, the analysis suggests that
individual dynamics as well as peer effects differ considerably between gains and losses.
In the domain of gains, the individual’s ambiguity attitude does not significantly influ-
ence the likelihood to change nor the likelihood to shift towards neutrality, neither in the
individual nor in the social anchor treatment. However, learning to be more ambiguity
averse than a peer significantly increases the likelihood to change, relative to having no
social anchor available. That is, the relative ambiguity attitude, i.e., the ambiguity at-
titude compared to the peer’s, matters. Further, conditional on a change in probability
equivalents, decision makers tend to follow their peer’s attitude, towards ambiguity aver-
sion, seeking, or neutrality. Ultimately, receiving a social anchor in the gain treatments
predominantly induces comparably ambiguity averse subjects to shift towards ambiguity
neutrality.
In the domain of losses, in contrast, individual attitudes matter in the individual treat-
ment, such that ambiguity seeking subjects are significantly more likely to change com-
pared to ambiguity averse subjects. But this relationship breaks down when a social
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anchor becomes available, where it is again the relative ambiguity attitude that matters,
but in a way that learning to have the same attitude as the peer significantly reduces
the likelihood to change. I label this a reassurance effect. Generally, again in contrast to
the gain domain, conditional on a change in probability equivalents, I observe significant
shifts only from ambiguity seeking towards neutrality in the loss domain, with and with-
out social anchor, suggesting that ambiguity seeking might not be very robust over time
in such settings. This is in line with mixed evidence on ambiguity attitudes in the domain
of losses, where some experiments report neutrality while others report a preference for
ambiguity.
The persistent finding that cognitive ability significantly and positively correlates to shifts
towards neutrality in the standard Ellsberg setting over gains further suggests that the
common finding of ambiguity aversion might be driven by bounded rationality of subjects.
The fact that no correlation between cognitive ability and ambiguity seeking over losses
is found corroborates the conjecture that this attitude might rather be of instinctive and
flighty nature.
In summary, I derive three main conclusions. The intensity of ambiguity attitudes is likely
to fluctuate, even if no social anchor is available; nevertheless, peers seem to be important
for decision-making under ambiguity; and being provided with a social anchor seems to
affect individual attitudes differently in the domain of gains compared to losses.
In the introduction I noted that this paper is closely related to the studies by Keck et al.
(2011) and Charness et al. (2013), who examine changes in individual ambiguity attitudes
after consultation with others. Both studies agree in their result that ambiguity attitudes
shift towards neutrality as a result of social interaction. Concordantly, the authors of
both studies agree in their hypothesis that ambiguity neutrality might be perceived as a
persuasive argument (Burnstein and Vinokur, 1977). The present study replicates this
shift towards ambiguity neutrality in the presence of others, but reports two additional
findings. First, although the relative ambiguity attitude matters for the likelihood to
change, ambiguity aversion over gains might also be corroborated since individuals seem
to converge to the peer’s attitude in either direction, conditional on a change. Second, in
the domain of losses, the shift towards ambiguity neutrality might be present whether or
not a social anchor is available.
A crucial difference between this and the other two studies lies in the way in which
feedback about others is introduced. The present experiment only provides subjects with
information about others choices, while the cited papers allow for face-to-face interaction
between peers. Thus, although feedback about others’ choices might already cause peer
effects, establishing ambiguity neutrality as a persuasive argument in individual choices
might be not as evident if the social anchor purely refers to hard-coded information instead
of discussion or consultation.
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The present study is restricted to ambiguity attitudes with respect to symmetric and
moderate probabilities. Future research is needed to uncover dynamics behind peer effects
in situations in which events occur with small likelihoods, where hopes or fears might drive
individual choices (following the terminology of Viscusi and Chesson, 1999). Moreover, in
this study I do not disentangle any effects which occur through distributional preferences
with respect to the peer from effects that stem from learning the peer’s choices. The fact
that I do observe relatively weak social anchor effects might suggest that either channel
does not have a substantial impact on individual choices. However, studies on peer effects
in risk taking actually suggest that distributional and informational channels might be
orthogonal (see, e.g., Cooper and Rege, 2011; Bursztyn et al., 2014), i.e., induce different
shifts in attitudes independently of each other. Thus, disentangling distributional and
informational channels in social anchor effects might be worthwhile to understand how
ambiguity attitudes can be shaped by information about others.
This study has important implications with respect to economic behavior where discrim-
inating ambiguity from risk may have detrimental effects. Ambiguity aversion, in par-
ticular, has been proposed among economic theorists to explain suboptimal choices in
decisions under uncertainty, such as with respect to the stock market participation puz-
zle (Easley and O’Hara, 2009) or the reluctance to take up (costless) genetic tests (Hoy
et al., 2014). In this respect, my study suggests that social interaction – and even individ-
ual dynamics over time – might establish neutral preferences towards ambiguity, which
might ultimately inhibit adverse effects in decision-making under uncertainty. Finally, my
findings suggest that individual dynamics as well as peer effects in ambiguity attitudes
might work differently in different outcome domains, and, similarly, that cognitive ability
is likely to affect the evaluation of ambiguous events only in some specific settings. Obvi-
ously, further research is needed to fully understand in which settings consultation with
others or providing professional advice might be particularly beneficial.
Chapter 5
Team Reasoning as a Guide to
Coordination∗
5.1 Introduction
It has always been transparent to the attentive observer that traditional rational choice
theory (RC) performs poorly as a descriptive theory of human behavior in many areas of
social interaction. In recent years, experiments with simple dilemma games by behavioral
economists and other behavioral scientists validated this simple truth. The theory of
team reasoning (TR; Sugden, 1993, 2000, 2003; Bacharach, 1999, 2006) is one attempt to
cope with this problem. A particular problem of traditional RC is that it cannot explain
equilibrium selection in simple coordination games. Patterns of coordination very often
seem evident from a common sense point of view, and, so, coordination is in fact rarely an
actual problem for real individuals. Still, if actors were to ask RC for advice they would
get utterly frustrated. RC remains silent if equilibrium selection is the issue. If individuals
look at the problem from a team perspective, however, some of the most common routes
to coordination become unveiled. If there is a single pattern of behavior that is best for
the group (which often amounts to ’best for each individual in the group’), then it seems
reasonable that each should do his1 part in the scheme of actions so defined. But a team
perspective is not comprehensible within the classical rational choice approach to social
interaction.
TR is an attempt to fill this gap by implementing team agency into the theory of ra-
tional action. Teams are added to the theory as possible agents, while the fundamental
assumptions of RC about rational decision-making remain unchanged in principle. In TR,
these assumptions are just transferred to the realm of the new agents and, thus, apply
to individuals and groups alike. TR introduces team agency in two steps. First, team
∗This chapter is based on joint work with Bernd Lahno.
1We refer to a decision maker as “he” throughout the paper.
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preferences are defined as a common scheme of evaluation. Second, a choice rule specifies
how an individual is to contribute to maximizing team utility by making his (individual)
choice.
Extending agency from individuals alone to individuals and groups seems in fact suitable
to account for various instances of successful coordination and other cooperative regular-
ities. Moreover, by reference to team agency, TR can explain the stability of behavioral
patterns and behavioral expectations. It thus gives some account of social norms not
available within RC. However, as TR sticks with the fundamental assumptions of instru-
mental rationality as conceptualized in RC it also inherits the idea of opportunistic choice.
As individuals according to RC, teams according to TR instantly detect and take oppor-
tunities as soon as they arise. Choices of team members, therefore, are assumed to be
principally unaffected by normative expectations or behavioral regularities observed in the
past. They may conform with customs or norms to the extent that those actually promote
the team interest. But neither customs nor norms constitute a fundamental restriction to
decision-making.
An interesting consequence of opportunism as embodied in TR’s choice rule is that indi-
viduals do not make use of the entire private information available to them. While the
principles of individual opportunistic rationality would demand that each individual uses
all the private information available to him, a team cannot make a decision dependent
on information that is available to some but not all its members. As a result, the opti-
mal scheme of action in terms of the team goal may be different depending on whether
determined from an individual or from the team perspective.
In this paper we analyze and discuss the solution concept for common coordination prob-
lems as incorporated in TR. Special consideration is given to TR’s concept of opportunistic
choice and to the resulting restrictions in using private information. We report results from
a laboratory experiment in which we analyze behavior in simple coordination dilemmas.
In particular, we test whether ’teams’ react opportunistically to changes in a strategic
environment.2 In the experiment teams were given a chance to coordinate on a particular
pattern of behavior in a sequence of HiLo games. Then, a modification of the stage game
offered opportunities to improve on the team goal by changing this accustomed pattern
of behavior. We implemented three treatments which differ with respect to the particular
modification and the optimal strategy induced by team reasoning.
Our observations throw considerable doubt on the idea of opportunistic team reasoning as
a guide to coordination. Contrary to what TR would predict, individuals tend to stick to
accustomed behavioral patterns. Moreover, we find that individual decisions are at least
2Experimental studies of the empirical validity of the theory of team reasoning seem to be rare. In
an experimental comparison of TR and Cognitive Hierarchy, Bardsley et al. (2010) found mixed evidence
for the explanative power of TR in coordination problems. Colman et al. (2008) found evidence for team
reasoning in experiments with lifelike vignettes as well as in abstract games.
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partly determined by private information not accessible to all members of a team, which
violates TR’s assumption that individual solely use information which is available to all
team members. Alternative theories of choice, in particular cognitive hierarchy theory
(Camerer et al., 2004), may be more suitable to explain the observed pattern of behavior.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. First, we briefly sketch the guid-
ing ideas and basic elements of the theory of team reasoning. We illustrate the theory
by discussing TR’s suggestions to solve problems of cooperation as represented by the
prisoners’ dilemma and general problems of coordination as exemplified in a simple HiLo
game (section 5.2). After specifying the empirical claims incorporated in TR as a descrip-
tive theory (section 5.3) we investigate the theoretical relationship between RC and TR
(section 5.4). We argue that TR inherits a strict conception of instrumental rationality
and opportunistic choice from RC. To extract the opportunistic nature of TR’s concept of
rational choice we consider variants of the HiLo game and derive behavioral predictions
under different forms of uncertainty (section 5.5). We then test the empirical significance
of TR by actually implementing these cooperation dilemmas in a laboratory experiment;
we describe the experimental design, and present and discuss our results (section 5.6).
Finally, we conclude and provide some general remarks (section 5.7).
5.2 The foundations of team reasoning
The core idea of TR is to abandon the assumption of exclusively individual agency in
RC and amend traditional decision theory by an adequate account of collective agency.
Consider a classic Prisoners’ Dilemma (PD) as given in Figure 5.1 (payoffs normalized):
C D
C a | a 0 | d
d > a > 1
D d | 0 1 | 1
Figure 5.1: Prisoners’ dilemma
RC implies that rational individuals will mutually defect, (D, D), although both prefer
mutual cooperation, (C, C). There is ample evidence that real decision makers in fact
cooperate in such situations to a considerable extent. TR offers the following explanation:
individuals do not always maximize their expected individual utility given what they
believe about the actions of others as RC would demand. The individual actor may
perceive a situation primarily as one that poses a problem to the group (the ’team’) of
the two actors as a whole rather then to each of them separately and in isolation. So,
instead of asking ’What should I do?’ the guiding question in the decision-making process
is: ’What should we do?’. In a PD as given above the natural answer seems to be:
’We should cooperate!’ meaning that the collective of the two actors should collectively
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realize the result (C, C). So both should do their part in the collective scheme to realize
the collectively preferred result, each should cooperate. This decision-making procedure
presupposes that there is a common scheme of evaluating the consequences of interaction
from a team perspective. Given such a scheme, then, the question ’What should we
do?’ can be answered in the standard instrumental way by identifying the combination of
actions that yields the best result according to team evaluation. TR prescribes that each
individual does his part of the optimal scheme provided that it is common knowledge
among the individuals that each individual identifies with the group and endorses the
common evaluation scheme. Consequently, acting as a ’teamer’ involves being guided
by the team objective and a distinctive way of reasoning. TR therefore comprises two
discernible parts: (1) a theory of preference transformation and (2) a decision-making
rule.
It is, in fact, an extremely complex and difficult task to give a general account of how
to derive team preferences from individual preferences and the relevant properties of a
situation of choice. Nevertheless, in many situations we have quite firm intuitions about
group evaluation. In our PD a plausible transformation from individual to team payoffs
is given in Figure 5.2.
C D C D
C a | a 0 | d
d > a > 1 → C baaba baeba a > 1 > eD d | 0 1 | 1 D e 1
Figure 5.2: Team payoffs in a prisoners’ dilemma
From the team perspective (C, C) is preferred to (D, D) and – in contrast to individual
evaluation as given in the original matrix – also preferred to the asymmetrical outcomes
(C, D) and (D, C). If all individuals take on the team perspective and if this is commonly
known among them, team reasoners will proceed according to the following decision-
making rule:
Choose your part of the common scheme of actions that maximizes team payoff. (tr)
One might wonder whether the choice rule of team reasoning as specified in (tr) may
play a relevant role beyond traditional rules of individual rationality at all.3 Will it not
suffice to assume that it is common knowledge that both players take on the team’s
objective? Will rational individuals in the traditional sense of RC, maximizing the so
defined utility individually, not ’automatically’ decide in exactly the same way as proposed
by TR without the necessity to refer to a special decision rule? The answer is NO.
3Although (tr) will inevitably produce cooperation in a PD it does not necessarily define an action for
every individual in each and every strategic situation. If no unique optimal strategy profile exists (e.g.,
because of indifference in terms of team evaluation), then, obviously, an additional choice rule is needed
to determine the scheme of actions to be collectively chosen.
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Consider again the payoffs in the matrix to the right of Figure 5.2 and assume that the
payoffs represent team as well as individual utilities derived from the respective action
profiles. The payoff e is assumed to be smaller than 1, which is a plausible assumption for
team evaluation. According to standard RC this game has two equilibria, (C, C) and (D,
D). As we shall argue in a moment, the resulting equilibrium selection problem cannot be
solved on the basis of the standard assumptions of instrumental rationality alone. The
choice rule (tr) solves this problem.
The problem of equilibrium selection in RC – for which TR offers a (partial) solution – is
a general one. It is just as relevant as the notorious problem of cooperation in dilemma
games but has not received the same sort of attention (as it deserves). Thus, taking a
closer look is worthwhile.
For illustration consider the following coordination game in Figure 5.3 (payoffs again
normalized), which is known as the HiLo game.
red blue
red a | a 0 | 0
a > 1
blue 0 | 0 1 | 1
Figure 5.3: HiLo game
Compared to the PD HiLo has an important property relevant to someone who is inter-
ested in the empirical validity of TR, namely, the preferences of both players are perfectly
congruent. It is only natural to assume that team payoffs coincide with individual payoffs
(see Figure 5.4) and the problem of deriving team preferences does not even evolve.4
red blue red blue
red a | a 0 | 0
a > 1 → red baaba ba0ba a > 1blue 0 | 0 1 | 1 blue 0 1
Figure 5.4: Team preferences in a HiLo game
Hence, HiLo is particularly suited to investigate the empirical validity of (tr), the team
reasoning choice rule. We will concentrate on variants of this game in what follows.
Consider, the HiLo in Figure 5.3 from a pure RC point of view. The game has two
equilibria (red, red) and (blue, blue) with (red, red) dominating (blue, blue) in the Pareto
sense. So red seems to be the unique rational choice in this situation (our experiment
once more supports the conjecture that individuals consistently act in accordance with
this simple insight). But notice that the Pareto-optimality of (red, red) is a property of
a common scheme of action, which no individual can realize individually by his choice.5
4Moreover, we may abstain from analyzing the role of (outcome-based) social preferences (see, e.g.,
Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000). Obviously, concerns for distributions in outcomes
do not influence utilities.
5The same is true of the property of being an equilibrium, and a similar argument applies (Gintis,
2009).
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Being solely based on conditions of individual rationality RC cannot substantiate reasons
to choose red or blue in the following situation.
Consider an individual A playing against B. From an RC point of view A has reason to
choose red only if he has reason to believe that B will also choose red (with sufficient
probability). But B is in the same position. Knowing that B is rational like herself A
therefore needs a reason to believe that B has reason to believe that A will choose red.
But again: B is in the same position. . . Obviously this leads into an endless regress.
To assume that individual rationality as defined in RC might provide a decisive reason to
act in certain ways – and, thus, provide a solution to the choice problem – in coordination
problems as HiLo is void.6 In contrast, TR provides an outright solution to the problem
that fits very nicely with our intuitions. The fact that individual goals are completely
congruent gives sufficient reason to assume that A and B realize their collective (joint)
dilemma. (tr) is the core of this solution: the best result from everyone’s point of view is
brought about by mutually choosing red. And this is common knowledge. So, according
to TR each has reason to follow (tr) and choose his part in the preferred scheme; each
chooses red.
5.3 Team reasoning as a descriptive theory
TR is particularly relevant for situations in which choice may be conceived as an issue of
a collective rather than of individuals. But even if a situation may be characterized as
such from the outside, TR does not necessarily demand that individuals actually employ
team reasoning. Team reasoning is conditional on a certain perception of the situation
from inside, i.e., by the individuals that are to form the collective. It presupposes that
individuals conceive themselves as members of a team and perceive this team as a possible
unit of (collective) agency characterized by its team goals (cf. Gold and Sugden, 2007,
125). The essential element of such group identification then is that individuals take on
the team goal as their own.
Whether or not an individual identifies with a team is a matter of framing, not a matter
of rationality. Both Sugden and Bacharach agree that there are empirical regularities such
that group identification is promoted by certain situations but prevented by others.7 But
these issues are understood as the object of empirical research in psychology or behavioral
science, rather than as being an integral part of TR. Sugden takes TR – just like RC – as
a theory without empirical content (Sugden, 2000, 203). Bacharach, however, identifies
6See Lahno (2007) for a more detailed account of the problem. Different scholars have recognized
and analyzed the problem; see Sugden (1991) for an overview on the ’classic’ literature. Sugden traces
the discovery and first analysis of the problem to Hodgson (1967).
7Hindriks (2012) may serve to exemplify this idea. Based on the literature from scholars of the so
called “social identity approach” in social psychology he argues that social categorization is a core factor
in group identification.
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at least one condition of group identification within his account of TR. He, first, refers
to theories of group identity and empirical research in psychology to present different
states of affairs that may prompt group identification (Bacharach, 2006, 73 ff.). He, then,
particularly identifies a source of group identification that is entirely determined by the
abstract form of a situation as represented in a game. He refers to this source of group
identification as ”strong interdependence” (Bacharach, 2006, 84). A situation is one of
strong interdependence if there is a feasible outcome that Pareto-dominates every (other)
possible solution consistent with the principles of individual rational decision-making as
specified by RC. Note that the two abstract situations discussed above, the PD as well as
the HiLo, are of this sort. (C, C) Pareto-dominates (D, D), the unique solution according
to RC in the PD, and (red, red) Pareto-dominates (blue, blue) which is the only other
possible solution according to RC, i.e., the only other equilibrium, in HiLo.
A rational individual in a situation with strong interdependence will realize that the
actors in the situation share a goal which they can collectively achieve. As a consequence,
Bacharach claims, the individual will identify with the group. Moreover, if we stick to
the common assumption that the rationality of individuals (and the structure of the
game) is common knowledge, the fact that individuals identify with the group will also
be common knowledge. Although individuals may lack the perfect rationality assumed
in theory, similar considerations may well apply to real world individuals. Bacharach, in
fact, makes the empirical claim that the perception of strong interdependence stimulates
group identification, or more precisely:
The probability of group identification is high if strong interdependence is perceived. (?)
Bacharach argues that reason dictates team reasoning once it is common knowledge that
individuals identify with the group. Again, although individuals may lack the perfect
rationality assumed in theory, they should be expected to team reason if they identify
with the group and perceive others as being alike. This results in another empirical claim,
the ”reasoning effect” (Bacharach, 2006, 135 ff.). Group identification stimulates team
reasoning, or more precisely:
Common group identification induces a high probability of team reasoning. (??)
Strong interdependence is particularly obvious and salient in HiLo and it seems natural
to assume that real individuals, just as their ideal rational counterparts, are well aware
of the fact that there is a shared goal which they can collectively achieve. In the light of
this observation (?) and (??) yield an empirical hypothesis for the HiLo game: there is a
high probability of coordination on the Pareto-optimal outcome in HiLo. In other words:
TR (as specified by Bacharach) can explain what is commonly observed but cannot be
explained within a pure RC approach.
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Sugden agrees: TR can indeed provide a valid explanation for coordination in HiLo games.
But he rejects the assumption that common knowledge of group identification is sufficient
to identify team reasoning as the unique rational mode of reasoning. According to Sugden,
it may still be rational to refrain from team reasoning, even if it is common knowledge that
every individual involved also identifies with the group. For Sugden team reasoning just
remains one rational mode of reasoning among others. Even if it is common knowledge
that all individuals identify with the group, it may remain rational (in the very light of
group goals) for a member of the group to follow another mode of reasoning, if all others
do. So to engage in team reasoning an individual has to be sufficiently assured that others
not only identify with the group but also use this mode of reasoning as well.8
As a consequence, Sugden demands that any complete explanation by TR has to refer
to some form of ”assurance”. Individuals must have good reason to believe that others
identify with the group and employ team reasoning to make their choice. A person that
identifies with the group and employs team reasoning as his mode of reasoning is referred
to a ’teamer’. For Bacharach, every member of the team is a teamer if group identification
(and the rationality of the members) is common knowledge. For Sugden this does not
necessarily hold. Individuals must have good reasons to believe that others are teamers,
they must have good reasons to believe that the others also have good reasons to believe
that group members are teamers, and so on.9
But when will this condition be fulfilled? This, again, is an empirical question. Sugden
identifies one important source for such assurance: common experience of a shared practice
(Gold and Sugden, 2007, 135). If people regularly observe that others act according to the
beneficial scheme and if this is a public experience – everybody observes the regularity,
everybody is aware that everybody else does, etc., – then each individual is sufficiently
assured that sufficiently many others not only identify with the group but also act on the
group’s goal in the way TR prescribes.
5.4 Instrumental rationality and opportunism
The founders of TR are firmly rooted within the RC tradition. They were motivated
by the shortcomings they found within RC, and so they made an attempt to revise RC
in ways such that many fundamental ideas of RC are preserved while some of its most
pressing problems are solved. Moreover, while team reasoning is understood as genuinely
rational, it is not claimed to be the only viable form of rational decision-making. As was
noted before, TR has a special focus on interaction in which groups of individuals may
8Compare the problem of equilibrium selection in RC as discussed in section 5.2 above!
9This is a rough sketch of the condition only. For a precise formulation see Gold and Sugden (2007),
132 ff, and Cubitt and Sugden (2003) for an elucidation of the concept of “reason to believe”.
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be identified as units of agency. It is not claimed that new insights to issues outside the
range of this focus are actually added.
Thus, TR can be understood as an attempt to advance RC by extending the range of
possible subjects of agency and generalizing the fundamental concepts of the theory of
individual rationality such that they may be applied to contexts where collectives can be
understood as agents. As a consequence, TR is fundamentally related to traditional RC.
This becomes particularly lucid by the following two observations:
(1) Whatever action TR prescribes to an individual in a certain situation, choosing
this action is individually rational in the sense of RC relative to team preferences.
Given that the other agents act as teamers the individual maximizes team utility
by choosing the act proposed by TR.
(2) RC may be understood as a special case of TR by defining individuals as groups of
one. TR then produces the very same theorems as RC on the domain of individuals
so defined.
(1) TR is based on a simple insight: a profile of strategies which is proposed by TR
maximizes team utility. Hence, there is no other profile with larger team utility and,
hence, an individual cannot improve (relative to team utility) by deviating unilaterally.
That is, team reasoning is consistent with instrumental rationality in the sense of RC if
individual preferences and team preferences are assumed do be identical. However, TR
does more than just adding collective goals to RC. This is manifest in the decision rule
(tr). As noted above (tr) serves inter alia to solve equilibrium selection problems which
cannot be solved by individual instrumental rationality as defined in RC alone.
(2) is a simple consequence of the guiding idea behind TR. Groups of individuals are
introduced as additional units of agency. The traditional assumptions of RC about in-
dividuals (i.e., that they are characterized by specific preferences and beliefs) and their
ways of decision-making are then transcribed to these new units. In this regard, TR is a
genuine amplification of RC: it contains RC as a special case. Another consequence is that
TR mirrors the key assumptions of individual decision-making in RC in its assumptions
about team reasoning.
The essential element of TR’s heritage from traditional RC is its rigorous conception of
instrumental rationality:
• According to RC all individual goals can be represented by a suitable utility function
over the consequences of action, and every motivational force can be represented as
a disposition to maximize this utility function in a certain choice situation.
According to TR all team goals can be represented by a suitable team utility func-
tion over the consequences of action-profiles, and every collective intention can be
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represented as a disposition to maximize this utility function in a certain choice
situation
• According to RC every individual chooses those options that guarantee (relative to
his beliefs) maximum individual utility.
According to TR every team or collective chooses those options that guarantee (rel-
ative to common beliefs in the team) maximum team utility.
• According to RC any individual will choose opportunistically in the following sense:
he will instantly detect every opportunity to improve by changing his way to act and
use it immediately; he will do so, whenever the opportunity may arise, i.e., in every
single situation of choice. Therefore there is no motivational force in considerations
like: what will be the overall consequences of me following this route of action in
the long run?
According to TR any team will choose opportunistically in the following sense: the
team will instantly detect every opportunity to improve by changing the profile
of actions by the teamers and it will collectively use it immediately; it will do
so, whenever the opportunity may arise, i.e., in every single situation of choice.
Therefore there is no motivational force in considerations like: what will be the
overall consequences of us following this route of action in the long run?
Opportunism10 combines extreme agility and responsiveness to changing circumstances
with resolute restrictions on the determinants of choice. On the one hand, opportunistic
decision makers unswervingly take any opportunity as soon as it occurs. An opportunistic
individual is not governed by customs or habits. his behavior may conform with norms
(if this suits his interests), but it is not restricted by norms. he does whatever is best
independently of his own past behavior or of what others may think suitable. On the
other hand, there is a clear and rigorous restriction on what may influence the decision of
an opportunistic decision maker: only the expected future consequences of own individual
choices are relevant for opportunistic choice.
Individual opportunism is both, a distinguishing feature of theoretical clarity and an-
alytical rigor in the architecture of RC, and a major source of RC’s problems to cope
with the empirical regularities of human decision-making. An important example of the
problematic aspect of opportunism in RC is the so-called commitment problem as, e.g.,
illustrated by the Prisoners’ Dilemma. Assume player A could commit herself to coop-
erate if he expected B to cooperate, and B, after being informed on the commitment of
A, could commit herself to cooperate. Then, the two could jointly realize the mutually
preferred outcome (C, C). But, although both would benefit from such an arrangement,
it is not obtainable to rational individuals in the sense of RC unless they have an external
10Cf. Kliemt (2009), 55ff, for the concept of opportunism as used here.
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and binding commitment mechanism at their disposal. The sole fact that it is mutually
advantageous that both restrict their options does not enable them to actually restrict
options, - it cannot be effective as a reason to act. Opportunism is the core reason for
this. If the occasion arises each has to choose the optimal option given his beliefs about
the actions of the other. As long as a strictly dominant option D is actually available (as
in the PD), opportunism commands to choose it. Opportunism makes individuals look
solely at the future consequences of their individual choice given their beliefs about other’s
choices. The fact that regularly following a different scheme of action might be mutually
beneficial is irrelevant, as only the choice of each single action is under individual control,
but not the choice of a (binding) scheme of action.
HiLo provides another example for the difficulties of opportunistic individual decision-
making. That the outcome (red, red) is mutually preferred provides no reason for choosing
red because the outcome (red, red) is not an option of an individual. It would provide
a reason for an opportunistic individual only if the mutual preferability would somehow
justify the expectation that the other would choose red. This would make the option
red optimal. But this is exactly what is at issue. It is the very flexibility of opportunis-
tic choices that prevents individual actors from coordination on a mutually advantageous
equilibrium. Since opportunistic actors are perfectly responsive to the conditions of choice
and absolutely flexible in their reactions they may loose their ground if the crucial de-
terminant of choice is what they expect from others (as is generally the case in strategic
interaction).
Individual opportunism is a theoretically elegant conception but it hardly accounts for the
complexities of real life human decision-making. Actual human actors are not perfectly
free to instantly detect and choose whatever is best. They are subject to the influence
of custom and habit, and they are bound by personal and social norms independently
of the support of these norms by sanctions. Such observations may, in fact, explain to
some extent why the commitment problem as well as problems of coordination are not as
pressing for real life individuals as RC would predict.
TR is an attempt to formulate a theory that offers a remedy against the deficiencies of
individual opportunism and, at the same time, accounts for real life restrictions and op-
portunities in decision-making processes. According to TR, individuals may restrict the
range of their options to those part of an optimal scheme by adopting a team perspec-
tive. Thus, they may overcome a commitment problem as represented by the Prisoners’
Dilemma game. Moreover, they may cut across the endless regress constituted by the
mutual dependence of choice and expectation by introducing the social optimum as an
authoritative common point of reference. In both cases the neglect of individual oppor-
tunism and its consequences allows for a more realistic account of decision-making.
At least in the form fostered by Sugden TR also gives some account of the influence of
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custom and habit on decision-making. According to Sugden “assurance” is a necessary
condition such that group identification makes individuals act as teamer. The common
experience of a shared practice is, as Sugden emphasizes, an important and sufficient
condition of such assurance. Hence, according to TR, custom plays an important rule
in explaining social interaction. Recurring patterns of behavior in a group are taken as
evidence for team reasoning to be the prevalent mode of reasoning in the group and –
therefore – justify and motivate team reasoning as the appropriate mode of reasoning.
Similarly, norms induce commonly shared patterns of behavior and expectations. If these
patterns are consistent with the demands of team reasoning they may bring about a
shared perception of team reasoning as the appropriate mode of reasoning. This will in
turn consolidate the behavioral pattern.
Notice, however, that this account of the influence of custom and social norms on social
interaction is limited by the condition that it is team reasoning instead of customs or
norms themselves that induces the regularities of conforming behavior. Custom and norms
merely explain the stability of team reasoning as a mode of decision-making. But this
stability can only be sustained as far as team reasoning continuously prescribes the same
route of action. The stability will break down as soon as a change in the environment
implies profitable deviations from a team perspective. As noted above, TR assumes the
same kind of opportunism for teams as RC does for individuals. Hence, according to TR,
teams display the same sort of rigid flexibility and instant responsiveness to changing
circumstances as individuals do according to RC. If a new opportunity arises, the team
will detect and take it instantly. Understood as units of agency, teams are assumed to be
free of habits, custom or normative restrictions.11
There is another, more traditional account of behavioral regularities that also sticks to
the fundamental assumption of rational decision-making within RC while extending its
explanatory power. On this account social norms are defined as specific equilibria12 which
function as additional constraints on individual decision-making. Thus, norms are under-
stood as the primary source of the regularities and not as a by-product of rational action.
Such considerations certainly shed some light on the nature of social interaction in gen-
eral and on norm guided behavior in particular, but their actual empirical significance
is limited. The reason is that – although a general account of the nature of behavioral
regularities is given – the theory does not provide an explanation why this or another
norm prevails.
11And so, the commitment problem and the problem of equilibrium selection may reappear on a higher
level if different teams interact strategically.
12Strictly speaking, only a specific form of norms (“norms of conduct” can be identified with equilibria,
see Lahno (2007, 2010) for a detailed account). Well known representatives of the idea that (some)
norms are equilibria are, e.g., David Lewis, Michael Taylor, Robert Sugden, Christina Bicchieri and Ken
Binmore (see Gintis, 2010, endnote 1 for references). Gintis (2009, 2010) proposes a generalization of the
idea based on the theory of epistemic games and the concept of coordinated equilibrium.
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5.5 Changing accustomed patterns of behavior by
team reasoning: introducing uncertainty
TR not only offers a general account of how people solve coordination problems, it actually
generates testable hypotheses on what regularities are to be expected. In the remaining
part of this paper we investigate the empirical significance of TR’s assumption of oppor-
tunistic decision-making on the team level. We focus on a particular form of change in
the environment, which offers opportunities to improve on the team goal by changing an
accustomed pattern of behavior. This change consists of the introduction of a particular
kind of uncertainty regarding the consequences of individual choice.
Our interest in the impact of uncertainty on team reasoning is originally motivated by
Bacharach’s provoking and in some respect surprising discussion of the demands of TR
in case that there is some (known) probability that others will not conform to TR. This
sort of problem is well known from rule-utilitarianism: given that, realistically, a certain
fraction of the population will act immorally, what rule should the moral person comply
with? Donald Regan (1980) presents ”cooperative utilitarianism” as a solution to the
problem. This in turn serves Bacharach as a model for the solution of his problem, in
his theory of ”circumspect team reasoning” (Bacharach, 2006, 130ff; Gold and Sugden,
2007, 131). The theory displays a radical resoluteness in the team perspective ascribed
to individual team reasoners by TR, a resoluteness that, in fact, may well arouse some
doubts in the empirical significance of TR.
The theory of circumspect team reasoning is interesting in normative respects but a thor-
ough discussion of the theory would go beyond the scope of this paper. We are interested
in the extent of opportunism assumed in TR and the empirical plausibility of these as-
sumptions, which is why we discuss the impact of uncertainty on decision-making in TR.
The uncertainty in Bacharach’s model of circumspect team reasoning is assumed to be
endogenous. However, in order to empirically address the impact of uncertainty we con-
sider a related but exogenously defined uncertainty in a very specific and much simpler
setting, namely in variants of the HiLo game.13
Our point of departure is a HiLo game with payoffs as given in Figure 5.5 (with corre-
sponding parameter a = 1.25 in the representation as in Figure 5.3):
We assume that the given payoffs (the numbers in the bi-matrix) represent standard car-
dinal utility values, and, as before, we assume that team utilities coincide with individual
utilities. Team reasoning then prescribes that every teamer chooses his part in the optimal
scheme; accordingly, teamers will coordinate on the Pareto-optimal outcome (red, red).
13One major benefit of focussing on exogenously imposed uncertainty is that the latter can be repro-
duced in the lab, – in contrast to the uncertainty assumed in the theory of circumspect team reasoning.
It is hardly possible to exogenously vary the fraction of team reasoners given the same strategic situation
in every treatment.
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red blue
red 5 | 5 0 | 0
blue 0 | 0 4 | 4
Figure 5.5: Basic HiLo game
We will now, consecutively, introduce two slight modifications of the game. First, we
consider the game resulting from the one above, if a random mechanism partly determines
the choice of one of the two players, in the following referred to as person A. Depending
on the outcome of this mechanism A can either freely choose between red and blue, with
probability ω, or is forced to choose blue with probability 1−ω. The other player, person
B, is not informed on the outcome of this random mechanism. However, the existence of
such a mechanism and ω are common knowledge.
Payoffs are again symmetric across players. Figure 5.6 represents the expected outcomes
(in terms of team utilities) for the different combinations of strategies. As long as 5ω >
4 − 4ω, i.e., ω > 4
9
, the game is still a coordination game with equilibria (red, red) and
(blue, blue). Therefore, both choices red and blue are rationalizable from an RC point
of view. If an individual has reason to expect his partner to choose red, choosing red is
his rational response, and a corresponding statement applies to expecting the partner to
choose blue: it is a sufficient reason to choose blue oneself.
Player B
red blue
Player A
red bl5ωbl 4− 4ω
blue 0 4
Figure 5.6: One-sided uncertainty
From a team perspective (red, red) is the unique optimal outcome as long as 5ω > 4. So
TR predicts that teamers will choose red in the role of person A as well as in the role
of person B if ω > 0.8, and blue if ω < 0.8. As TR determines a unique best scheme of
action as long as ω 6= 0.8, choices of teamers are uniquely defined.
We conclude: if the likelihood that person A is forced to choose blue is high enough (larger
than 0.2), then teamers will take the opportunity to maximize expected (team) earnings
by changing to blue.
The experience of a shared practice in the standard HiLo may assure players that team
reasoning is the prevailing mode of reasoning among individuals who identify with the
group. But a shared practice owns no independent momentum of inertia, as one might
expect from experience with common social practices. TR predicts that (red, red) is
abundant as soon as (blue, blue) becomes optimal from the team’s perspective. Yet, (red,
red) could still serve as a convenient focal point for coordination.
In a second step, we extend this kind of uncertainty to both players. Consider the mod-
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ified HiLo game in which both individuals are independently confronted with a chance
move that might force them to choose blue. Two formally identical random mechanisms
determine – independently – for each of the individuals whether he can freely make his
choice (with probability ω) or is forced to choose blue (with probability 1 − ω). While
outcomes of the mechanisms are only communicated to the respective individual but not
to his partner, the mechanism as such and the value of ω are again common knowledge.
Payoffs remain symmetric. Figure 5.7 represents the expected outcomes for the different
combinations of strategies.
This case of two-sided uncertainty is formally identical to the uncertainty that gave rise to
Bacharach’s introduction of circumspect team reasoning.14 Hence, the analysis to follow
perfectly accords with Bacharach’s corresponding discussion (see in particular Bacharach,
2006, 132 f.).
The game in Figure 5.7 is still a coordination game with equilibria (red, red) and (blue,
blue) as long as 5ω2 + 4(1− ω)2 > 4− 4ω , i.e., as long as ω > 4
9
. (red, red) is the unique
optimal outcome as long 5ω2 +4(1−ω)2 > 4. Hence, TR prescribes to choose red if ω > 8
9
and blue if ω < 8
9
. As with the first modification above: if the likelihood that a partner is
committed to choose blue is high enough, then team reasoners will take the opportunity
to maximize expected (team) earnings by changing to blue.
Player B
red blue
Player A
red 5ω2 + 4(1− ω)2 bla4(1− ω)bla
blue 4(1− ω) 4
Figure 5.7: Two-sided uncertainty
Hence, if 4
5
< ω < 8
9
team reasoners will coordinate on (blue, blue) in case of two-sided
uncertainty, while they will coordinate on (red, red) in the corresponding case of one-sided
uncertainty.
This result may come as a surprise: at first sight the situation of an actor under two-sided
uncertainty after being informed that he may freely choose seems to resemble the situation
of actor B under one-sided uncertainty in all relevant respects.
Assume 4
5
< ω < 8
9
. Consider the situation of an actor A after being informed that he is
free to choose. Given this private information the expected utility of the profile (red, red)
14There is a slight, but relevant substantial difference, though: while there is a known proportion 1−ω
of non-teamers in the case of circumspect team reasoning, all individuals in case of two-sided uncertainty
as discussed here are assumed to be teamers. In the circumspect team reasoning scenario the non-teamers
deliberately choose a default strategy s* (corresponding to blue in our case) while in case of two-sided
uncertainty teamers are forced to choose blue. This difference may be of some relevance in relation to
the empirical inclination of individuals to identify with the group. If I know that there is a considerable
number of people who do not identify with the group then I might myself be less motivated to identify
with the group. So group identification seems to be more precarious in the circumspect team reasoning
scenario.
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is 5ω. So (red, red) is the optimal profile for the team from A’s perspective, - it would
be best if both choose red. Of course, the partner B does not have the same information.
B does not know that A is free to choose; therefore it may seem questionable to A that
B will do his part in the optimal profile. But notice that, if B actually gets the chance
to choose, his situation will be exactly like the one we have just discussed. So B will also
find that (red, red) is the optimal profile. Finally, from the perspective of any individual
free to choose (red, red) is the optimal profile; and rational individuals, whether teamers
or not, will know this. However, teamers should neglect their private information about
their own situation in their decision-making, which is why – seemingly contrary to their
interest – TR defines (blue, blue) as the optimal profile in case of 4
5
< ω < 8
9
. Is it possible,
that from the perspective of every player who gets the opportunity to choose (red, red) is
the optimal scheme of action in terms of group goals, while (blue, blue) is in fact optimal?
It is! Note that the argument above considers only the expected gains of those that are
free to choose. The expected loss of those that are forced to choose blue are not taken into
account. But in case of 4
5
< ω < 8
9
these losses outweigh the potential gains of those left
free to choose. Individual opportunism is at the heart of the strategic calculus unfolded
above. It is true: for those that actually can control their choice (red, red) is the optimal
profile. So if they mutually control the outcome – as TR assumes for the team as a whole
– they should choose red. Moreover, if all choose accordingly each does his part in the
profile that is optimal from his own perspective, - some because they already know that
they actually control their choice, others because their choice is irrelevant anyway. But,
as in the classical PD: if everybody chooses the best means available to achieve his aims
(which, in our case, are actually shared aims) this does not necessarily result in an optimal
outcome for each. In fact, the expected outcome for everyone is suboptimal.
TR offers a cure for the detrimental narrow-mindedness of individual opportunism among
those that by coincidence acquire the power to decide. Team reasoning yields better
results for the team and the individuals on average, by disregarding the individual and
concentrating on the collective perspective only. The argument above considers for each
actor in a team the case that he is free to choose while it is unknown whether the partner
is also free or not. But these cases overlap and they are not exhaustive. To determine the
optimal profile for the team one must consider the following four cases which are pairwise
disjoint and mutually exhaustive instead:
(i) first player free, second bound to choose blue;
(ii) first player bound, second free;
(iii) both players free; and
(iv) both players bound.
Taking all these cases and their respective probabilities into account we get the result
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stated above: team reasoners will choose red if 5ω2 + 4(1 − ω)2 > 4, and blue if 5ω2 +
4(1 − ω)2 < 4. Team reasoning can, thus, overcome suboptimal choices suggested by
individual opportunism to those that effectively control their choices.
However, opportunism remains a crucial characteristic of decision-making according to
TR, albeit opportunism concerning team actions in the light of team goals. If the envi-
ronment changes from ω > 8
9
to ω < 8
9
teamers will, again, instantly and concurrently
change from coordinating on red to coordinating on blue. A shared practice is entirely
volatile under the regime of team reasoning. TR predicts that it will immediately change
if the probability of a forced move exceeds 1
9
.
Finally, note the problem of two-sided uncertainty as discussed above may also be framed
as a problem of using private information. Individual opportunism demands that every
player should use all the information available to his in making his decision. This is largely
what drives the argument suggesting that rational players should act in exactly the same
way in cases of one-sided and two-sided uncertainty if the parameter ω is identical. But
team reasoning demands to refrain from using information not mutually available to all
individuals in the team alike. The simple reason is that every teamer must be in the
position to determine the team solution to contribute his part, so the solution cannot
depend on information that is not available to all. While TR’s tendency to transgress
individual opportunism may appear as a step towards a more realistic account of social
interaction in general, neglecting private information may well seem a too demanding
requirement for real human individuals.
5.6 Experimental evidence
5.6.1 Experimental design
We conducted a laboratory experiment to test behavior differences in the situations dis-
cussed in the preceding section. The experiment involved three different treatments in
a between-subjects design, and each treatment consisting of three parts. The exogenous
variation across treatments referred only to the second part of the experiment.
In the beginning of the experiment, every subject was paired with another participant, in
the following referred to as his ’team member’ or ’partner’. These ’teams’ remained the
same for the rest of the experiment. In every team one subject was randomly assigned the
role of person A, the other subject the role of person B; roles were in fact only effective
in Part 2 as described below. Although team members were anonymous throughout, we
encouraged team identity by framing pairs as ’teams’ in the instructions.15
15The instructions for treatment ONE-L (described below) are provided in appendix E.1; the instruc-
tions for other treatments are available from the authors.
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In Part 1, each team played a series of five HiLo games with payoffs (in Euro) as given in
Figure 5.5. Feedback about the other team member’s choice and the payoff associated with
the team’s strategy profile was given after every round.16 By being engaged in a sequence
of interactions subjects were induced to identify with their team and to coordinate on
one equilibrium outcome. Moreover, by controlling whether team members were able to
perfectly coordinate throughout in Part 1, we may assume that group identification as
required in TR was satisfied. First, subjects gained experience in the series of HiLos,
which we consider sufficient as ’assurance’ in the sense of Sugden. Second, the HiLo game
displays ’strong interdependence’ as is required according to Bacharach.17
In Part 2, participants played a one-shot modified HiLo game with uncertainty as defined
in either Figure 5.6 or Figure 5.7, depending on the treatment. Treatments differ with
respect to the kind of uncertainty and the probability ω. We implemented one-sided
uncertainty with 1− ω = 1
6
(treatment ONE-L(ow risk)) and with 1− ω = 1
3
(treatment
ONE-H(igh risk)), and two-sided uncertainty, again with 1 − ω = 1
6
(treatment TWO-
L(ow risk)). Again, the team member’s choice and associated payoff was communicated
ex-post.
In the ONE-sided treatments, only one team member, namely person A, faced a chance
move which forces his to choose blue with probability 1 − ω = 1
6
in ONE-L, and with
probability 1−ω = 1
3
in ONE-H. Importantly, person B was not informed on the realization
of this chance move at any point in the experiment. In the TWO-sided treatment, both
team members faced the risk of being compelled to choose blue, with probability 1 −
ω = 1
6
and independently of each other. Again, subjects were not informed about the
realized outcome of their partner’s chance move.18 As in Part 1 the condition of strong
interdependence is satisfied in all treatments, and we assume that assurance gained from
the series in Part 1 is still effective.
In Part 3, we elicited individual risk attitudes using choice lists with 16 different decision
items (see, e.g., Holt and Laury, 2002). In each of these items participants had to choose
between receiving a certain amount of money and participating in a lottery. While the
lottery was kept constant across all decisions, the certain amount increased continuously
from the first to the last decision item. Finally, at the end of the experiment participants
completed a questionnaire on socioeconomic characteristics.
16To avoid any income effects, if this part was selected for payoff, only one round was randomly
determined to be paid out to subjects. More details on the experimental procedures are provided in
section 5.6.2.
17Subjects that proved unable to coordinate in Part 1 were excluded from the data set.
18To describe the random mechanism in an intuitive way to subjects the realization of chance moves
was implemented as follows. In the ONE treatments Person A was assigned an identification number,
i.e., an integer ranging from 1 to 6 in ONE-L and ranging from 1 to 3 in ONE-H. Accordingly, in the
TWO-sided treatment Person A and Person B were each assigned an identification number between 1
and 6. Then, a virtual dice (6-sided or 3-sided, respectively) was rolled by the computer. In case the dice
coincided with the subject’s ID, his choice was set to blue, while he was free to choose in the other case.
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5.6.2 Experimental procedures
Experimental sessions were conducted between June and October 2013 at the Frankfurt
School Laboratory, Frankfurt School of Finance and Management, Germany. Participants
were recruited from the pool of resident students at Frankfurt School. In total 103 sub-
jects participated in our study.19 23.3% were female, the average age was 22 years, and all
of them had a business or management background in their studies. Detailed instructions
were handed out to participants in the beginning of every part, i.e., not before the pre-
ceding part was finished. Instructions were read out aloud by the experimenter in front
of participants to exclude the opportunity that participants received private information.
Everyone was given enough time to carefully look at them and ask questions before and
during the experiment, which were answered in private.
In Part 1, subjects necessarily received feedback about their team members choice and,
hence, about the monetary outcome realized by their mutual actions. To avoid any income
effects within Part 1 and across Part 1 and 2, for each team, either Part 1 or Part 2 was
randomly and equally likely selected for payment. Further, if Part 1 was selected, only one
round was again randomly drawn to be payoff-relevant. Additionally, subjects received
their earnings from their individual decisions in Part 3. In this part only one of the 16
decision problems was again randomly selected for payoff.20 If a subject chose lottery A
for this particular problem, the computer performed a random draw given the respective
distribution and independent from other subjects, to determine the lottery outcome. On
top, participants received a show-up fee of e 4.00. On average participants earned e
13.00 (approximately $ 17.50 at the time of the experiment). All of what is written above
was common knowledge.
5.6.3 Hypotheses
The condition of strong interdependence is satisfied in every game of Part 1 and Part 2
in the experiment. We further assume that successful coordination on (red, red) in Part 1
generates ’assurance’ in the sense of Sugden: subjects will have common reason to believe
that their partner identifies with their team and makes his decision accordingly. Thus,
for those who manage to coordinate in Part 1 TR may predict subjects’ decisions in Part
2. Hence, we restrict our analysis to those individuals that continuously succeeded in
coordinating on the profile (red, red) in Part 1 and assume strong interdependence and
assurance to be satisfied in what follows.
If both partners are teamers, then TR predicts coordination on (red, red) in ONE-L and
coordination on (blue, blue) in ONE-H and TWO-L. If team reasoning is in fact the
19As the experiment necessitates an even number of subjects, in one session a member of the student
assistants staff participated; his data are not included in the analysis.
20All random draws were implemented by the computer.
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prevalent mode of reasoning in coordination problems, then this results in the following
hypotheses for behavior within each treatment in Part 2.21
Hypothesis 1 (Strategy profiles). bla
(H01) A considerable majority of the subjects chooses red in treatment ONE-L.
(H02) A considerable majority of the subjects chooses blue in treatment ONE-H.
(H03) A considerable majority of the subjects chooses blue in treatment TWO-L.
Participants were randomly assigned to treatments, and thus the fraction of teamers and
non-teamers may be assumed to be similar across treatments. This yields the following
hypotheses for differences across treatments in Part 2:
Hypothesis 2 (Treatment differences). bla
(H11) The fraction of subjects who choose red in treatment ONE-L is significantly higher
compared to treatment ONE-H.
(H12) The fraction of subjects who choose red in treatment ONE-L is significantly higher
compared to treatment TWO-L.
(H13) The fraction of subjects who choose red in treatment TWO-L is not significantly
different from the fraction of subjects who choose red in treatment ONE-H.
5.6.4 Results
We first comment on behavior in Part 1 before we analyze behavior in Part 2. Results
from Part 3, in which we controlled for any effects of risk attitudes, are addressed within
the discussion in section 5.6.5.
Part 1
Although RC does not imply a prediction for this series, it is not surprising that all
but one team consistently coordinated on the strategy profile (red, red). For the reasons
explained above, the data of those two subjects who failed to coordinate is excluded from
the analysis of Part 2. This leaves us with 101 observations, 36 observations in treatment
ONE-L (18 subjects in the role of person A, 18 in the role of person B), 45 observations
in treatment ONE-H (23 in role A, 22 in role B), and 20 observations in TWO-L (role A
and role B were perfectly congruent).
21In our theoretical discussion of the HiLo game (with and without uncertainty) we assumed expected
utility theory with near-linear utility functions. Using the data from Part 3 we controlled for this condi-
tions as outlined in section 5.6.5.
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Part 2
In ONE-L, two A players were forced to choose blue in Part 2; in ONE-H, eight A players
were forced to choose blue; in TWO-1/3, two subjects were forced to choose blue. All
numbers provided in the following analysis refer only to those subjects that could actually
make a choice, i.e., we do not count enforced choices.
Strategy profiles
TR predicts that in ONE-L teamers should choose red, and we in fact observe that a
significant majority chooses accordingly (two-sided-binomial test; p-values 0.001, 0.035,
0.013, for the pooled sample, for A and B players, respectively).22 Figure 5.8 displays the
fraction of subjects who chose red for each treatment. While more than 81% chose red
in ONE-L, this fraction shrinks to 67% in TWO-L, and to 42% in ONE-H. This clearly
supports Hypothesis (H01). Consistent with TR, we also observe a lower frequency of
red choices in both other treatments. While in ONE-H a majority of subjects chose blue,
in support of (H02), a majority of subjects still chose red in TWO-L, contrary to (H03).
However, neither (H02) is sufficiently supported nor can (H03) be rejected by the data:
we cannot reject the hypothesis that the fraction of red choices is statistically significantly
different to 50% (two-sided binomial tests; p-values 0.238, 0.508, 0.508 in TWO-L, and
0.473, 1.0, 0.238 in ONE-H, again for the pooled sample, for A and B players, respectively).
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Figure 5.8: Frequency of red choices by treatment
In TWO-L, we can at least reject the hypothesis that the average fraction of red choices
22The statistical analysis is conducted in the most conservative way, treating observations of team
members not as independent observations, given that team members interacted in Part 1. However,
given that we drop those observations where team members failed to coordinate throughout in Part 1,
and given that participants and, in particular, team members stayed anonymous during the experiment,
we may have also treated team observations as independent, in which case our results remain unchanged.
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in TWO-L is smaller than 0.48 (p-value 0.088, one-sided binomial test). This yields
evidence against the prediction that a considerable majority generally chooses blue, i.e.,
against (H03). Overall, given the limited number of observations, we find some evidence
against (H03) in TWO-L, and some evidence for (H02) in ONE-H.
Strategy profiles by role
According to TR team members should coordinate on the optimal strategy profile which
is symmetric in roles. That is, predictions (H01), (H02) and (H03) do not depend on
whether players are assigned role A or B, i.e., face the uncertainty of being forced to
choose blue themselves. Hence, in a next step, we differentiate by role. Table 5.1 provides
the fraction of subjects who chose red, by role and treatment.
Treatment Player B Player A Player A & B N
ONE-L 82.35 % 80.00 % 81.25 % 34
TWO-L 66.67 % 66.67 % 66.67 % 20
ONE-H 33.33 % 53.85 % 41.94 % 31
Notes: enforced decisions again are excluded.
Table 5.1: Fractions of red choices by treatment and role
Both, with low risk of blue enforcement in ONE-L and TWO-L, role does not significantly
matter. In contrast, we observe a striking difference between choices of A players and B
players in ONE-H. The overall effect in this treatment – i.e., that a majority chose blue,
which is in line with (H02) – is apparently driven by the behavior of B players. While
67% of them chose blue only 46% of A players chose blue, contrary to what TR predicts.23
For B players we can again reject the hypothesis that the fraction of subjects who chose
blue is smaller than 52% (p-value 0.088, one-sided binomial test), providing mild support
for (H02) and B players. However, there is considerable doubt that (H02) also applies to
role A players.
Result 1. We find significant evidence for (H01); we do not find significant evidence for
(H03) and only mild support for (H02). We find evidence for (H02) only for B players
and not for A players, which is not consistent with TR.
Treatment differences
According to TR the distribution of choices should also differ between treatments. First,
we find significant evidence for (H11): the frequency of red choices is significantly dif-
ferent between ONE-H and ONE-L (χ2- and Fisher exact test, p-values 0.006 and 0.005,
respectively, collapsing over teams). However, if we distinguish between player A and
23Using a χ2-test the difference between the fraction of red choices is not significantly different between
players A and B, p-value 0.253. Yet, our sample only counts 13 A players and 18 B players.
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player B (see Figure 5.9) we again find that this difference is significant only for B players
(p-values 0.003 for B, 0.139 for A). This finding is not consistent with TR, since theory
does not predict different effects for different roles.
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Figure 5.9: Treatment effects for one-sided uncertainty by role
Second, TR would predict a significant drop of red choices from ONE-L to TWO-L (H12).
We do, in fact, observe a moderate drop of red choices, but this change is not significant
at a satisfying level (p-values 0.351 and 0.315, respectively, collapsing over teams).
Lastly, our observations are neither consistent with (H13). While theory does not predict
a difference between ONE-H and TWO-L (H13), we only find that the frequency of red
choices is marginally significantly lower in ONE-H compared to TWO-L (p-values 0.130
and 0.131, respectively, collapsing over teams). But again this result is driven by role B
behavior (p-value 0.010). The behavior of A players is not significantly different in the two
treatments (p-value 0.548). Although the latter might be consistent with theory, the fact
that the majority of A players choose red, as noted above, is not. Overall, the observed
treatment differences again do not support TR’s predictions:
Result 2. We find significant evidence for (H11); we do not find significant evidence for
(H12) and (H13). Further, (H11) is only supported by behavior of B players, but not of
A players.
Coordination Rates
We briefly comment on coordination rates and realized profits. Surprisingly, in both
treatments with one-sided uncertainty, the fraction of teams who managed to coordinate
on either (red, red) or (blue, blue) is quite high - and similar. While 64.7% coordinate in
ONE-L, even 67.6% coordinate in ONE-H where the probability that player A is forced to
choose blue is even higher. Under two-sided uncertainty, only 40% succeed to coordinate.
However, in ONE-H, of those who manage to coordinate, only 28.0% ultimately coordinate
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on (red, red), but 72% on (blue, blue). In contrast, 90.9% conditionally coordinate on (red,
red) in ONE-L, and at least 75% in TWO-L, under two-sided uncertainty. Under one-
sided uncertainty, χ2-tests show that successes in conditionally coordinating on (red, red)
are significantly less frequent under high compared to low uncertainty (p-value 0.001,
collapsing over teams). It is also significantly smaller in ONE-H compared to two-sided
uncertainty (p-value 0.074). Put differently, conditionally coordinating on (blue, blue) is
significantly more frequent in ONE-H compared to both other treatments. Finally, these
coordination rates naturally translate into average earnings which are highest in ONE-L
and lowest in TWO-L. bale
5.6.5 Discussion
Result 1 and Result 2 reveal that we do not find good evidence for opportunistic decision-
making according to TR. Consistent with TR’s prediction (H01) we observe that a sig-
nificant majority of subjects choose red under the condition that only player A faces the
uncertainty of being forced to choose blue and that the probability of blue enforcement is
rather low (1/6). Also consistent with TR’s prediction (H02) we observe that a majority
of subjects choose blue under one-sided uncertainty if the probability of blue enforcement
is rather high (1/3).
However, if we discriminate for roles A players and B players appear to behave differently
in the asymmetric situation of one-sided uncertainty with a high risk of player B being
forced to choose blue. In ONE-H the majority of A players still choose red instead of
blue, i.e., not consistently with TR’s prediction. This result makes us doubt whether the
initial evidence for (H01) actually supports TR. The behavior under two-sided uncertainty
provides further arguments against TR. The majority of subjects chose red in TWO-L,
contrary to the prediction (H03). One possible argument might be that a subject who
learned that he is free to make a choice, might perceive the risk that the other is forced to
choose blue to be rather low (1/6). In this way, he would indeed make use of his private
information which is not available to his group member.
Treatment comparisons also yield mixed results with respect to TR’s predictions. While
(H11) seems to be supported at a first glance, distinguishing between roles again shows
that (H11) is supported for B players only. Finally, we observe a significant difference
between ONE-H and TWO-L and, thus have to reject (H13), which in turn contradicts
TR. Apart from the weak support for TR when averaging over both roles, the differences
in behavior and treatment effects across roles is generally inconsistent with TR.
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Alternative theories of choice and the importance of private information
The only solid support in favor of TR seems to be the significant evidence for (H01).
However, this result is also consistent with other theories of choice. In particular, a
simple variant of cognitive hierarchy theory (Camerer et al., 2004) with custom as an
input delivers the same prediction, assuming sufficient similarity between choice situations
in Part 1 and Part 2:
(0) Assume that level 0 individuals tend to stick to an accustomed pattern of behavior if
choice situations are sufficiently similar. In our set up, after successful coordination
in Part 1, level 0 individuals should choose red in Part 2.
The same remains true if strategic reasoning is added:
(1) Assume that level 1 individuals believe that others act in line with (0) and maximize
utility given this belief. If the fraction of level 0 players that choose red is sufficiently
high, it is rational for level 1 players to choose red as well.
(2) Assume that level 2 individuals believe that a certain fraction of the others act as
level 0 players while others act in line with (1). And assume, again, that level 2
players maximize utility given this belief. In this case it is, again, rational for them
to choose red.
Obviously, for every higher level of strategic reasoning we get the very same result. So the
assumption that our population is composed of subjects using different levels of strategic
reasoning in the sense of cognitive hierarchy theory combined with the assumption that
custom produces predominantly red choices among level 0 players yields hypothesis (H01):
a considerable majority will choose red. What we learn from these considerations is: the
alleged support for TR by the confirmation of (H01) in treatment ONE-L is quite weak.
TR does not explain our observations better than the assumption that behavior is simply
determined by habit or custom or a theory that combines such an assumption with some
strategic reasoning of any level as in cognitive hierarchy theory.
Moreover, this simple cognitive hierarchy model is not only on a par with TR in ex-
plaining our observations under one-sided uncertainty, in contrast to TR it also offers an
explanation of our observation that a majority of the subjects chose red under two-sided
uncertainty:
(0) Assume that level 0 individuals tend to stick to an accustomed pattern of behavior
if choice situations are sufficiently similar. In our case, after successful coordination
in Part 1, a majority of level 0 individuals choose red in Part 2.
Again, this remains true under strategic reasoning:
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(1) Assume that level 1 individuals believe that others act in line with (0) and maximize
utility given this belief. Given our assumptions for level 0 it is rational for them to
choose red, if the probability p that level 0 players choose red and the probability ω
that they are free to choose are sufficiently high.
Obviously the same applies to higher level strategic reasoning. Therefore cognitive hi-
erarchy with an input of (sufficiently effective) custom on level 0 produces a prediction
consistent with our observation.
A particularly striking observation is the asymmetry between role A and role B behavior in
ONE-H. Remember that the game subjects are playing in ONE-H is given by a symmetric
strategic form with symmetric payoff outcomes - although only one team member faces
the risk of not being allowed to choose. Whatever strategy is optimal for A must also be
optimal for B. If there is a significant difference between the choices of role A and role B
players this must be due to an asymmetry in the interaction that is not captured in the
strategic form. Such an asymmetry arises in the course of the game when player A obtains
private information on whether he can make his choice or not. In TR this asymmetry is
not taken into account. In the simple cognitive hierarchy model it is. In fact, because
cognitive hierarchy accounts for this asymmetry it also provides an explanation of the
asymmetry in behavior that we observe in ONE-H:
(0) Assume that level 0 individuals tend to stick to an accustomed pattern of behavior
if choice situations are sufficiently similar. In our case, after successful coordination
in part 1, level 0 individuals choose red with some probability p significantly larger
than 1/2.
Assuming sufficient similarity between choice situations in Part 1 and Part 2 of ONE-H
custom would produce a majority of red choices. The asymmetry gets in, when strategic
reasoning is considered in higher levels:
(1) Assume that level 1 individuals believe that others act in line with (0). Consider
a level 1 player in role A maximizing utility given this belief. If p > 4
9
his optimal
choice is red. In contrast a level 1 B player faces a blue choice of his partner with
probability 1 − p · 2
3
. If p < 2
3
his optimal choice is blue. Thus, for 4
9
< p < 2
3
, we
get: level 1 A players will choose red, level 2 B players will choose blue.
This pattern is reproduced for higher levels. A players of level n will choose red as long as
they believe that the overall fraction of B players of lower levels who choose red is larger
than 4
9
. B players will choose blue as long as they believe that the overall fraction of A
players choosing red is smaller than 2
3
.
If the population is suitably composed of actors of different reasoning levels (e.g. composed
of all levels with the fraction of level 0 players being sufficiently high and the fraction of
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level 1 players being comparably low) this will create a pattern as the one we observe: a
majority of A players choose red, while a majority of the B players choose blue.
We are not claiming that cognitive hierarchy theory offers the correct and unique ex-
planation for the behavior in our experiment. However, considering cognitive hierarchy
theory as a theory of choice sheds some light on why TR seems to fail as an explanation.
In particular, our discussion highlights the two main weaknesses of TR as an empirical
theory of choice:
First, bygones are bygones. As a theory of opportunistic choice TR cannot account for
the influence of past behavior on future choice. A regularity observed in the past can
inform individuals on the type of players they are paired with - in Sugden’s version of
TR it may inform us on team identification. But it has no direct impact on the behavior
to be expected. Therefore TR cannot account for habitual and customary behavior and
its indubitable impact on social interaction. Second, TR confines the individual decision
maker to a team perspective that can be shared by everyone. This severely restricts the use
of arguments based on private information gained in the course of the game to determine
optimal choice. In the experiment A players appear to use their private information on
their realized outcome, although TR prohibits them to do so.
Risk attitudes
So far, in theory as well as empirically, we neglected the potential influence of risk atti-
tudes, we simply assumed near-linear utility functions. Risk aversion which is predomi-
nantly found among subjects in experiments does not have a significant effect on the main
predictions of TR. We still elaborate on possible confounds at this point.
From a TR perspective, in Part 2 of the experiment subjects choose among two lotteries
given by the payoffs of the two equilibrium outcomes.24 In all treatments group members
gain 4 currency units if both coordinate on (blue, blue).
In ONE-L by coordinating on (red, red), subjects enter a lottery that yields 0 with proba-
bility 1−ω = 1
6
, and 5 otherwise. Risk neutral and risk seeking team reasoners as well as
moderately risk averse individuals are predicted to choose red (as assumed in (H01)). In
contrast, if individuals are sufficiently risk averse, they should rather go for blue. Thus,
taking risk aversion into account might result in a slight variation of Hypothesis (H01).
This was in fact the only hypothesis that is actually supported by our data with satisfying
significance.
In ONE-H, coordinating on (red, red) implies the lottery that yields 0 with probability
1 − ω = 1
3
and 5 otherwise. In TWO-L by coordinating on (red, red) individuals enter
24To make the following argument we assume that individuals simply transcribe their individual utility
function to the team, and thus, under expected utility theory, transfer their individual risk attitude onto
the group.
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a lottery that pays 4 with probability (1 − ω)2 = 1
36
, 5 with probability ω2 = 25
36
, and 0
otherwise. In both treatments (since expected values are smaller than 4) risk neutral and
risk averse team reasoners as well as moderately risk seeking individuals are predicted to
choose blue (as assumed in (H02) and (H03)). Only sufficiently risk seeking individuals
should go for red. If subjects are predominantly risk neutral or risk averse (H02) remains
unaffected by taking risk attitudes into account.
Hence, in ONE-L sufficiently risk averse teamers might choose blue, while in ONE-H and
TWO-L sufficiently risk seeking teamers might choose red. Assuming that risk aversion
predominates risk seeking we get a slight weakening of (H11) and (H12): some risk averse
individuals are predicted to choose blue in ONE-L as they do in ONE-H and TWO-
L, thus weakening the difference between treatments ONE-L and ONE-H and TWO-L,
respectively.
Comparing ONE-H and TWO-L as in (H13) and assuming that risk aversion predominates
risk seeking we get only a very a slight weakening of (H23) because team reasoners will
only act differently in the two treatments if they are risk seeking in a quite peculiar way.
They must evaluate ’4 for sure’ better than the lottery that delivers 0 with probability
1 − ω = 1
3
and 5 otherwise, but worse as the lottery that delivers 4 with probability
(1− ω)2 = 1
36
, 5 with probability ω2 = 25
36
and 0 else. Such an individual will – according
to TR – choose red in TWO-L but blue in ONE-H. So, to the extent that such individuals
are among the subjects, TR predicts a weakening of (H23). These subjects will behave
differently in the two treatments.
The sample size of our experiment is quite limited in order to identify any of the above
effects. Nevertheless, we collected data about subject’s risk attitudes to test whether any
behavioral changes that might support or undermine TR are due to risk rather than to
team reasoning. In Part 3, we included a choice list to elicit risk attitudes w.r.t. a risky
lottery related to the strategic (risky) situation in the experiment. In 16 decisions subjects
had to choose between certain amounts of Euros (0.5; 1; 1.5; 2; 2.5; 3; 3.2; 3.4; 3.6; 3.8; 4;
4.2; 4.4; 4.6; 4.8; 5) and a risky lottery that pays e 0.00 with probability 1/6, and e 5.00
with probability 5/6. In ONE-H subjects completed an additional list in which the lottery
pays e 0.00 with probability 1/3, and e 5.00 with probability 2/3. The switching point
at which a subject switches from choosing the lottery to choosing the certain amount
defines the individual’s certainty equivalent (CE), i.e., the smallest amount preferred to
the lottery.25 We define subjects as risk averse if their certainty equivalent is smaller than
the expected value of the respective lottery.
We find that at least 80% of subjects are risk averse (80.65% in ONE-H, 84.4% in ONE-
L and 94.5% in TWO-L), in line with the assumption made above. However, we cannot
25Additionally, in the questionnaire conducted at the very end of the experiment we asked subjects to
assess their risk attitude on a scale from 1 to 10, however, this was not incentivized.
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identify any of the relationships between risk aversion/seeking and the likelihood to choose
red, which we considered. Risk averse and risk seeking individuals are nearly equally likely
to choose red, see Table E.1 in appendix E.2 for details on choices by treatment, role and
risk attitudes.
5.7 Conclusion
We do not find good evidence for opportunistic team reasoning as a guide to coordination
in our experiments. Our observations suggest that individuals tend to stick to behavioral
patterns they are in some way or other accustomed to. As a theory of opportunistic choice
TR categorically contradicts such influence of past behavior on future choice. Moreover,
we find significant differences in the behavior of subjects in accordance with their indi-
vidual and particular situation of choice. Individuals may obviously take everything into
consideration that they get to know about their individual situation in the course of the
interaction. In contrast, TR demands to determine optimal play entirely from a team
perspective that is equally accessible to all members of the team.
The extent of evidence against TR may surprise in the light of the intuitive plausibility
that team reasoning seems to have. In fact, in informal conversations with and among
subjects after the experiment we often heard arguments that sounded as if they were
directly taken from a course in team reasoning: “The best thing we could do was ... so
this is what each of us did!”; “My partner did not understand the problem, we should have
chosen ... but he did ...” etc.
We have no doubt that TR would earn overwhelming approval by most individuals if
introduced as as a normative theory of choice. Moreover, our intuition as well as the
anecdotical evidence from discussions about the experiments suggest that there is also
some descriptive truth in TR. Team reasoning as a reasoning procedure just seems too
familiar to all who get acquainted with the theory.
Our hunch is that the failure of TR in our experiments is not so much due to empirical
inadequateness of the team reasoning procedure in principle, but rather a consequence
of the specific conditions of choice. Bacharach assumes, that individuals will engage in
team reasoning as soon as they take on the team perspective, i.e., as soon as they identify
with the team. Sugden adds another necessary condition: individuals need some mutual
assurance that others reason in the same way. These conditions still seem to be quite weak
and are easily satisfied in our experimental setting. If our observations show that team
reasoning as conceptualized in TR does not in fact determine choice to the postulated
extent, this may well point to a misapprehension of the conditions that trigger team
reasoning rather than to a fundamental misconception in the idea of team reasoning as
such.
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Still, there might be a more fundamental shortcoming in the background. In TR team
reasoning is understood as a procedure of purely individual reasoning. The team is under-
stood as a collective agent, but not as the subject of collective reasoning. So the ’team’ in
’team reasoning’ points to the object rather than the subject of reasoning. The reasoning
process is located entirely in each individual’s mind.
The reluctance to ascribe reasoning processes to collectives is possibly grounded in the fact
that collectives have no brains or minds beyond the brains and minds of their members.
But, of course they also cannot act beyond what can be done by the concert of their
members acts; and we still ascribe agency to them. Collective reasoning processes may be
hard to define in theory, but they are not mysterious at all. We all know them in practice
and we all know how to participate in them. Maybe this is the very reason that team
reasoning appears so familiar to us.
However, collective reasoning processes in this sense may well require extended commu-
nication among the team members – which was carefully precluded in our experiments.
How would TR have performed in our experiments, had we allowed partners to discuss
things out before playing the game?
Appendix A
Peer Effects in Risk Taking
A.1 Theoretical framework
A.1.1 A model of relative payoff concerns
Assume the utility in state j (j ∈ {g, b}) of having chosen lottery i (i ∈ {A,B}) and
earning mji , to be given by the sum of two terms: a consumption utility, which is solely
determined by individual risk preferences, plus a social utility term, which depends on
payoff differences. This implies vji,k = u(m
j
i ) + R(m
j
i − mjk), where k ∈ {A,B} is the
lottery of the peer, and R(·) is a function of payoff differences and defined as follows:
R(x) =
x if x ≥ 0,λx if x < 0.
The parameter λ captures how large losses with respect to the peer loom relative to gains.
An individual’s expected utility from choosing lottery i is
Vi,k = Ui +
∑
j
pjR(m
j
i −mjk),
where Ui is the expected consumption utility of lottery i. If the peer holds a lottery
that yields a lower consumption utility, the individual may nevertheless choose it, if he
experiences a strong disutility from falling behind the peer, i.e. if λ is large enough.
Let us define an individual’s strategy space as S = {imitate = (i;AA,BB), deviate =
(i;BA,AB), stay = (i; iA, iB), change = (i;−iA,−iB); for i ∈ {A,B}}. Here i (−i)
denotes his (opposite) choice in Part I, and the tuple ik describes the choice of lottery i
in Part II given that his peer has lottery k. Then, the cutoffs are given by the following
proposition.
Proposition 1. Define ∆ ≡ UB−UA
pδ
+ (1−p)(c−δ)
pδ
and Θ ≡ UA−UB
(1−p)(c−δ) +
pδ
(1−p)(c−δ) .
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An individual imitates if λ > max{∆, Θ}. An individual deviates if λ < min{Θ, ∆}. An
individual stays with his Part I choice otherwise.
Note that whether ∆ is smaller or greater than Θ is determined by the individual’s choice
in Part I, i.e. by his expected consumption utility UA and UB.
Proof. An individual imitates if VA,A > VB,A and VB,B > VA,B. VB,B > VA,B is equivalent to
λ(1− p)(c− δ) > UA − UB + pδ ⇔ λ > ∆ ≡ UA − UB(1− p)(c− δ) +
pδ
(1− p)(c− δ) .
VA,A > VB,A is equivalent to
λpδ > UB − UA + (1− p)(c− δ) ⇔ λ > Θ ≡ UB − UA
pδ
+
(1− p)(c− δ)
pδ
.
Hence, for an individual to imitate it must hold that λ > max{∆, Θ}.
Similarly, an individual deviates if VA,A < VB,A and VB,B < VA,B. It follows directly from above
that this is satisfied if λ < min{∆, Θ}.
A.1.2 Choice-dependent relative payoff concerns
Assume relative payoff concerns to be defined by the comparison term R(·) as defined in
A.1. If λ increases, the likelihood of imitation increases. At the same time, the weight on
the payoff differences between lotteries A and B increases. Specifically, the disutility from
falling behind when choosing A would increase by (1− p)(c− δ) = (1− p)c(1− (1− p)f).
The disutility from falling behind when choosing B would increase by p(20− (20− δ)) =
p(1−p)cf . If the expected value ofA equals that ofB (EVA = EVB), or equivalently f = 1,
the increase is of the same magnitude. However, if f > (<)1, then 1− (1− p)f < (>)pf ,
and the increase is stronger in magnitude for the case the individual chooses B (A).
Assume that – instead of λ – the social comparison term R(·) is increased by a factor α.
Then, the marginal change in social utility from α is given by
−(1− p)(c− δ)λ+ pδ when choosing A,
and by − pδλ+ (1− p)(c− δ) when choosing B.
Hence, the change in utility is smaller when choosing A than B, i.e. the incentive to
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imitate B is larger compared to A, if
− (1− p)(c− δ)λ+ pδ < −pδλ+ (1− p)(c− δ)
⇔ λ [pδ − (1− p)(c− δ)] < (1− p)(c− δ)− pδ
⇔
λ < −1 if pδ − (1− p)(c− δ) > 0;λ > −1 if pδ − (1− p)(c− δ) < 0.
In line with the seminal model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) we would assume λ ≥ 1.
Following from the same argument as above, i.e. pδ − (1 − p)(c − δ) < 0 ⇔ f < 1,
we would expect more imitation towards B if f < 1. Similarly, we would expect more
imitation towards A if f > 1. This is consistent with Hypothesis 1A.
Lastly, assume that the social comparison term is given by R˜(x) = µ · x · max{x; 0} +
λ · x ·min{x; 0}. If both µ and λ increase by factor α, the incentives to imitate A or B
do depend on how λ relates to µ. Specifically, the marginal change in social utility when
choosing A is smaller than that when choosing B if
− (1− p)(c− δ)λ+ pδµ < −pδλ+ (1− p)(c− δ)µ
⇔ λ [pδ − (1− p)(c− δ)] < µ [(1− p)(c− δ)− pδ]
⇔
λ < −µ if pδ − (1− p)(c− δ) > 0 (⇔ f > 1) ;λ > −µ if pδ − (1− p)(c− δ) < 0 (⇔ f < 1) .
If we assume that µ ≥ 0, i.e. individual gain from being better off, then 0 < λ < −µ is
clearly a contradiction. Hence, if f < 1 we would again expect more imitation towards B,
and if f > 1 more imitation towards A. On the other hand, if we allow µ < 0, i.e. allow
for the possibility that social gains enter negatively into social utility, then our predictions
from Hypothesis 1A only hold if λ > −µ = |µ| is satisfied. This assumption was already
placed in Fehr and Schmidt (1999), i.e. “a player suffers more from inequality that is to
his disadvantage” (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; p. 823).
A.1.3 A model based on social comparison theory
Consider a model in which, the closer the individual risky choice is to the social anchor,
the more utility the individual derives. In a setting with only two options, this can be
captured by an additional utility γ when the option chosen coincides with the social
anchor. In particular, the expected utility of lottery i given the anchor k is
Vi,k = Ui + γ · 1(i = k),
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where 1(·) is the indicator function. (Cooper and Rege (2011) also assume this form of
utility when examining conformism.) Based on the argument above, we would expect γ
to differ across treatments and γC , in Choice, to be larger than γR, in Rand. This would
generate an increase in imitation in Choice. Further, since the effect of γ is independent
of lottery characteristics, we would expect the change in imitation across treatments to
be symmetric with respect to the two available options, A or B.
A.2 Instructions for the Choice treatment
Welcome to the experiment.
Thank you very much for participating. Please refrain from talking to any other participants
until the experiment is finished.
General information on the procedure
The purpose of this experiment is the analysis of economic decision-making. During the course of
the experiment you can earn money which will be paid out to you at the end of the experiment.
The experiment lasts about 1 hour and consists of two parts. At the beginning of each part
you receive detailed instructions. If you have questions after the instructions or during the
experiment please raise your hand. One of the experimenters will come to your place and
answer your questions in private.
While you take your decisions a small clock will count down at the upper right corner of your
computer screen. This clock serves as an orientation for how much time you should need to take
your decision. However, the countdown will not be enforced in the case that you need more time
to come to a decision. Especially in the beginning you might need more time.
Payment
In both parts of the experiment your income is directly calculated in Euro. This amount will be
paid out to you at the end of the experiment. For your punctual arrival you receive an additional
4 euro.
Anonymity
The experimental data will only be analyzed in the aggregate. Names will never be connected
with the data from the experiment. At the end of the experiment you have to sign a receipt,
confirming that you received your payoff. This receipt only serves our sponsor’s accounting
purposes. The sponsor does not receive any further data from the experiment.
Devices
At your place you find a pen. Please leave the pen at your place at the end of the experiment.
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Part I
Task
You will be presented 20 decision situations. In every situation you can choose between two
options, option A and option B. Consider your choice carefully, as your choice can - as described
below - affect your payoff.
On the screen your will be shown one or two urns which contain white and black balls. The
screen will further inform you about the number of white balls and the number of black balls in
each urn. Furthermore you will be informed about the value of each white ball and the value of
each black ball, in the case that you choose option A or option B, respectively. From each urn
one ball will be randomly drawn. If there is only one urn the ball which was drawn is relevant
for both options, A and B. If there are two urns the ball will be drawn from the urn which
belongs to your chosen option. This is how your screen might look like.
Example - Decision Problem
In this example there is only one urn which contains 10 balls: 5 white balls and 5 black balls,
i.e. the probability that a white ball is drawn amounts to 50
Should a white ball be drawn from the urn you receive 20 Euro if you chose option A or 15
Euro if you chose option B. If a black ball is drawn from the urn you receive 0 Euro if you chose
option A or 5 Euro if you chose Option B.
The urns in the 20 decision situations are always filled according to one of the following types:
• Type 1: 5 white balls and 5 black balls
• Type 2: 8 white balls and 2 black balls
• Type 3: 2 white balls and 8 black balls
• Type 4: 2 white balls and 6 black balls
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You take your decision by marking either option A or option B on the screen. Your decision
is final once you clicked the OK-button in the lower part of the screen. In addition to these
instructions you are given a sheet of paper on which all decision situations are printed out.
Please note on this paper which decisions you have taken.
Payoff
At the end of part II of this experiment one participant will be chosen randomly by the computer.
This participant will be assigned the role of an assistant. You will be shown on your screen
whether you have been assigned this role or not. The assistant will help the experimenter to
randomly determine which part and which decision situations are payoff-relevant.
For this purpose the assistant will first draw one ball out of a nontransparent bag which contains
2 balls - marked with the numbers 1 and 2. This ball decides whether part I or part II of the
experiment is payoff-relevant for all participants. The experimenter will type in this number at
the assistant’s computer.
Assume that part I is drawn as being payoff-relevant. Then, for each participant, the assistant
draws one ball out of a nontransparent bag which contains 20 balls numbered from 1 to 20.
This ball decides which decision situation becomes payoff-relevant for the respective participant.
Every decision situation is drawn with the same probability. The experimenter will type in this
number at the assistant’s computer.
Finally the assistant draws one ball out of each of four nontransparent bags. Every bag corre-
sponds to one of the four types of urns.
• Bag 1 contains 5 white balls and 5 black balls; corresponds to an urn of type 1
• Bag 2 contains 8 white balls and 2 black balls; corresponds to an urn of type 2
• Bag 3 contains 2 white balls and 8 black balls; corresponds to an urn of type 3
• Bag 4 contains 2 white balls and 6 black balls; corresponds to an urn of type 4
The draw from bag 1 (2,3,4) decides which color will be paid out for an urn of the type 1 (2,3,4).
At the assistant’s computer the experimenter types in which color has been drawn from the four
bags.
For example: if, in the third draw, the assistant draws a ball with the number 2, the decision
situation 2 becomes payoff-relevant for participant 3. If, in decision situation 2, there is only
one urn which is of type 1, the color of the ball which has been drawn from bag one pins down
the payoff of participant 3.
Assume this decision situation is exactly the decision situation depicted above, which is of type
1. If the assistant has drawn a white ball from bag 1, participant 3 earns 20 Euro if he chose
option A in this decision situation; he earns 15 Euro if he chose option B. If the assistant has
drawn a black ball from bag 1, the participant earns 0 Euro if he chose option A and 5 Euro if
he chose option B.
Please note: as every decision situation will be drawn with the same probability, it is in your
interest to take every decision carefully.
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Subsequently the computer computes your income, which will be shown to you on your screen.
Furthermore you will be informed, which part and which decision situation have been drawn for
you as well as which color decides your income.
Part II
Groups
At the beginning of part II you will be randomly matched with another participant of this
experiment. The two of you will form one group in part II. Groups will remain unchanged for
the rest of part II.
Every participant will be randomly assigned by the computer one of two roles in his group. We
call these roles person 1 and person 2. At the beginning you will be informed on your screen
whether you will be person 1 or person 2 for the rest of part II.
Task
In this part person 1 and person 2 will be presented 20 decision situations. These decision
situations will be identical to the decision situations from part I. The sequence of decision
situation however, will be different from part I. As in part I, both as person 1 and person 2, you
will be informed on your screen about the value of a black ball and the value of a white ball in
the case you choose option A and option B.
In every decision situation each participant chooses one of the two options. Person 1 will take
the decisions as in part I. Person 2 can make his decisions conditionally on the choice of person
1. To do this, person 2 is asked to take a decision for the case that person 1 chose option A
and for the case that person 1 chose option B. Person 1 and person 2 decide simultaneously and
only at the end of the experiment person 2 will be informed about the choice of person 1 in this
decision situation.
This is how the screen of person 1 might look like:
Example - Decision Problem - Person 1
This is how the screen of person 2 might look like:
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Example - Decision Problem - Person 2
You take your decision by marking either option A or option B on the screen. Your decision is
final once you clicked the OK-button in the lower part of the screen.
Please consider your decision carefully, as your choice can – as described below – affect your
payoff.
Payoff
After all participants completed their decision problems the assistant will be selected randomly
by the computer. As described in the instructions of part I, for deciding whether part I or part
II becomes payoff relevant, the assistant draws one ball from a nontransparent bag containing
two balls.
Assume that part II is drawn as being payoff-relevant. Then, for each group, the assistant draws
one ball out of a nontransparent bag which contains 20 balls numbered from 1 to 20. This ball
decides which decision situation becomes payoff-relevant for the participants of the respective
group. Every decision situation is drawn with the same probability. The experimenter will type
in this number at the assistant’s computer.
Finally the assistant draws one ball out of each of four nontransparent bags. Every bag corre-
sponds to one of the four types of urns.
• Bag 1 contains 5 white balls and 5 black balls; corresponds to an urn of type 1
• Bag 2 contains 8 white balls and 2 black balls; corresponds to an urn of type 2
• Bag 3 contains 2 white balls and 8 black balls; corresponds to an urn of type 3
• Bag 4 contains 2 white balls and 6 black balls; corresponds to an urn of type 4
The draw from bag 1 (2,3,4) decides which color will be paid out for an urn of the type 1 (2,3,4).
At the assistant’s computer the experimenter types in which color has been drawn from the four
bags.
Assume this decision situation is exactly the decision situation depicted above, which is of type
1. If the assistant has drawn a white ball from bag 1, person 1 and person 2 of group 5 receive
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the following income: If person 1 and person 2 both chose option A each receives 20 Euro. If
both chose option B, each receives 15 Euro. If person 1 chose option A and person 2 chose
option B, person 1 receives 20 Euro and Person 2 15 Euro. Analogously if person 1 chose option
B and person 2 chose option A, person 1 receives 15 Euro and person 2 receives 20 Euro.
If the assistant has drawn a black ball from bag 1, person 1 and person 2 of group 5 receive the
following income: If person 1 and person 2 both chose option A, each receives 0 Euro. If both
chose option B, each receives 15 Euro. If person 1 chose option A and person 2 chose option
B, person 1 receives 0 Euro and Person 2 15 Euro. Analogously if person 1 chose option B and
person 2 chose option A, person 1 receives 15 Euro and person 2 receives 0 Euro.
Subsequently the computer computes your income. You will be informed on your screen, which
part and which decision situation have been drawn for you as well as which color defines your
income. As person 1 you will be shown both options, your choice, the resulting income as well
as the final choice of person 2 and the resulting income of person 2. As person 2 you will also
be shown both options, the choice of person 1 and which final choice results for yourself. This
defines your resulting income.
You will then be informed about the amount of Euro you have earned in this experiment. You
will also be informed about how much the other group member earned in the experiment.
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A.3 Additional results
A.3.1 Supplementary tables and figures
Panel A: 20/80 Lotteries
A: 20,0 vs. B: Coin Rand Choice χ2 p-value
(0.8,1) 86.8% 95.0% 86.7% 0.038
(5.6,0.2;0.6,0.8) 72.1% 73.3% 68.3% 0.936
(4,1) 27.9% 41.7% 28.3% 0.316
(8,0.2;3,0.8) 17.6% 43.3% 18.3% 0.004
(7.2,1) 7.4% 3.3% 3.3% 0.595
(10.4,0.2;5.4,0.8) 4.4% 5.0% 6.7% 0.815
Panel B: 50/50 Lotteries
A: 20,0 vs. B: Coin Rand Choice χ2 p-value
(8,1) 17.6% 20.0% 28.3% 0.146
(11,0.5;6,0.5) 19.1% 16.7% 23.3% 0.704
(10,1) 2.9% 13.3% 3.3% 0.066
(12.5,0.5;7.5,0.5) 5.9% 10.0% 8.3% 0.857
(12,1) 0.0% 3.3% 6.7% 0.212
(14,0.5;9,0.5) 1.5% 1.7% 5.0% 0.294
Panel C: 80/20 Lotteries
A: 20,0 vs. B: Coin Rand Choice χ2 p-value
(15.2,1) 19.1% 13.3% 18.3% 0.791
(16.4,0.8;11.4,0.2) 19.1% 11.7% 15.0% 0.61
(16,1) 11.8% 8.3% 11.7% 0.897
(17,0.8;12,0.2) 20.6% 11.7% 16.7% 0.512
(16.8,1) 8.8% 1.7% 11.7% 0.096
(17.6,0.8;12.6,0.2) 7.4% 5.0% 11.7% 0.577
Table A.1: Frequency of lottery A choices of first and second mover in Part I
Note: χ2 test is used to test for differences between choices in treatments Coin, Rand and Choice.
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Figure A.1: Distribution of individual switching rates, by treatment
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A.3.2 Estimating social utility: Econometric specification & re-
sults
We structurally estimate two distinct models of social utility and test their relative fit,
based on decisions in Rand and Choice. In both models we assume a CRRA (consump-
tion) utility function with parameter r, i.e. u(x) = xr. We estimate r for each subject
individually based on his choices in Part I.1 Under relative payoff concerns, we assume
social utility to be given by a comparison term, in which social losses enter negatively and
are weighted by the parameter λ ≥ 0; see Appendix A.1 for details. If social losses loom
larger than social gains, then λ > 1. In the estimation we test for differences in λ between
Rand and Choice, for choice-dependency of relative payoff concerns. In a model based
on social comparison theory we assume social utility to be given by a constant parameter
γ (see Appendix A.2 for details). We also allow for differences in γ between Rand and
Choice.
Econometric specification
Following Hey and Orme (1994), we allow subjects to make so-called Fechner errors when
comparing expected utilities (also see, e.g. von Gaudecker et al., 2011; Loomes, 2005).
Hence, a subject chooses lottery i if and only if Vi,k−V−i,k > τ, where Vi,k is the expected
overall utility if his peer has lottery k;  is drawn from a standard logistic distribution
and assumed to be independent between subjects and decisions. The parameter τ > 0
serves as a scaling factor and is assumed to be constant across subjects and decisions.
The probability to choose lottery i in decision problem t (t = 1, . . . , 18) depends on the
parameters θ = (r, λ, γ) and τ . The likelihood for subject n (n = 1, . . . , N) can be
determined by the score function dn,t(i|θ, τ) = 1τ (V ti,k(θ)− V t−i,k(θ)). Then, the likelihood
function becomes Ln,t(i|θ, τ) = Λ (dn,t(i|θ, τ)), where Λ(x) = (1 + exp(−x))−1 denotes
the standard logistic cumulative distribution function. The log-likelihood function to
be maximized is simply L(θ, τ) =
∑
n,t lnLn,t(ct|θ, τ), where we sum over all subjects
n, and their choices ct in all decision problems t. It is maximized using the Broyden-
Fletcher-Goldfarb-Shanno (BFGS) algorithm (see, e.g., Broyden, 1970; Fletcher, 1970).
Table A.3 reports the estimation results.2 Columns (1) and (2) describe the estimated
models of relative payoff concurs, columns (3) and (4) estimation results for models of
social comparison theory.
In models (1) and (2) λ is significantly larger than one (p-value = 0.008 and 0.022,
1Results remain qualitatively the same if we only use data from Part II and estimate an average r.
2By pooling all observations from second movers in treatments Rand and Choice irrespectively of
whether they are actually affected by the presence of their peer, this approach yields the most conservative
estimates of the social utility parameters. We also ran estimations, in which we dropped observations
for second movers who never switched in any decision problem (six subjects in Rand and five subjects
in Choice, corresponding to 20.0% and 16.7% of all choices, respectively). Estimates of λ and γ only
increase slightly, but significance levels stay exactly the same.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
λ 1.1785††† 1.1135††
[0.0674] [0.0494]
λC 1.1163
[0.0966]
γ 0.2567*** 0.1535***
[0.0696] [0.0503]
γC 0.2019*
[0.1173]
Error parameter
τ 2.6065*** 2.6021*** 0.6293*** 0.6265***
[0.2719] [0.2689] [0.0863] [0.0857]
Observations 2160 2160 2160 2160
Pseudo log–lik. -1280.95 -1279.33 -1049.69 -1045.21
Note: In models (1)-(4) r is fixed to individual estimates for each subjects’ Part I choices, where r > 0
is assumed throughout. Models (1) and (2) report estimates of λ, assuming λ > 0. In (2) we include
a treatment dummy for Choice, λC , which enters multiplicatively into λ. In (3) and (4) we estimate a
conformism parameter γ. In model (4), the treatment dummy γC enters additively.
The scaling parameter τ refers to the Fechner error. Standard errors are reported in brackets and
clustered on a subject level; * (**, ***) indicates significant difference from 0, † (††, † † †) indicates
significant difference from 1, at the 1% (5%, 10%) level, respectively.
Table A.3: Structural estimation of social utility models
respectively), suggesting that subjects are generally loss averse with respect to their peer’s
outcome. In model (2) we control for treatment differences by introducing a dummy λC
for Choice, which enters multiplicatively into λ.3 λC is not significantly different from one
(p-value = 0.229), suggesting that relative payoff concerns remain unchanged between
Rand and Choice.
In models (3) and (4) we find that γ is significantly larger than zero in both treatments,
consistent with imitation being the most frequent strategy in Rand and Choice (condi-
tional on switching). Moreover, column (4) shows that γ is significantly larger in Choice
than in Rand, in line with the assumption that peers’ choices provide a stronger anchor
than random allocations.4
Which model fits our data best? Comparing the log-likelihoods of model (1) and (2)
versus (3) and (4) suggests that the latter models might provide a better fit. This is
confirmed using the Vuong test (Vuong, 1989). In terms of goodness of fit, we find that
model (3) significantly outperforms model (1) as does model (4) in comparison to model
(2) (both p-values<0.01).
3This is due to our constraint λ > 0 which is implemented by estimating λ = exp(lnλ).
4This also holds if γ and γC are estimated while controlling for relative payoff concerns, fixing λˆ
estimated in model (1).
Appendix B
Conflicting Risk Attitudes
B.1 A stylized model of bargaining over risk
We present a stylized model of bargaining over risk to illustrate how heterogeneity in risk
attitudes could be related to conflict. Consider two individuals i and j who bargain over
the level of investment into a risky asset, e.g. new machinery for farming. The investment
is indivisible and has to be agreed upon by the two parties. If no agreement is reached,
conflict arises, and both individuals are left with the outside option d. If both individuals
agree on investing x where x ∈ [1, 6], the investment yields 6 + x with probability p and
6 − x with probability 1 − p, where p ≥ 0.5, for each individual. These assumptions are
based on the payoffs of the lotteries used in the experiment.
Each individual’s utility function is CRRA, with u = z1−γ, where γ is private information.1
For simplicity, we assume there are only two types of individuals, those with high risk
aversion and those with low risk aversion, γH with probability q and γL with probability
1 − q. We will further consider only two levels of investment, high and low, i.e. xH and
xL. For the low risk averse individuals, u(xH(γL)) > u(xL(γL)) > u(d). For the high
risk averse individuals, u(xL(γH)) > u(d) > u(xH(γH)). Hence, while low risk averse
individuals prefer a high investment, but also accept a low investment, high risk averse
individuals prefer a low investment, and do not accept the high investment, as they then
favor the outside option.
In the bargaining game, one player is randomly assigned to be the proposer, who makes
a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the responder. If the proposal x is accepted, the investment
is made and both parties share the proceeds equally. If the proposal is rejected, the
relationship between the two parties becomes conflictive. If a high risk averse individual
is the proposer, the prediction is clear. He proposes the low investment and both a high
risk averse and low risk averse responder accept.
1If each individual were to choose the investment amount, x, individually, his optimal level of invest-
ment would be a decreasing function of γ.
B.2 Sironko district and the Bagisu people 137
Proposition 1. If the low risk averse individual is the proposer, there exists a threshold γˆ
such that if γ < γˆ, the proposer chooses xH and the offer gets rejected with probability
q. In those situations, conflict arises.
Proof. For the low risk averse individual, the expected utility from proposing xH is
q · u(xH(γL)) + (1 − q)d. The utility from proposing xL is u(xL(γL)). For the individual
to prefer a proposal of xH , the following condition needs to hold:
q · u(xH(γL))− u(xL(γL)) > −(1− q)u(d). (B.1)
We show that the marginal utility of investment x is decreasing in γ, so that for smaller
γ the difference in utility between xH and xL is larger. Hence, γ needs to be sufficiently
small for (2) to hold. First note that, the derivative of u(x(γ)) with respect to x is:
∂u(x(γ))
∂x
= (1− γ)[p(6 + x)−γ − (1− p)(6− x)−γ],
which is positive, since p ≥ 0.5. Now we turn to the second derivative with respect to γ,
∂2u(x(γ))
∂x∂γ
= − [p(6 + x)−γ − (1− p)(6− x)−γ]
− (1− γ)[p(6 + x)−γ(ln(6 + x))− (1− p)(6− x)−γ(ln(6− x))],
which is negative.
B.2 Sironko district and the Bagisu people
This study was conducted in the Sironko district, located in the eastern part of the Eastern
region of Uganda. Sironko district is a densely populated area with an estimated popu-
lation of 346,400, roughly 284 inhabitants per squared kilometer, around 90% of whom
live in rural areas (Ministry of Water & Environment Uganda, 2010). People primarily
earn their livelihoods with farming, and soil conditions mostly favor food crops such as
beans, groundnuts, maize, soya or potatoes. Most people in Sironko district belong to the
ethnical group of the Bagisu people.2 This group was discovered by ethnologists to be
very vulnerable in two particular respects. Bagisu are known to suffer from violent con-
flicts and anger, primarily among males within kinship groups (Roscoe, 1924; La Fontaine,
1959; Heald, 1998). Further, this is predominantly caused by a particular gender ideal
of male providers. Men are expected to have absolute control in marital relationships
and support their kin, as well as to be resistant against violent pain, for example, in
2In our sample, more than 95% belong the Bagisu, who might also alternatively be referred to as
Gisu people, Gishu, Masaba, or Sokwia, and are closely related to the Bukusu tribe in Kenya.
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circumcision practices, a salient tradition among the Bagisu. Although households seem
to be controlled by men and domestic violence is a common feature of marriage (Kara-
magi et al., 2006), the reputation of Bagisu men strongly depends on being married as
a signal for adult masculinity. While Bagisu women are relatively free to divorce from
their husband and get remarried, marital failure might imply serious consequences for
Bagisu men. Bachelors or divorced men are likely to be ridiculed in their social group.
Outside marriage, conflicts among kin, often refer to access to resources, conflicts over
land, or land boundaries. Inheritance upon the death of a family head or the distribution
of remittances are other common sources behind disputes. Conflicts might also result
from accusations of sorcery if people feel that they are befallen by misfortune, or result
from political disputes or gossiping. Generally, different sources of conflict might even
translate into accusations of witchcraft or theft (Heald, 1998), and finally lead to violent
punishment.
B.3 Experimental details
B.3.1 Instructions for the experiment
Welcome. Thank you for taking the time to come today. You can ask any of us questions during
today’s programme.
We have invited you here, today, because we want to learn about how people in this area take
decisions. You are going to be asked to take decisions about money. The money that results
from your decisions will be yours to keep.
What you need to do will be explained fully in a few minutes. But first we want to make a
couple of things clear.
First of all, this is not our money. We belong to a university, and this money has been given to
us for research.
Participation is voluntary. You may still choose not to participate in the exercise.
We also have to make clear that this is research about your decisions. Therefore you cannot talk
with others. This is very important. I’m afraid that if we find you talking with others, we will
have to send you home, and you will not be able to earn any money here today. Of course, if
you have questions, you can ask one of us. We also ask you to switch off your mobile phones.
Make sure that you listen carefully to us. You will be able to make a good amount of money
here today, and it is important that you follow our instructions.
During today’s programme, you will be asked to make one or more choices, which will be
explained to you very clearly. If you are asked to take more than one decision, only one decision
will be selected to determine the money you will be paid. In that case, at the end of the exercise
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we will randomly select one of your decisions to be paid out. Any money you earn will be paid
out to you privately and confidentially after all parts of the exercise are complete.
Now, before we explain what you need to do, it is really important to bear one more thing in
mind. You will be asked to take decisions that are not a matter of getting it right or wrong;
they are about what you prefer. However, it is important to think seriously about your choices
because they will affect how much money you can take home.
Part I
Task
The task consists of two parts. In the first part you will have to make one choice, which may be
communicated to other participants. The choice is between the different options on the table in
front of you. You can choose exactly one of these options. Each option consists of one group of
5 counters, where 4 of the counters are white and 1 is green. Next to each group of counters is
a piece of paper which states how much each counter is worth in that option.
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Figure B.1: Presentation of lotteries
In option A, each white counter is worth 6000 UGS and each green counter is worth 6000 UGS.
In option B, each white counter is worth 7000 UGS and each green counter is worth 5000 UGS.
In option C, each white counter is worth 8000 UGS and each green counter is worth 4000 UGS.
In option D, each white counter is worth 9000 UGS and each green counter is worth 3000 UGS.
In option E, each white counter is worth 10,000 UGS and each green counter is worth 2000 UGS.
In option F, each white counter is worth 11,000 UGS and each green counter is worth 1000 UGS.
In option G, each white counter is worth 12,000 UGS and each green counter is worth 0 UGS.
You will be asked to select one option. After you have made your choice, your earnings will be
calculated in the following way. We will place the counters from the option you selected into a
bag and pick one out without looking. The colour of this counter will determine the amount of
money you will get. As there are 4 white counters and only 1 green counter, it is much more
likely that you will pick a white counter, than a green counter.
Let me give you the following examples.
• If you chose option A and picked a white counter, how much would you go home with?
(6000 UGS). If you chose option A and picked a green counter, how much would you go
home with? (6000 UGS).
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• If you chose option G and picked a white counter, how much would you go home with?
(12,000 UGS). If you chose option G and picked a green counter, how much would you go
home with? (0 UGS).
• If you chose option B and picked a green counter, how much would you go home with?
(5000 UGS). If you chose option B and picked a white counter, how much would you go
home with? (7000 UGS).
• If you chose option F and picked a white counter, how much would you go home with?
(11,000 UGS). If you chose option F and picked a green counter, how much would you go
home with? (1000 UGS).
• If you chose option C and picked a green counter, how much would you go home with?
(4000 UGS). If you chose option C and picked a white counter, how much would you go
home with? (8000 UGS).
• If you chose option E and picked a white counter, how much would you go home with?
(10,000 UGS). If you chose option E and picked a green counter, how much would you go
home with? (2000 UGS).
• If you chose option D and picked a green counter, how much would you go home with?
(3000 UGS). If you chose option D and picked a white counter, how much would you go
home with? (9000 UGS).
To make your decision we will use the following decision card. It shows the same 7 options as
the ones presented on the table. Out of these 7 options we ask you to select one.
Control Questions
We will now ask some questions to see whether you understood the instructions.
1. If you chose option C, how much would you go home with if you picked a white counter
out of the bag?
2. If you chose option A, how much would you go home with if you picked a white counter
out of the bag?
3. If you chose option F, how much would you go home with if you picked a green counter
out of the bag?
4. If you chose option D, how much would you go home with if you picked a white counter
out of the bag?
If you have no further questions, we will now begin. Please indicate the option you choose.
Remember, there are no wrong choices, so you should choose the option that you prefer.
We emphasize that it is important that you make your choice in private. Do not show your
decision card to the other participants. If you need assistance, please raise your hand so that
one of us can come to you to assist you. Once you have made your choice, please fold the decision
card and raise your hand so that we can come and collect your decision card.
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B.3.2 Details on non-reported experimental tasks
After the experimental task which we analyze in this paper, we implemented a second
task designed to examine the effect of feedback about others’ choices on individual choices.
Based on the data collected in the social survey we hereby focus on whether different social
links (such as kin, friends, or strangers) might relate to differently strong peer effects,
and whether different social links might induce different strategies (such as imitation or
deviation).
In the beginning of the second part, subjects were randomly paired with another partici-
pant (“peer”) from the same session. One subject from each pair was then allowed to once
more choose between the same options as in the first part. However, before making this
choice, the subject would get to know the decision made by the peer in the first part. We
implemented three different treatments. In the first treatment, within each pair, peers
come from the same village, and the decision-maker gets to know the identify of the peer.
In the second treatment, within each pair, peers come from the same village, but the
decision-maker does not get to know the identity of the peer. In the third treatment,
within each pair, peers come from different villages, and the decision-maker does not get
to know the identity of his peer.
For the decision-makers in the second part, either the first or the second task is randomly
selected for payment at the end of the experiment. For those subjects who acted as peers
in the second part, the first task is relevant for payment. The existence of a second part
and the fact that only one part would be payoff relevant was common knowledge from the
very beginning of the experiment. However, subjects did not know what to expect in the
second task when facing the first task (also see the instructions in section B.3.1).
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All Analyzed sample
N 275 252
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Gender 0.49 0.50 0.46 0.50
Age 40.78 13.56 40.23 13.36
Household Head 0.61 0.49 0.62 0.49
Married 0.80 0.40 0.81 0.39
Number of people in household 5.96 2.77 6.04 2.77
Farming as primary occupation 0.85 0.36 0.85 0.36
Farming activities 0.96 0.20 0.96 0.20
Education (type) 1.09 0.58 1.13 0.57
Years of schooling 4.97 2.94 5.21 2.87
Education type Freq. (%) Freq. (%)
None 11.3 9.1
Primary 69.8 70.2
Secondary 17.5 19.1
Tertiary 1.5 1.6
Religion Freq. (%) Freq. (%)
Catholicism 38.2 38.9
Protestantism (Anglicanism & other) 39.7 39.3
Islam 11.3 11.5
Seventh Day Adventists 0.4 0.4
Born Again 10.6 9.9
Table B.2: Summary statistics for whole and analyzed sample
Note: The whole and analyzed sample only differ in the observations which were dropped due to failures
in the control questions in the beginning of the experiment.
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KIN
N KIN NONKIN Other Total
All 351 566 1 918
No conflict 293 427 . 720
Conflict 58 139 . 197
Freq. (%)
All 38.24% 61.66% 0.11% 100%
No conflict 83.48% 75.44% . 78.43%
Conflict 16.52% 24.56% . 21.46%
GENERATION – among kin
N Same Generation Junior/Senior Total
All 195 156 351
No conflict 166 127 293
Conflict 29 29 58
Freq. (%)
All 55.56 % 44.44 % 100 %
No conflict 85.13 % 81.41 % 83.48 %
Conflict 14.87 % 18.59 % 16.52%
GENDER
N Female-Female Male-Male Female-Male Total
All 195 253 470 918
No conflict 155 221 344 720
Conflict 39 32 126 197
Do not know each other 1 0 0 1
Freq. (%)
All 21.24 % 27.56 % 51.20 % 100 %
No conflict 79.49 % 87.35 % 73.19 % 78.43 %
Conflict 20.00% 12.65 % 26.81 % 21.46 %
Do not know each other 0.51 % 0.00 % 0.00 % 0.11 %
Table B.3: Dyadic dataset
Note: Numbers report the number of dyads in our sample. A dyad defines a pair of two individuals, for
whom we elicited their social tie in the social survey.
In total, the analyzed sample consists of 918 dyads. From the whole sample, which includes 1,096 dyads,
we drop all dyads in which at least one individual failed to pass the control task. In one particular dyad,
both persons agreed that they do not know each other, hence, they do not appear in the categories w.r.t.
kin.
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Variable Mean SD N
Difference in RA (δRA) 2.23 1.63 917
Distance in age 15.52 11.03 917
Difference in gender 0.51 0.50 917
Different tribes 0.10 0.30 917
Different marital status 0.28 0.45 917
Different religion 0.51 0.50 917
Distance in education 0.52 0.61 917
Difference in wealth index 1.93 1.79 917
Different occupation 0.30 0.46 917
Difference in disabilities 0.42 0.49 917
Neighbors 0.60 0.49 917
Different social groups 0.57 0.50 917
Loan 0.19 0.39 917
Gifts 0.45 0.50 917
Kin 0.38 0.49 917
Table B.4: Independent variables in dyadic regression models
Note: The listed variables refer to the independent variables included in the dyadic regression models
reported in sections 2.6.1 and 2.6.2.
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(1) (2) (3)
RA 0.007
[0.047]
RAi−RAj
2 -0.016 -0.013
[0.041] [0.040]
Age distance 0.009* 0.010** 0.009*
[0.004] [.] [0.004]
Diff. Gender 0.083 0.245** 0.236**
[0.185] [.] [0.086]
Diff. Tribe -0.253 -0.076 -0.101
[0.321] [0.318] [0.260]
Diff. Marital Status 0.06 0.063 0.083
[0.126] [0.050] [0.094]
Diff. Religion 0.103 -0.079 -0.078
[0.130] [.] [0.063]
Education distance 0.063 -0.057 -0.042
[0.159] [0.055] [0.086]
Wealth distance 0.031 -0.022 -0.015
[0.036] [0.016] [0.027]
Diff. Occupation -0.157 0.079 0.16
[0.329] [0.113] [0.141]
Diff. In Disabilities -0.199 -0.079 -0.028
[0.162] [0.077] [0.095]
Sample RAi = RAj δRAij = 1 δ
RA
ij = 1
Fixed Effects Village + Session Village + Session and SeVillagessionnn
% conflict 17.14% 20.19% 20.19%
Observations 65 147 147
Log-lik. -25.56 -59.23 -68.30
Table B.8: Dyadic logit regression: conflicts and risk attitudes
This table reports the marginal effects of a dyadic logit regression. The dependent variable refers to the
presence of conflict. Model (1) includes only those dyads for which both individuals exhibit exactly the
same risk attitude (RAi = RAj); models (2) and (3) include only those dyads for which individuals differed
by exactly one choice, i.e. δRAij = 1. Independent variables are defined as in Table 2.6. Due to limited
degrees of freedom we restrict the set of independent variables to the socio-economic characteristics.
Regressions (1) and (2) include village and session fixed effects, for both individuals in each dyad. Given
limited degrees of freedom and to test the robustness of model (2), we estimate the same model, but only
with village fixed effects, reported in (3).
Standard errors are clustered on the village level and reported in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1. .
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B.5 Measuring differences in risk attitudes using cer-
tainty equivalents
In the experiment, subjects choose one out of seven lotteries. As given in Table 2.1
in section 2.3.2 of the main text, choosing a particular lottery corresponds to a CRRA
parameter r, if one assumes an expected utility framework and constant relative risk
aversion. One suggestion would be to measure differences in risk attitudes as the absolute
distance in certainty equivalents, instead of the absolute distance in lottery choices.
Assume that each subject’s CRRA parameter is given by a range of values [r1, r2). For ex-
ample, choosing lottery B corresponds to r ∈ [2.69, 8.13), choosing lottery D corresponds
to r ∈ [1.03, 1.55), and choosing lottery F corresponds to r ∈ [0.38, 0.70). For a given r,
the expected utility of lottery L is given by EU [L|r] = p · x1−rh
1−r + (1− p) ·
x1−rl
1−r , assuming
the standard functional utility under constant relative risk aversion, where xh, xl denote
the high and low outcomes, respectively. A subject’s certainty equivalent ce(L|r1, r2) can
be approximated by the midpoint between EU [L|r1] and EU [L|r2]. If lottery A or G is
chosen, the certainty equivalent can be approximated by the expected utility determined
by the boundary values for r, as given in Table 2.1. The difference in risk attitudes for
subjects i and j may then be defined by the absolute difference between cei and cej.
Note, that cei and cej are a function of some r1 and r2, which need to be specified. The
intuitively most appealing approach would be to define the difference in risk attitudes as
perceived by subject i, i.e., as the difference in certainty equivalents of his and j’s lottery,
conditional on his own CRRA parameter range: δCEij = |ce(Li|ri,1, ri,2) − ce(Lj|ri,1, ri,2)|.
Since not δCEij 6= δCEji , unless Li = Lj, this definition of differences in risk attitudes is not
symmetric. Analyzing the relation between the likelihood for conflict and differences in
risk attitudes, hence, requires to examine unilateral links. As argued in the main text,
defining conflicts unilaterally is not as conservative as defining conflicts by using the “or-
matching” in a dyadic dataset. Especially individuals, who actually caused a conflict with
somebody else, may feel reluctant to state this conflict (compare 39ff in section 2.3.1).
Appendix C
An Anatomy of Ambiguity Attitudes
C.1 A review of related preference measurements
Following the seminal Ellsberg experiments (Ellsberg, 1961) numerous studies replicated
the phenomenon of ambiguity aversion over ambiguous moderate likelihood gain events.
Besides, experiments and surveys also documented ambiguity seeking behavior, especially
if ambiguity relates to low likelihood gains (e.g., Curley and Yates, 1989; Dimmock et al.,
2012, 2013) or to moderate likelihood losses (e.g., Casey and Scholz, 1991; Hogarth and
Kunreuther, 1985, 1989; Viscusi and Chesson, 1999). Generally, similar to findings on
decision-making under risk, as formalized by Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky,
1979), individual ambiguity attitudes are likely to exhibit a boundary effect, such that
small likelihoods are overweighed while high likelihoods are underweighted (e.g., Abdel-
laoui et al., 2005, 2011). This might, for example, explain a preference for ambiguity for
low likelihood gain prospects. Moreover, several studies reported a reflection effect which
describes a reversal of attitudes between the outcome domain of gains to losses (see, e.g.,
Ho et al., 2002; Abdellaoui et al., 2005; Kothiyal et al., 2014, and those studies which we
will review below).
Taken together, there is vigorous experimental evidence for the existence of a fourfold
pattern of ambiguity attitudes. Individuals might prefer ambiguity to risk for gains with
low likelihoods, where ambiguity aversion increases with increasing likelihoods. At the
same time, individuals might be averse to ambiguity for losses which occur with low
likelihoods, where ambiguity seeking increases with increasing likelihoods.
This pattern has been documented in some experimental studies which we summarize
in Table C.1. These studies elicit ambiguity attitudes for the gain as well as loss do-
main, both for different levels of likelihoods. In Table C.1 we distinguish between two
main experimental design features, i.e., whether treatment variations are implemented
within or between subjects (horizontal dimension), and whether real financial incentives
are employed to elicit truthful preferences (vertical dimension).
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Starting with Kahn and Sarin (1988), who elicited ambiguity attitudes in the context of
consumer choice experiments, the experimental tasks range from auctions over the right
to insure negative outcomes and to assure positive outcomes (Di Mauro and Maffioletti,
2004), the elicitation of certainty equivalents (Abdellaoui et al., 2005), typical Ellsberg
urn choice experiments (Vieider et al., 2012), and the elicitation of probability equivalents
over ambiguous prospects (Baillon and Bleichrodt, 2013).
Most of these studies, however, document changes in individual ambiguity attitudes across
domains, by varying outcome domains and probability levels within instead of between
subjects. Only Di Mauro and Maffioletti (2004) implement choice tasks with respect to
gain and loss prospects in a between-subjects design, while still varying probabilities on
the subject level. Moreover, to be able to compare elicited attitudes for gain and loss
prospects, the experimental design has to induce a salient reference point of wealth, with
respect to which changes in wealth (gains as well as losses) are implemented. Thus, an
initial endowment given to subjects in the beginning of an experiment, in particular to
cover losses during the experiment, should be kept constant across domains. Among the
studies discussed in Table C.1, this is the case only in Kahn and Sarin (1988) and (Baillon
and Bleichrodt, 2013).
Nevertheless, Table C.1 represents reasonable experimental evidence on the existence of
the particular fourfold pattern of ambiguity attitudes. Yet, we are also aware of some ex-
periments which report (at least partially) conflicting findings with respect to this pattern.
Among those studies which considered all four relevant domains, Einhorn and Hogarth
(1986) as well as Budescu et al. (2002) find evidence for ambiguity neutral preferences for
moderate likelihood losses. Keren and Gerritsen (1999) even report ambiguity aversion in
all domains. The design features of these studies are summarized in Table C.2.
Einhorn and Hogarth (1986) and Keren and Gerritsen (1999) employ a between-subjects
design for variations in outcomes and probabilities, similar to our design. However, both
studies do not employ financial incentives, and also consider likelihoods that are either
close to extreme (50% versus 0.1% in Einhorn and Hogarth, 1986) or generally close to
moderate levels (1/3 versus 2/3 in Keren and Gerritsen, 1999).
In this study, we use a clean between-subjects design to study attitudes over prospects
involving gains versus losses, which occur with either low versus moderate likelihood,
respectively. We collect data from roughly 500 participants, keep endowments for partic-
ipants constant across different treatments, and we control for trust and skewed beliefs
about ambiguous prospects.
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Within- and between-
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Budescu et al. (2002): find
rather weak ambiguity aversion,
and an insensitivity of attitudes
with respect to probability level
Choice dimension: direct response
for certainty equivalents
Stimuli: vague probabilities with
width 0.3 around center values
Price: +/- $ 5, 10, 15, $ 5 endow-
ment
Probabilities: 25, 50, 75%
# of subjects: 24
Country: USA
Notes: endowment not sufficient to
cover all potential losses; three gain
prospects and one loss prospect ran-
domly selected for payment (hedg-
ing possible); subjects could refuse
from playing any gamble and keep
endowment; additionally test ambi-
guity attitudes with respect to out-
comes
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Einhorn and Hogarth (1986):
find ambiguity aversion for gains
with small and moderate likelihood
as modal response; ambiguity aver-
sion for low likelihood losses and
ambiguity neutrality for moderate
likelihood losses
Choice dimension: direct choice be-
tween risky and ambiguous prospect
Stimuli: 2-color Ellsberg urn, and
urn with numbered balls
Price: -
Probabilities: 0.1 and 50%
Notes: two probability levels im-
plemented within subjects; gains
versus losses implemented between
subjects; allow for indifference
# of subjects: 274
Country: USA
Keren and Gerritsen (1999):
find ambiguity aversion in each
cluster
Choice dimension: direct choice be-
tween risk and ambiguity (betting
color)
Stimuli: 3-color Ellsberg urn
Price: NLG 6 ($ 6) flat fee
Probabilities: 1/3, 2/3
Notes: four treatments in which
subjects would win / lose if if their
chosen color would match / not
match the randomly drawn ball
# of subjects: 258
Country: The Netherlands
Table C.2: Literature overview - different findings from fourfold pattern of ambiguity
attitudes
C.2 Instructions for the treatment for gains with mod-
erate likelihoods (20.50)
Welcome to the experiment and thank you for your participation!
Please do not talk to other participants of the experiment from now on.
General information on the procedure
This experiment is conducted to investigate economic decision-making. You can earn money
during the experiment. It will be paid to you privately and in cash after the experiment. The
entire experiment lasts about 1 hour and consists of 4 parts. At the beginning of each part
you will receive detailed instructions. If you have questions after the instructions or during the
experiment please raise your hand. One of the experimenters will then answer your question
privately. During the experiment you will be asked to make decisions. Your own decisions will
determine your payment which is a result of the following rules. While you will be making your
decisions a clock will count down at the right upper corner of the screen. This provides you with
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an orientation about how much time you should spend on your decisions. Of course you can
take more time if you need to; this might be especially likely in the beginning of the experiment.
Only the information screens where no decisions need to be made will disappear after the time
has run out.
Payment
In each part of the experiment your income is directly stated in Euro. Of Part I, Part II, and
Part III only one part will be paid out. One participant will select which of those parts will be
payoff relevant, randomly and with equal probability at the end of the experiment (after Part
IV). As you do not know which part will be chosen, it is optimal for you to behave like each
part was to be paid. Part IV is definitely relevant for your payment. In the beginning of the
experiment you will also receive an endowment of 20 Euro. Your total income is then equal to
the sum of your endowment, the income of the selected part (I, II, or III), and of Part IV.
Anonymity
We evaluate any data of the experiment only in aggregate form and never connect personal
information to individual data. At the end of the experiment you have to sign a receipt for the
payment. This only serves for our internal accounting.
Devices
At your place you find a pen. Please leave it on the table after the experiment.
Start
In the beginning of the experiment I ask you to choose a color, which will be your personal
decision color during the experiment. You will learn for what this color is important in the
following instructions.
On the first screen a list of colors will be displayed. Please mark exactly one of those colors and
confirm your choice by clicking the OK-button in the lower part of the screen. All participants
choose from the same list of colors. As soon as every participant has chosen his personal decision
color the instructions for the first part of the experiment will be distributed.
Part I
Task
In this part you have to choose between two prospects. These prospects are described by two
opaque bags, bag A and bag B. From each of these bags one chip is randomly drawn which will
determine your payment as described further below. You choose whether your chip should be
drawn from bag A or from bag B.
Bag A: Bag A has already been filled with exactly 100 colored chips before the experiment.
These chips are either red or blue. The distribution of the colors is unknown to you: a student
assistant has randomly drawn 100 chips from a bigger bag that contained far more than 100
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chips - only red and blue ones. Thus, you do not know how many of the 100 chips are red or
blue. If you choose bag A, you receive 20 Euro if the color of the chip that will be drawn from
bag A is equal to you personal decision color, and 0 Euro if the chip has a different color.
Bag B: In a moment we will fill exactly 100 chips into bag B. Of those chips, exactly 50 are red
and the remaining 50 are blue. If you choose bag B, you receive 20 Euro if the color of the chip
that will be drawn from bag B is red, and 0 Euro if the chip is not red. Part I ends as soon as
everyone has made his decision, you will then receive the instructions for Part II.
Payment
After the completion of Part IV the computer will randomly assign two participants as assistants.
One assistant will first draw a ball from a bag filled with three balls - numbered from 1 to 3.
The number of that ball determines the payoff relevant part.
If Part I is selected for payment the assistant will draw one chip from each of the bags A and
B. The colors of these chips are then relevant for your payment (depending on whether you
have chosen bag A or bag B). The other assistant will enter the color of the chips on his screen.
Whether you have been assigned the role of an assistant will be shown to you on your screen at
that point.
Part II
Task
In this part you will receive in total 9 decision problems. These will be displayed to you simul-
taneously on one screen. In each of these problems you choose between two prospects which we
will again describe by two opaque bags.
In each of these problems you decide between bag A from Part I and a second bag, denoted by
bag C. Bag C also contains exactly 100 - only red and blue - chips. How many of the chips are
red and blue will be displayed on your screen.
To remind you: bag A has been randomly filled with 100 chips before the experiment. These
chips are either red or blue. You do not know how many are red and how many are blue.
The decision problem form Part 1 is one example for a possible decision problem in this part.
Another example is illustrated in the following table:
Bag A Bag C Your decision
Bag A contains exactly 100 chips. You do not Bag C contains exactly 100 chips
know how many of those are red or blue. If a chip of which exactly 40 are red. If a red Bag A
is drawn that is of your personal decision color chip is drawn, you receive 20 Euro. or
you receive 20 Euro. If a different chip is drawn If a different chip is drawn, you Bag C
you receive 0 Euro. receive 0 Euro.
Example for choice between A and C
Your decision is not valid before you have made a choice for all decision problems and then
clicked on the OK-button in the lower part of the screen. Take enough time for your decisions,
as each decision can determine your payment from this part.
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Payment
If Part II is selected as payoff relevant, your income from this part will be determined as follows:
for each participant the computer selects randomly and with equal probability one of the 9
decision problems (i.e. each with a probability of 1/9). Each bag C will be filled with the
corresponding number of red and blue chips. One assistant will draw one chip from each of
these bags, and one chip from bag A, which will determine your payment as described above. If,
for example, the upper decision problem is chosen and you have chosen bag C you will receive
20 Euro if the chip from this bag is red, and 0 Euro if it is not red. If you have chosen bag A
you receive 20 Euro if the chip from this bag is of your personal decision color that you have
chosen yourself in the beginning. Since you do not know which of the 9 decision problems will
be selected for payment, it is optimal for you to behave as if each decision problem was relevant
for payment.
Part III
Task
Part III consists of two periods: in each period 21 decision problems will be displayed simulta-
neously on your screen. In each of these problems you choose between a prospect and a safe
amount of money. Within one period the prospect remains unchanged, whereas the safe amount
of money is increasing with every decision problem.
Period 1: in the first period the prospect is given by bag B from Part I.
To remind you: bag B contains exactly 100 colored chips of which 50 are red and 50 are blue.
If a red chip is drawn from the bag, you receive 20 Euro, otherwise, you receive 0 Euro. One
example is illustrated in the following table:
Bag B Amount of money Your decision
Bag B contains exactly 100 chips
of which exactly 50 are red and 50 are blue. You receive Bag B
If a red chip is drawn 9 Euro or
you receive 20 Euro. If a different chip is drawn for sure. Safe amount of money
you receive 0 Euro.
Example for choice between A and C
Your decisions in period 1 are not valid before you have made a choice for all decision problems
and then clicked on the OK-button in the lower part of the screen. Period 2 will start afterwards.
Period 2: in the second period the prospect is given by bag A from Part I (and Part II).
To remind you: bag A was randomly filled with 100 chips before the experiment; these chips are
either red or blue. You do not know how many of those chips are red or blue. You receive 20
Euro if the chip that will be drawn from bag A is of your personal decision color, and 0 Euro
if this chip is of a different color. The example for a decision in period 2 is analogous to the
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upper example from period 1; however, you choose between bag A, instead of bag B, and the
safe amount of money.
Your decisions in period 2 are again not valid before you have made a choice for all decision
problems and then clicked on the OK-button in the lower part of the screen. Please note: since
the safe amount of money increases continuously, you should, as soon as you have chosen the
safe amount for once, do so for all remaining decisions in this period. Take enough time for your
decisions, as each decision can determine your payment from this part.
Payment
If Part III is selected as payoff relevant the computer will randomly and with equal probability
select one of both periods, and one of the 21 decision problems. Your decision in this problem
determines your payment. If you have chosen the prospect in that particular decision problem,
then, for period 1, the color of the chip from bag B determines your payment, and for period
2, the color of the chip from bag A determines your payment. Since you do not know which
period and which of the 21 decision problems will be selected for payment, it is optimal for you
to behave as if each decision problem was relevant for payment.
Instructions for Part IV can be received from the authors upon request.
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Figure C.1: Picture of lab room and colored chips
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C.3 Definition of ambiguity neutrality
p = 0.5 Your choice Risky prospect with prob. qi
x 0.25
x 0.3
x 0.35
Ambiguous x 0.4
prospect x 0.45
(x) [x] 0.5 = p
x 0.55
x 0.6
x 0.65
p = 0.1 Your choice Risky prospect with prob. qi
x 0.01
x 0.04
x 0.07
Ambiguous (x) [x] 0.1 = p
prospect x 0.13
x 0.16
x 0.19
x 0.22
x 0.25
Table C.3: Switching points for ambiguity neutrals subjects
Table C.3 demonstrates the possible decisions of ambiguity neutral subjects in the stage 2
choice lists. Because the subject is indifferent between the risky and ambiguous prospect
in the decision item which is framed by dashed lines, she may choose either prospect in
this choice item. Hence, switching may either occur already in that row (choice indicated
by parentheses), or in the next decision item (choice indicated by square brackets).
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Figure C.2: Histograms of probability equivalents by treatment
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Figure C.3: Frequencies of chosen decision colors (all observations included)
Treatment
20.50 (−20).50 (−10).510
Red 56.9% 39.7% 42.5%
Blue 43.1% 60.3% 57.5%
Treatment
20.10 (−20).10 (−10).110 10.1(−10)
Red 12.7% 9.6% 15.9% 12.9%
Blue 16.9% 19.2% 18.8% 24.3%
Grey 1.4% 0.0% 2.9% 0.0%
Green 19.7% 23.3% 33.3% 21.4%
Purple 11.3% 9.6% 5.8% 5.7%
Pink 1.4% 8.2% 2.9% 8.6%
Orange 18.3% 11.0% 10.1% 10.0%
Yellow 12.7% 11.0% 4.3% 5.7%
Black 4.2% 2.7% 1.4% 5.7%
White 1.4% 5.5% 4.3% 5.7%
Table C.4: Frequencies of chosen decision colors (all observations included)
# obs. Stage 1: Stage 2: Consistent
Stage 1 ambiguous probability between
Treatment (Stage 2) choices (%) equivalenta stage 1 and 2b (%)
20.50 70 37.1 AA** .48 AA*** 72.9
(−20).50 71 49.3 (AA) .53 (AA) 88.7
20.10 67 55.2 (AS) .12 AS*** 82.1
(−20).10 72 62.5 AS** .09 (AS) 79.2
Table C.5: Ambiguity attitudes for restricted samples in Part 1 and Part 2
Notes: a: median; b: same choice made in Part 1 and the respective decision item in Part 2; direction of
effect: AA=ambiguity averse; AS=ambiguity seeking; *,**,*** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and
1% level; Part 1: two-sided binomial test against p=0.5/0.1; Part 2: two-sided t-test against probability
equivalent=0.5/0.1. Data of subjects who violate consistency criteria in Part 2 excluded in Part 1 and 2.
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# obs. Stage 1: Stage 2: Consistent
Stage 1 ambiguous probability between
Treatment (Stage 2) choices (%) equivalenta stage 1 and 2b (%)
20.50 51 17.6 AA*** .48 AA*** 100
(−20).50 63 47.6 (AA) .53 (AA) 100
20.10 55 60.0 (AS) .12 AS*** 100
(−20).10 57 56.1 (AS) .09 (AS) 100
Table C.6: Ambiguity attitudes for consistent subjects
Notes: a: median; b: same choice made in Part 1 and the respective decision item in Part 2; direction of
effect: AA=ambiguity averse; AS=ambiguity seeking; *,**,*** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and
1% level; Part 1: two-sided binomial test against p=0.5/0.1; Part 2: two-sided t-test against probability
equivalent=0.5/0.1. Data of subjects who violate consistency criteria in Part 2 and whose choices in Part
1 and Part 2 are not consistent excluded in Part 1 and 2.
C.5 Consistency
Inconsistencies might be caused by indifferent preferences in stage 1, in which case choos-
ing different prospects in stage 1 and the corresponding decision item in stage 2 is rational.
To further test whether inconsistencies might bias our overall results we distinguish be-
tween consistent and inconsistent subjects in Figure C.4, and picture their average stage
1 choices in the upper row, and median probability equivalents from stage 2 in the lower
row. Differences between consistent and inconsistent subjects become most obvious with
respect to direct choices, and in particular in treatment 20.50. Nearly 90% of inconsis-
tent subjects choose the ambiguous urn, in contrast to only 18% of consistent subjects.
Similarly, in treatment (−20).10, 87% of inconsistent subjects are ambiguity seeking, com-
pared to only 56% of consistent subjects. Both differences are significant (Fisher exact
tests, p-values <0.01 for 200.50, and 0.037 for (−20).10). That is, inconsistent subjects on
average deviate from the fourfold pattern of attitudes reported for non-neutrals in section
3.4.2. In contrast, we do not find stark differences in terms of median probability equiva-
lents. Only for low likelihood loss prospects, inconsistent subjects are significantly more
ambiguity seeking, which indicates the same bias as stage 1 choices (Wilcoxon rank-sum
test, p-value 0.037).
Given that differences between inconsistent and consistent subjects are particularly appar-
ent for direct choices in which we cannot identify ambiguity neutrality, inconsistencies and
ambiguity neutrality might be positively correlated. Such a correlation, however, might
confound our finding reported in section 3.4.2, namely that a fourfold pattern unfolds if
we abstract from the ambiguity neutrals: deviations from the fourfold pattern might be
due to subjects who exhibit inconsistent rather than neutral preferences.
We argue that this is not the case, by comparing the frequency of ambiguity neutrals
between consistent and inconsistent subjects. Numbers are reported in Table C.7. Except
for standard prospects with moderate likelihood gains, the fraction of consistent subjects
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Figure C.4: Ambiguity attitudes by treatment and consistency
Notes: Numbers of observations denoted (# of cons. subjects, # of incons. subjects) are as follows:
Stage 1: (19, 53) for 20.50, (8, 65) for (−20).50, (13, 58) for 20.10, and (15, 58) for (−20).10.
Stage 2: (19, 51) for 20.50, (8, 63) for (−20).50, (12, 55) for 20.10, and (15, 57) for (−20).10.
does not significantly differ between ambiguity neutrals and non-neutrals (Fisher exact
tests, p-values 0.028 for 20.50, 0.673 for (−20).50, 0.741 for 20.10, and 0.552 for (−20).10).
Yet, ambiguity aversion in treatment 20.50 appears to be the only attitude which is robust
against any subsample and elicitation task. Thus, a hidden fraction of inconsistent choices
is rather unlikely to confound the revelation of the fourfold pattern by abstracting from
ambiguity neutrality.
Treatment
l20.50l l(−20).50l l20.10l l(−20).10l (−10).510 (−10).110 10.1(−10)
Including 72.9%* 88.7%* 82.1%* 79.2%* 72.1%* 74.6%* 78.3%*ambiguity neutrals
Excluding 88.5%* 93.8%* 80.0%* 75.0%* 75.0% 63.6% 92.3%*ambiguity neutrals
Ambiguity 63.6% 87.3%* 83.0%* 81.3%* 71.4%* 80.0%* 75.0%*neutrals
Table C.7: Consistency of ambiguity attitude
Notes: Entries report percentages of subjects who make consistent choice in the identical choice item in
stage 1 and stage 2 of the experiment. * indicates that the percentage is larger at the 5% significance
level than expected under random choices (50% consistency).
Appendix D
Social Anchor Effects in
Decision-Making under Ambiguity
D.1 Instructions for the GAIN-IND and GAIN-PEER
treatments
The instruction for Part I and with respect to general information about the experiment
are identical in IND and PEER treatments. Instructions of IND and PEER treatments
only differ in a few sentences in Part II. Sentences or words which are included in the
PEER but not in the IND treatments are written in blue text color; sentences/words
which are included in the IND but not in the PEER treatments are written in green text
color.
Welcome to the experiment and thank you for your participation!
Please do not talk to other participants of the experiment from now on.
General information on the procedure
This experiment is conducted to investigate economic decision-making. You can earn money
during the experiment. It will be paid to you privately and in cash after the experiment. The
entire experiment lasts about 1 hour and consists of 3 parts. At the beginning of each part
you will receive detailed instructions. If you have questions after the instructions or during the
experiment please raise your hand. One of the experimenters will then answer your question
privately. During the experiment you will be asked to make decisions. In the course of the
experiment it is possible that other participants will get to know your decisions from a previous
part of the experiment. In this case, this will happen anonymously: it is neither possible to
allocate your decisions to your seat number or your person, nor to draw conclusions on your
payment. Only your own decisions determine your payment, which is a result of the following
rules.
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Payment
In each part of the experiment your income is directly stated in Euro. Of Part I and Part II
only one part will be paid out. Which of both parts will be relevant for payments will be chosen
randomly and with equal probability by the computer at the end of the experiment (after Part
III). Since you do not know which of the parts (Part I or Part II) will be selected, it is optimal
for you to behave as if each part was to be paid out. Part III is definitely relevant for your
payment.
In the beginning of the experiment you will also receive an endowment of 10 Euro. Your total
income is then given by the sum of your credit, the income of Part III, and the part (I or II)
which was selected for payment.
Anonymity
I evaluate all the data of the experiment only in aggregate form and never connect personal
information to the data of the experiment. At the end of the experiment you have to sign a
receipt for the payment. This only serves for our internal accounting.
Devices
At your place you will find a pen. Please leave it on the table after the experiment.
Start
In the beginning of the experiment I ask you to choose a color, which will be your personal
decision color during the experiment. You will learn for what this color is important in the
following instructions.
On the first screen a list of colors will be displayed. Please mark exactly one of those colors and
confirm your choice by clicking the OK-button in the lower part of the screen. All participants
choose from the same list of colors. As soon as every participant has chosen his personal decision
color the instructions for the first part of the experiment will be distributed.
Part I
Task
In this part you receive 21 decision problems. These will be displayed simultaneously on your
screen. In each of the decision problem you choose between two lotteries. I describe these
lotteries with two opaque bags, bag A and bag B. In the end of the experiment one chip will be
drawn randomly from each of these bags. This chip will determine your payment, as described
further below. Thus, you choose whether your chip should be drawn from bag A or from bag B.
Bag A: Bag A was already filled with exactly 100 colored chips before the experiment. Those
chips are either red or blue. The distribution of those colors is unknown to you: a student
assistant has randomly drawn 100 chips from a bigger bag that contained far more than 100
chips - only red and blue ones. Thus, you do not know how many of the 100 chips are red or
blue.
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If you choose bag A, you receive 10 Euro if the color of the chip that will be drawn from bag A
is of your personal decision color, and 0 Euro if the chip is of a different color.
Bag B: Bag B also contains in total 100 chips which are either red or blue. How many of the
chips are red and blue will be displayed on your screen. If you choose bag B, you receive 10
Euro if the color of the chip that will be drawn from bag B is red, and 0 Euro if the chip is not
red.
An example of one decision problem is illustrated in the following table:
Bag A Bag B Your decision
Bag A contains exactly 100 chips. You do not Bag B contains exactly 100 chips
know how many of those are red or blue. If a chip of which exactly 16 are red. If a red Bag A
is drawn that is of your personal decision color chip is drawn, you receive 10 Euro. or
you receive 10 Euro. If a different chip is drawn If a different chip is drawn, you Bag B
you receive 0 Euro. receive 0 Euro.
Example for choice between A and B
Your decision is not valid before you have made a choice for all decision problems and then
clicked on the OK-button in the lower part of the screen. Take enough time for your decisions,
as each decision can determine your payment from this part.
Payment
After the completion of Part III the computer will randomly choose whether Part I or Part II
is relevant for your payment. Both parts will be selected with the same probability. If Part I is
relevant for your payment, the computer will randomly and with equal probability select one of
the 21 decision problems. Your decision in this problem determines your payment.
In addition, the computer will randomly choose two participants as assistants. For bags B of
decision problems 9 to 17 an opaque bag will be filled with the corresponding number of red
and blue chips. Assistant no. 1 will then draw one chip from each of those bags, and one chip
from bag A, which will determine your payment. Assistant no. 2 will enter the colors of the
drawn chips on his screen. In the interest of time, for the remaining bags B of decision problems
1 to 8 and 18 to 21 the computer will randomly draw a chip, corresponding to the respective
distribution of red and blue chips.
If, for example, the above decision problem is chosen for you and you have chosen bag B, then
you receive 10 Euro if the chip from this bag is red and 0 Euro otherwise. If you have chosen
bag A in this decision problem, then you receive 10 Euro if the chip is of your personal decision
color that you have chosen in the beginning of the experiment yourself. Since you do not know
which of the 21 decision problems will be selected for your payment, it is optimal for you to
make your choices as if each decision problem was relevant for payment.
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Part II
Task
[PEER] In the beginning of Part II you are randomly assigned to another participant of the
experiment, with who you will form a group. Your group number will be displayed on your
screen in the beginning. In this part you have the opportunity to reconsider your decision
from Part I. Therefore, the 21 decision problems will again be displayed simultaneously on your
screen. Simultaneously, you see the decisions that you have made in Part I [PEER] and the
decisions that your group member has made in Part I. Part II ends again after you have made
all decisions. In this part you should also take enough time for your decisions, as every decision
can determine your payment for this part of the experiment.
Payment
In the end of the experiment, the computer will randomly choose for each participant whether
Part I or Part II is relevant for payment. [PEER] For each group holds that both members are
paid for different parts: if for you part I is paid, then for your group member part II is Paid. If
Part II is payoff relevant for you, then your group member is paid for Part I. Part I and Part
II are selected with equal probability for every participant. Then, the computer will randomly
and with equal probability choose one of the 21 decision problems for each [IND] participant
[PEER] group. Your decision in this problem of your respective part determines your payment.
For bags B of decision problems 9 to 17 an opaque bag will be filled with the corresponding
number of red and blue chips. Assistant no. 1 will then draw one chip from each of those bags,
and one chip from bag A, which will determine your payment. Assistant no. 2 will enter the
colors of the drawn chips on his screen. In the interest of time, for the remaining bags B of
decision problems 1 to 8 and 18 to 21 the computer will randomly draw a chip, corresponding
to the respective distribution of red and blue chips.
Since you do not know which of the 21 decision problems will be selected for payment, it is
optimal for you to behave as if each decision problem was relevant for payment.
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Figure D.1: Picture of lab room
D.2 Supplementary tables and figures
Part 1 Part 2
Treatment t-test signrank test t-test signrank test
GAIN-IND 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
LOSS-IND 0.000 0.001 0.010 0.011
GAIN-PEER 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Group 1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Group 2 0.081 0.087 0.020 0.031
LOSS-PEER 0.020 0.039 0.046 0.168
Group 1 0.701 0.735 1.000 0.569
Group 2 0.004 0.005 0.019 0.036
Notes: two-sided t-test and Wilcoxon sign rank test; both test null hypothesis that probability equivalent
is equal to 0.5 (ambiguity neutrality). Median probability equivalents are given in Table 4.2 in section
4.3.2.
Table D.1: P-values for ambiguity attitudes
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No change Change Whole sample
Part 1 / 2 N Part 1 Part 2 N Part 1 Part 2 N
GAIN-IND 0.46 20 0.48 0.45 15 0.47 0.46 35
LOSS-IND 0.50 17 0.45 0.47 18 0.47 0.49 35
GAIN-PEER 0.46 14 0.44 0.44 22 0.45 0.45 36
Group 1 0.44 6 0.40 0.43 13 0.41 0.43 19
Group 2 0.48 8 0.49 0.47 9 0.49 0.48 17
LOSS-PEER 0.48 21 0.48 0.50 17 0.48 0.49 38
Group 1 0.49 10 0.51 0.51 9 0.50 0.50 19
Group 2 0.46 11 0.44 0.49 8 0.45 0.47 19
Table D.2: Average qP1 and qP2 by changes in probability equivalents
GAIN vs. GAIN-IND vs. GAIN-PEER vs.
Part 1 LOSS LOSS-IND LOSS-PEER
χ2-test
Aggregate 0.000 0.000 0.000
Group 1 0.000 – 0.003
Group 2 0.000 – 0.021
Fisher exact test
Aggregate 0.000 0.000 0.000
Group 1 0.000 – 0.008
Group 2 0.000 – 0.042
GAIN vs. GAIN-IND vs. GAIN-PEER vs.
Part 2 LOSS LOSS-IND LOSS-PEER
χ2-test
Aggregate 0.000 0.000 0.003
Group 1 0.009 – 0.008
Group 2 0.000 – 0.095
Fisher exact test
Aggregate 0.000 0.000 0.004
Group 1 0.017 – 0.019
Group 2 0.000 – 0.181
Notes: χ2-test and two-sided Fisher exact test to test for differences between the composition of ambiguity
averse, neutral and seeking subjects between GAIN and LOSS treatments.
Table D.3: P-values for differences in ambiguity attitudes in GAIN vs. LOSS
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IND vs. GAIN-IND vs. LOSS-IND vs.
Part 1 PEER GAIN-PEER LOSS-PEER
rank-sum test
Aggregate 0.748 0.137 0.435
Group 1 0.346 0.037 0.672
Group 2 0.513 1.000 0.472
χ2-test
Aggregate 0.947 0.351 0.473
Group 1 0.897 0.969 0.858
Group 2 0.978 0.244 0.101
Fisher exact test
Aggregate 1.000 0.514 0.625
Group 1 1.000 1.000 1.000
Group 2 1.000 0.438 0.182
IND vs. GAIN-IND vs. LOSS-IND vs.
Part 2 PEER GAIN-PEER LOSS-PEER
rank-sum test
Aggregate 0.979 0.476 0.403
Group 1 0.249 0.056 0.673
Group 2 0.160 0.194 0.531
χ2-test
Aggregate 0.935 0.351 0.377
Group 1 0.506 0.132 0.842
Group 2 0.622 0.007 0.083
Fisher exact test
Aggregate 1.000 0.514 0.478
Group 1 0.604 0.180 1.000
Group 2 0.641 0.018 0.128
Notes: Wilcoxon rank-sum test to test for differences in the distribution of q between IND and PEER
treatments; χ2-test and two-sided Fisher exact test to test for differences between the composition of
ambiguity averse and seeking subjects between IND and PEER treatments.
Table D.4: P-values for differences in ambiguity attitudes in IND vs. PEER
Treatment χ2-test Fisher exact test
All 0.089 0.126
GAIN 0.405 0.518
LOSS 0.029 0.049
IND 0.005 0.007
PEER 0.701 0.814
GAIN-IND 0.167 0.292
LOSS-IND 0.008 0.012
GAIN-PEER 0.810 1.000
Group 1 0.130 0.316
Group 2 0.402 0.620
LOSS-PEER 0.635 0.744
Group 1 0.809 1.000
Group 2 0.243 0.338
Notes: χ2-test and two-sided Fisher exact test to test for differences in the likelihood to change between
Part 1 and Part 2 between ambiguity averse and ambiguity seeking subjects.
Table D.5: P-values for differences in frequencies of change across ambiguity attitudes
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GAIN-IND LOSS-IND GAIN-PEER LOSS-PEER
Predictions model (1) 0.43 0.51 0.62 0.45
True values 0.43 0.51 0.61 0.45
AA AS AA AS AA AS AA AS
Predictions model (2) 0.42 0.55 0.31 0.61 0.60 0.70 0.30 0.54
Predictions model (3) 0.39 0.76 0.18 0.67 0.62 0.58 0.40 0.48
True values 0.39 0.75 0.18 0.67 0.59 0.69 0.40 0.48
less AA more AA same AA less AA more AA
Predictions model (4) 0.43 0.51 0.53 0.68 0.15 0.44 0.60
0.42 0.56 0.46 0.54
Predictions model (5) 0.43 0.51 0.53 0.68 0.15 0.43 0.60
0.41 0.59 0.32 0.60
Predictions model (6) 0.43 0.51 0.53 0.68 0.14 0.44 0.60
0.39 0.76 0.18 0.67
True values 0.43 0.51 0.53 0.68 0.14 0.44 0.60
0.39 0.75 0.18 0.67
Notes: Predicted values for the likelihood to change based on models (1)-(4) from Tables 4.4 and 4.5.
Table D.6: Model predictions for likelihood to change
Appendix E
Team Reasoning as a Guide to
Coordination
E.1 Instructions for ONE-L
Welcome to the experiment and thank you for your participation!
Please do not talk to other participants of the experiment from now on.
General information on the procedure
This experiment is conducted to investigate decision-making. You can earn money during the
experiment. It will be paid to you privately and in cash after the experiment. The entire
experiment lasts about 1 hour and consists of 3 parts. At the beginning of each part you
will receive detailed instructions. If you have questions after the instructions or during the
experiment please raise your hand. One of the experimenters will then answer your question in
private. During the experiment you will be asked to make decisions. You will partly interact
with other participants, i.e. your own decisions, as well as the decisions of other participants,
may determine your earnings. These results from the rules explained in the following. While you
make your decisions, you will see a clock running down in the right top corner of your screen.
This provides you with some orientation, how much time you should need for your decision. Of
course you can also exceed this time, if you need more time for your decision. Especially at the
beginning, this may often be the case. Only the information screens, in which no decisions are
to be made, will vanish after the time passed out.
Payment
In each part of the experiment your income is directly stated in Euro. Of part I and part II only
one of the parts will be paid out. Which of the two parts will be paid out will be determined
randomly and with equal probability by the computer at the end of the experiment (after part
III). Your total income is then the sum of your income in part III, and the drawn part (I or II).
For your punctual arrival you get 4 Euro in addition to the income you can receive during the
experiment. In the beginning of the experiment you will also receive an endowment of 10 Euro.
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Your total income is then given by the sum of your credit, the income of Part III, and the part
(I or II) which was selected for payment.
Anonymity
We evaluate all the data of the experiment only in aggregate form and never connect personal
information to the data of the experiment. At the end of the experiment you have to sign a
receipt for the payment. This only serves for our internal accounting.
Devices
At your place you will find a pen. Please leave it on the table after the experiment.
Part I
Task
At the beginning of Part I, all participants are divided into teams of two people, which we denote
by person A and person B. The allocation is randomly determined by the computer. It will be
displayed on the screen if you are person A or person B. You remain member of the same team
throughout Part I and Part II. You will not get to know the identity of your team partner at
any time of the experiment. Part I consists of five identical rounds. In each round, exactly
one decision is to be made. Your decision together with the decision of your team partner will
influence your payout as well as your partner’s payout. Task In each round, you can choose
between option red and option blue. Also, your team partner chooses between option red and
blue and you both make your decision at the same time. The income for you and your team
partner is as follows:
Decision of Person B
Red Blue
Decision of Person A
Red
Person A receives e 5 Person A receives e 0
Person B receives e 5 Person B receives e 0
Blue
Person A receives e 0 Person A receives e 4
Person B receives e 0 Person B receives e 4
For example: Person A selects red: then you and your team partner both receive 5 Euro if
person B opts for red as well. If person B decides for blue in this case, you both get 0 Euro. If
Person A selects blue, then get you and your team partner both get 0 Euro if person B chooses
red; you both receive 4 Euro if person B chooses blue as well.
After both team partners have made their decision in the specific round, you will learn which
option your team partner has chosen, and how high your income is in this round, if this round
would be selected for payout. Then the next round begins. Once round 5 is completed, Part I
ends and the instructions for Part II will be handed out.
If Part I is drawn as the payout relevant part at the end of the experiment (i.e. after the end
of Part III), the computer again randomly selects for each team one of the 5 rounds with equal
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probability (1/5 = 0.2 = 20%). The amount you have achieved in this selected round, will then
be paid out to you in cash. You know at the end of the experiment, whether Part I is payout
relevant and if so, what round was selected for you and your team partner. Please note: Since
you do not know which round is selected, you should devote the same attention to your decisions
in each round.
Part II
In Part II, you are again matched with the same team partner from Part I to form a two-person
team. As in Part I you are still person A or person B, and this will again be displayed to you on
the screen. Part II consists of one round, that is, you make only one decision which determines,
together with the decision of your team partner, your own income and the income of your team
partner from this part.
Task
Person A and Person B again decide between option red and option blue and both take their
decision simultaneously.
If you are person A, you will have to roll a virtual dice (by the help of the computer) before
each person takes his decision. All persons A roll independently of all other persons A in the
experiment. The dice’s result, can affect the choice options of person A looks as follows. For
each person A it holds:
• If Person A rolls a 6, then the decision of that person A is set to blue.
• If Person A rolls a number other than 6 (1, 2, 3, 4, or 5), then the decision of person A is
not affected.
The probability that the decision of person A is set to blue, is hence 1/6th. Note that the dice
roll only influences the choice of person A and not the decision of person B. Additionally Person
B does not learn at any point in time what person A of his team has thrown. So you do not
know if person A can freely choose or if he/she is set to blue.
You will make your decision after every person A has rolled the dice and is informed about its
outcome. Your and your team partner’s income is (as in Part I) as follows:
Decision of Person B
Red Blue
Decision of Person A
Red
Person A receives e 5 Person A receives e 0
Person B receives e 5 Person B receives e 0
Blue
Person A receives e 0 Person A receives e 4
Person B receives e 0 Person B receives e 4
For example: If both people ultimately opted red (or blue), then both receive 5 Euro (or 4 Euro).
If one person has red and his team partner has blue (or vice versa), both receive 0 Euro.
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After all participants have made their decisions, you are informed about your income from this
part of the experiment – in case this part will be drawn at the end as payout relevant. After
that ends Part II.
Part III
In this part you will only take individual decisions. Hence, your own decisions do not affect the
income of other participants and your income is completely independent of the decisions of other
participants.
Task
In this part, 16 decision problems are presented to you on the screen. In each of these problems,
you can choose between a lottery A and a safe amount of money, which we denote by lottery B. A
lottery will remain basically unchanged, only the safe amount of money from lottery B increases
with each additional decision problem. Since this safe amount of money is continually increasing,
you should as soon as you have decided once for lottery B, do this for all of the following decision
problems. An example for such a decision problem is presented in the following table:
Your decisions are only valid if you have made a selection for all of the problems and then clicked
on the OK button at the bottom of the screen. Take enough time for your decisions because
each can determine your payoff from this part.
After you have taken all the decisions, your earnings from Part III is determined as follows:
The computer randomly selects with equal probability one of the 16 decision problems for each
participant. If you would have selected lottery A in this case, the computer will simulate it and
you receive the appropriate result. If you have opted for the safe amount of money from lottery
B, you get this.
For example: Assume that the computer randomly selects the above decision problem, and you
preferred lottery A. Then you either receive 5 Euro (with probability 5/6) or 0 Euro (with
probability 1/6) as your payment for this part of the experiment. If you have opted for lottery
B, you obtain 3 Euro with certainty.
After Part III, the experiment ends. We then ask you to complete a few questions about yourself
honestly and completely. Once all participants have finished answering these questions, we will
call you out one by one in random order based on your subscriber. Your earnings will be paid
out privately and in cash.
After the completion of Part III the computer will randomly choose whether Part I or Part II is
relevant for your payment. Both parts will be selected with the same probability.
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E.2 Supplementary tables
Player B Player A Player A & B
Treatment Risk seeking Risk averse Risk seeking Risk averse Risk seeking Risk averse
ONE-H 0.00 % 37.50 % 50.00 % 55.56 % 33.33 % 44.00 %
N 2 16 4 9 6 25
# red choices 0 6 2 5 2 11
ONE-L 50.00 % 86.67 % 100.00 % 75.00 % 80.00 % 81.48 %
N 2 15 3 12 5 27
# red choices 1 13 3 9 4 22
TWO-L 100.00 % 62.50 % . 66.67 % 100.00 % 64.71 %
N 1 8 0 9 1 17
# red choices 1 5 0 6 1 11
Notes: Enforced decisions are excluded. A subject is classified as risk averse if his certainty equivalent is
smaller than the expected value of respective lottery used in the choice list of Part 3 of the experiment.
Table E.1: Frequency of red choices by treatment, role and risk attitude
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